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Introduction
People do not always behave as economists expect them to do. Not so long ago,
my girlfriend, who holds a Ph.D. in economics, had to decide which health club
to go to. One of these clubs had a higher membership fee than the other, but also
provided more facilities. In the end she made the decision to go for the expensive
one. Surprisingly, it was not the high price-quality ratio that ultimately mattered
most, but, she reasoned, the fact that if she paid a high contribution, she would
f e e lc o m m i t t e dt oa c t u a l l yg o .
1.1 Rational economic man
Economics students are taught early in their study about the rational economic
man1. The economic man at least knows his preference ordering (which satisﬁes
transitivity and completeness), and given this ordering plus some constraints he
attempts to attain his most desired bundle of goods. Moreover, economic man
is incredibly good at solving optimization programs to calculate the best, say,
consumption to savings ratio. In other words, he is usually depicted as selﬁsh as
well as smart.
1Rationality is a delicate concept. For current purposes, I need not deﬁne it in a precise way. Hereafter I
drop the term and just speak of economic man and the economic paradigm (see section 1.3.1).Chapter 1. Introduction 2
Being smart means, among other things, that decisions are based on weighing
marginal beneﬁts against marginal costs (a consequence of maximizing utility).
This means that the optimal frequency of visiting a health club is independent
on membership fees, since such fees are ﬁxed costs and do not inﬂuence marginal
costs. If people fail to disregard sunk costs (or do not feel that they should be
treated as such), then there is something wrong with modeling those people as
economic men. If even economists cannot be modeled as economic men, there is
something seriously wrong. In this thesis, individuals are taken to be less selﬁsh
and smart.
1.2 Defending rational economic man
The economic man is quite often practical for reasons of tractability. Clearly,
however, it is not a very accurate description of most people in real life. Friedman
and Savage [1948] have nevertheless defended the use of economic man on the
grounds that it does not matter so much whether the assumptions underlying the
model are truly accurate, as long as the predictions are (see also Thaler [1980]).
Economic man need not literally and consciously make the necessary calculations.
In a well known passage, they compare the assumptions behind the economic man
who calculates, say, the optimal lifetime savings plan, to a billiard player who has
to predict all the movements of the balls and therefore essentially needs to solve
a system of equations. They reason:
”... it seems not at all unreasonable that excellent predictions would
be yielded by the hypothesis that the billiard player made his shots as
if he knew the formulas. (...) It would in no way disprove or contradict
the hypothesis, or weaken our conﬁdence in it, if it should turn out
that the billiard player had never studied any branch of mathematics
and was utterly incapable of making the necessary calculations...”
(Friedman and Savage [1948, 298], italics in original).
Of course, modeling a billiard player as if he solves a system of equations yields
more accurate predictions when one considers excellent players than for a notori-
ous beginner. Thus, the model would arguably be more fruitful to describe games
at championships than at the average elderly home.3 Economics and psychology
A similar argument goes through for using the standard assumptions behind
economic man. Modeling an agent as if he can solve an optimization program is
likely to yield better predictions for some agents than for others. One is in particu-
lar tempted to think that agents who are actively engaged in market transactions
can reasonably be modeled this way. The market would punish those agents who
do not behave as if they solved the optimization programs properly. These agents
would realize losses, a situation that cannot be sustained for a very long time.
Or at least they would on average make less proﬁts and be competed away. Ac-
cording to similar logic, the market would leave no room for other than purely
self-interested agents. Setting a price that is perceived as fair but is not compet-
itive, induces losses as well, leaving the opportunistic agents in the market.
We would thus be left with the (as if) maximizing and selﬁsh agents as market
participants. Since economics is in particular oriented towards studying markets,
the ”as if” assumption seems innocent in this ﬁeld. In fact though, neither one of
the above claims is necessarily true. Both non-maximizing and boundedly selﬁsh
players can survive market forces. Arbitrage opportunities are limited, apparently
even in the realm of ﬁnancial markets (Mullainathan and Thaler [2000]). Learning
by agents may over time lead to the competitive equilibrium, but learning itself
is often a costly and slow process.
All in all, the defense of modeling agents as if they are maximizing selﬁsh
agents seems unwarranted on many occasions. Moreover, to the extent that the
market will surpress non-maximizing or unselﬁsh agents, it is still interesting to
study what kind of heuristics (like simple rules) agents would use otherwise, or
with what kind of sentiments they are equipped. Only then is it possible to judge
market eﬃciency in comparison to other institutions that bolster these sentiments
more than the market does (Rabin [2002]).
1.3 Economics and psychology
Assuming less intelligent and selﬁsh agents than usual is not always straight-
forward or even useful. Sometimes the agents make mistakes but is it not well
understood how they reason or why they reason other than is assumed. At other
times, the mistakes are just too small to consider. It also happens that agents
make mistakes but over time converge to the predicted equilibrium. To illustrate:
in an experiment by Nagel [1995], individuals had to state a number in the in-Chapter 1. Introduction 4
terval [0, 100]. The one closest to two thirds of the average received a price. It is
easy to see that in equilibrium all individuals choose 0. In the experiment, this
was not the case. In the ﬁrst round, the mean and median were around 33. The
mean number did converge to the equilibrium thereafter.
Many times, however, agents make ’mistakes’ which are predictable, important,
and for which there are good explanations. In those cases, it makes sense to model
agents as psychological man instead of economic man.
In this dissertation the consequences of various psychological sentiments are
scrutinized. In order to place the chapters in a broader framework, it is useful
to consider the categorization by Rabin [1998] and Tirole [2002]. They survey
the literature that departures from the economic paradigm. I brieﬂy discuss this
categorization and some of the interesting contributions in the literature so far.2
1.3.1 The economic paradigm
Tirole [2002, 634] summarizes the economic paradigm as follows. The individual
is thought of as ”maximizing at each instant t over some action set At the ex-
pectation of the present discounted ﬂow utility of consumption uτ(cτ) given the












Disentangling the maximization program, the following elements can be distin-
guished: the utility function, beliefs, discounting, and optimization. For each of
these elements, violations of the usual assumptions are identiﬁed. In the remain-
der of the section some of the many contributions are highlighted. Some of them
a r ee l a b o r a t e du p o nm o r ei nl a t e rc h a p t e r s .
1.3.2 Preferences
The starting point of most economic analysis is a concave utility function that
is only a function of individual i’s own bundle of consumption goods: ui = u(ci)
with u0(ci),u 00(ci) > 0. There are many indications that this functional form does
not capture many subtleties that enter the agent’s decision. Both the functional
2The most extensive survey is that by Rabin [1998]. The survey by Tirole [2002] includes some of the most
recent contributions to the ﬁeld.5 Economics and psychology
form of how much utility is derived from consumption as well as the idea that
only own consumption matters do not reﬂect the true complexity of real behavior.
u00(ci) S 0
To begin with, consider individuals’ choices isolated from interaction with other
agents. The existing evidence from experiments suggests that the utility function
contains a reference point at the status quo. For gains, the utility function is
indeed concave as is usually assumed, implying risk aversion. For losses, however,
the utility function turns convex, implying risk seeking behavior (see Tversky
and Kahneman [1992]). Individuals are loss averse in the sense that a small loss
compared to the status quo is not outweighed by an equal gain. These properties
together, and some more, are elements of what Kahneman and Tversky [1979]
dubbed prospect theory, now one of the most well known theories.
ui = u(ci,c j,·)
It is often suggested that people derive not only pleasure from own consumption,
but also from the happiness of their friends and relatives, from the fact that
other people behave nicely towards them, from possessing more wealth than their
neighbours, etc. In short, they have social preferences: they care about the payoﬀs
of others (Charness and Rabin [2002]).
Consider for example the following series of experiments. In the dictator game,
one person has the power to distribute a sum of money over another person and
himself. He can do so in any way he wishes. Often, the other person is anonymous.
The observation that the player who divides the money (the proposer) usually
does not keep all the money to himself points to a notion of fairness. Apparently,
agents derive pleasure from being fair and it is not regarded as a fair distribution
to keep all the money.
In an extended version of the game, the ultimatum game, the proposal of the
player is not immediately implemented. The second player (the responder) gets a
chance to either accept or reject the proposal. If he rejects, nobody gets anything.
If he accepts, the sum is divided as proposed. After a rejection there is no second
opportunity to make a proposal (at least not with this combination of players).
It can be expected that the responder will not always accept positive but smallChapter 1. Introduction 6
enough oﬀers. Since he may dislike unequal distributions, he may decline oﬀers
where he gets too little and the other too much in his view. This is indeed found.
Interestingly, however, we can learn more from this game. As it turns out, it is
not only the (inequality of the) distribution that the players care about, but also
the intentions of players, something conjectured by Rabin [1993] in a theoretical
paper. To see the relevance, consider the following special case of the ultimatum
game taken from Falk et al. [1999]. In this game, the proposer can only choose
between two possible oﬀers. Either he chooses the oﬀer (8,2) (keeping 8 for himself
and leaving 2 for the responder) or the oﬀer (x,y),w h e r ex and y are varied among
diﬀerent treatments. In the ﬁrst variant (x,y) is set to (8,2). This means that
the proposer has no other choice than to propose (8,2). It turns out that this
oﬀer is rejected in about 20 percent of the cases. In a second variant, (x,y) is set
to (5,5) giving the proposer the opportunity to split the sum of money exactly
in two. From the proposers who oﬀered (8,2) in this treatment, no less than 45
percent is rejected. This, despite the fact that given the proposal, the distribution
is identical in both treatments. The natural interpretation is that in the latter
case, responders were angry because the proposer did have the option of an equal
split, but he decided to go for the unequal distribution anyway.
Collecting data from experiments, a preference for an equal distribution and
reciprocal behaviour (that is, rewarding nice behaviour and punish stingy players)
now seems a robust ﬁnding (Fehr and Schmidt [1999], Bolton and Ockenfels [2000],
Charness and Rabin [2002]). It is nonetheless also an established phenomenon that
agents try to distinguish themselves from others rather than trying to become
equal. Worries about status is one of the most recurring patterns in all cultures
(see Wright [1994], Van Kempen [2003], and chapter 3). Inequality aversion and
status seeking behaviour need not be mutually exclusive if status is rewarded
for making the distribution more equal. Often, however, they are. To my best
knowledge, conditions for when status seeking behaviour prevails over inequality
aversion are unknown, but would be interesting for future research.
Finally, a recurring theme in the recent literature is that people are intrinsically
motivated (Deci and Ryan [1985]). Intrinsic motivation refers to an inner state
of satisfaction from being involved in an activity. The activity itself is reward-
ing. This contrasts with the idea that people only work for monetary (extrinsic)
rewards or in a controlling environment. This partly explains why people supply
voluntary labour or work harder and longer hours than is expected from them.7 Economics and psychology
This concept is ﬁrmly established in psychology, but has not received much at-
tention from economists (Frey [1997b]).
Stability of preferences
A ﬁnal note on the utility function concerns the stability of preferences. A sizeable
body of research shows a picture of a remarkably labile nature of preferences (see
Slovic [1991]). Illustrative of this are the following well-known examples.
First, there are endowment eﬀects: once goods are part of one’s endowment, the
valuation immediately increases sharply. This eﬀect is present even if the subjects
are made familiar with the object on beforehand, thereby excluding learning
arguments as an explanation (Loewenstein and Adler [1995], Thaler [1980]). In
the experiment by Loewenstein and Adler [1995] for instance, subjects indicated
their preference for a mug, and based on this the predicted mean selling price was
$3.73. A few minutes later, when the participants were actually given mugs, the
mean selling price increased to $4.89.
Secondly, framing eﬀects take place: the choice of agents is sensitive to the way
that a choice problem is formulated. For example, the valuation of a gamble is
sensitive to whether the outcomes are framed as gains or losses relative to the
status quo (Tversky and Kahneman [1992]).
Third, individuals adjust to the state they are in. Such treadmill eﬀects are
discussed for instance by Kahneman [2000, 686]:
”Anyone who has bathed in a cool pool, or in a warm sea, will recog-
nise the basic phenomenon. As one adapts, the experience of the tem-
perature of the water gradually drifts towards ”neither hot nor cold,”
and the experience of other temperatures changes accordingly. A tem-
perature that would be called warm in one context may feel cool in
another.”
Another instability is caused by the simple fact that individuals have diﬃculties
in remembering how they felt about something. Retrospective evaluations of past
utilities are known not always to be reliable (Kahneman [1994]). This is one reason
why individuals have imperfect self-knowledge (see Baumeister [1998]). We tend
to forget how diﬃcult it actually was to give up an addiction and therefore tryChapter 1. Introduction 8
to do so over and over again3. Right after the struggle of the attempt to quit
smoking, a person may decide never to try again. Yet after a while he tends to
forget and tries to give up his habit again.
1.3.3 Beliefs
I now turn to the second element of the economic paradigm: beliefs. The ex-
pected utility functional is the standard framework for decision making under
uncertainty. Agents are assumed to maximize the sum of utilities of outcomes
linearly weighted by the corresponding probabilities that these outcomes occur.




where outcome xi is received with probability pi for i =1 ,...,n, a n dw i t hau t i l i t y
function u(x) over outcomes (see e.g. Varian [1992]).
I already pointed out that the utility function itself does not satisfy the usual
assumptions of global concavity (see Kahneman and Tversky [1979]). But even
if it would, Rabin [2000] shows that within the framework, risk aversion cannot
be sensibly explained. He makes this clear by the following observation. Suppose
an individual turns down a bet that gives him a 50 percent chance of winning
$110, and another 50 percent of losing $100. Then, if he is an expected utility
maximizer, this same individual should also turn down a bet which gives him a
loss of $1,000 with a 50 percent chance, no matter what the possible gain would
be. That even a bet with a 50 percent chance of winning, say, $10 billion and a
50 percent chance of losing $1,000 is turned down by anyone can be said to be
counterintuitive, except perhaps for the credit constrained people.
The Allais paradox is an early contribution showing the limitations of the
expected utility theorem. The paradox lies in the choices of subjects between two
sets of lotteries. Denote by X =( p1,x 1;p2,x 2;...;pn,x n) a lottery X which gives
ap r i z ex1 with probability p1, ap r i z ex2 with probability p2, etc. Consider ﬁrst
the following two lotteries, taken from Kahneman and Tversky [1979]:
3Likewise, people are not perfectly able to predict their feelings. “Most people are very suprised to learn
that paraplegics are not always miserable and that lottery winners are not particularly happy” (Kahneman et
al. [1997, 396]).9 Economics and psychology
A =( 0 .33,2500;0.66,2400;0.01,0),
B =( 1 ,2400).
Thus, lottery B is degenerate and gives a prize of 2400 with certainty. Out of
these two lotteries, 82 percent prefers lottery B. Consider next the following set
of lotteries:
C =( 0 .33,2500;0.67,0),
D =( 0 .34,2400;0.66;0).
Out of these two lotteries, 83 percent prefers lottery C. These choices are, however,
inconsistent with each other. This is, then, the paradox. To see this, note that
preferring B to A implies (normalizing without loss of generality u(0) = 0):
0.33u(2500) + 0.66u(2400) <u (2400), (1.3)
or equivalently:
0.33u(2500) < 0.34u(2400). (1.4)
However, preferring lottery C to D implies the opposite of equation (1.4):
0.33u(2500) > 0.34u(2400). (1.5)
To gain in descriptive power, the expected utility model needs to be reﬁned.
Optimism: π 6= p
Non-expected utility models have reﬁned the expected utility model in the utility
domain but also in the domain of beliefs (see Starmer [1998] for a survey). For
example, rank-dependent utility models assume that probabilities, p, are trans-
formed by a weighting function, π(p). The intuition behind the weighting function
is that individuals do not only pay attention to the speciﬁc probability that a par-
ticular outcome occurs, but also to the probability of an outcome in comparison
to other outcomes (Diecidue and Wakker [2001]). An individual will for exam-
ple take into account the probability of getting a certain outcome or something
better.
Calibrating the weighting function it is found that individuals tend to overweigh
both high and low probabilities. This can explain phenomena such as optimism
and pessimism. It also explains why people are at the same time risk-seeking and
risk-averse, in other words, why they participate in lotteries and insure themselvesChapter 1. Introduction 10
against unforeseen events (see Diecidue and Wakker [2001]). This is predicted by
the theory because the small probability of ending up with the jackpot of the lot-
tery and the small probability that their house burns down are both overweighted.
Overconﬁdence
Besides being optimistic, individuals are also often overconﬁdent: 90 percent of
adults rate themselves as better than average drivers4,a n d2 5p e r c e n to fh i g h
school seminars rate themselves in the top 1 percent on the ability of getting
along with others (see Baumeister [1998]).
Part of the overconﬁdence is the result of ignorance of relevant information.
This happens even if the costs of obtaining information is insigniﬁcant. Blackwell’s
theorem, on the other hand, says essentially that individuals should never ignore
freely available information. The idea is that actions are based on information.
More information enables agents to design better strategies (Grant et al. [1998]).
The ﬁrst thing to note is that Blackwell’s theorem holds for expected utility
maximizers. However, I have already argued that expected utility theory does
not give an accurate description of behaviour. If, on the other hand, someone is
not an expected utility maximizer, he should sometimes prefer less information
(Grant et al. [2000], Wakker [1988]).
There are intuitive reasons why individuals may prefer to have less information.
First, individuals may have an intrinsic value of ignorance due to psychological
sentiments such as anxiety, hope, or fear (Grant et al. [1998], Ahlbrecht and Weber
[1997]). Not all people would like the idea to know it when they are terminally
ill. Secondly, individuals may attempt to self-commit. This is very much linked to
dynamic inconsistency (i.e. overweighing the present), something I turn to now. I
come back to the relation between overconﬁdence and self-commitment in section
1.4.
1.3.4 Discounting
The third element in (1.1) concerns discounting. Suppose you get the choice
between $50 now or $100 in 2 years. Which one do you prefer? A majority of the
adults from a sample report that they prefer to have $50 now. Now consider the
4Although this can be in line with the true distribution, the distribution would have to be very skewed.
The second example (ability of getting along with others) is not compatible with any distribution.11 Economics and psychology
choice between $50 in 4 years or $100 in 6 years. Almost no adult prefers the $50
in 4 years. Are these choices consistent with the assumption that agents discount
the future exponentially?
Exponential discount factors are most frequently used in economics. Thus, as
in equation (1.1), in period t, the ﬂow utility at time τ is discounted by the factor
δ
τ−t. This has the following prediction: suppose an individual has the choice
between consumption level c to be received n periods from now, and c0 to be
received n + ∆ periods from now. Then, if he prefers c to c0 = c + x for a given
n, then he should prefer c to c0 for any n. Since c gives present value utility
δ
nu(c) and c0 gives present value utility δ
n+∆u(c0), he chooses c if and only if
δ
nu(c) ≥ δ
n+∆u(c0) or, equivalently, u(c) ≥ δ
∆u(c0). Hence, what matters is the
time lag between dates, but not how far in the future they are. If individuals make
their choices in a way that satisﬁes this property, they are said to be dynamically
consistent.
This is not how people (or some animals) choose (Ainslie [1991]). In the above
experiment the time lag between receiving $50 or $100 is 2 years in both cases.
Thus, if people prefer $100 in 6 years to $50 in 4 years, their behaviour can only
be consistent with exponential discounting if they also prefer $100 in 2 years to
$50 immediately. But the experimental data shows otherwise.
The choices of above are inconsistent with exponential discounting. The choices
of the individuals can be described by a slightly more complicated discount func-






with β ≤ 1. Hence, the future is discounted by an additional term β relative to
the present. This distorts choices that involve the present and leads to interesting
predictions. For β =1the hyperbolic function reduces to the exponential case.
For β<1 discounting is present-biased.
To illustrate how this functional form describes choices: preferring $50 now to
$100 in 2 years implies:
u(50) >β δ
2u(100). (1.7)
Preferring $100 in 6 years to $50 in 4 years implies:
u(50) <δ
2u(100). (1.8)Chapter 1. Introduction 12
In the second inequality, β cancels out because both dates are in the future.
The term β does not cancel out in the ﬁrst inequality because one of the pos-
sibilities is paid out immediately. Obviously, equations (1.7) and (1.8) can hold
simultaneously for a small enough value of β.
Consider now an individual who needs to save so that in ﬁve years he can buy
the overly expensive car he wants so desperately. He is predetermined to set part of
his monthly paycheck away on another account. Sadly enough, he is a hyperbolic
discounter. Every month when his paycheck is added on his regular account,
he has to make the trade-oﬀ of between saving the required bit or consume it
rightaway. Overweighing the present, he is too tempted to consume. After ﬁve
years, the savings account is still empty.
This individual would be much beneﬁt t e db yh a v i n gt oh i sd i s p o s a lac o m m i t -
ment device to save. Fortunately, there are opportunities for him. Illiquid assets
provide a form of commitment (Laibson [1997]). Investments in illiquid assets
that are subject to a penalty for early withdrawal turn the cost-beneﬁt ratio in
favour of saving. Of course, plenty other forms of commitment can be explained
within the same framework, such as self-imposed deadlines, ﬁxing appointments
well in advance to prevent endless postponements, putting the cookies box on the
highest shelf, and moving the (very annoying) alarm clock far away from the bed.
Heroic ﬁgures would even tie themselves to the mast in order to self-commit.
1.3.5 Maximization
The last element in program (1.1) is that agents maximize their utility (given
constraints and information etc.). Do agents really maximize? Some studies show
that they do not.
The existence of such non-maximizing agents is nicely illustrated in a study
by Camerer et al. [1997] of the taxi cab drivers of New York City. Rather than
maximizing revenues per hour by working longer hours on a rainy day with many
clients, and shorter hours on less proﬁtable days, they tend to stop working after
reaching a certain target level of earnings. This behaviour is opposite to that
predicted by maximization.
Target earnings and other aspiration levels are found in many other studies
as well (see Diecidue and Van de Ven [2003] for a survey). Managers often do
not choose a project that maximizes expected proﬁts but they rather aim at
reaching a target level (see Payne et al. [1980], [1981]). Similarly, portfolios are13 Applications
often constructed on the basis of the likelihood that a certain target return will
be met. Some farmers are known to grow safe crops until their subsistence level
is guaranteed, and to grow more risky crops beyond that level (see Lopes [1984]).
In an experimental study by Loomes [1998], it is also shown that individuals
do not maximize payoﬀs. Individuals had to divide 20 green and 20 white balls
over two bags: A and B. Every bag should contain twenty balls but the individual
could freely decide on the shares of green and white balls in each bag. Now, the
individuals knows that a lottery will take place that selects bag A with probability
0.65 and B with remaining probability 0.35. From this bag, a ball will be randomly
taken and if the ball is green a sum of £20 will be paid to the decision maker.
If a white ball is picked, the decision maker earns nothing. Virtually all models
of decision making predict that the decision maker puts all green balls in bag A,
thereby maximizing the probability of payoﬀ (i.e. 0.65)(see Loomes [1998]). As it
turned out, most people choose to put 13 green balls in bag A and 7 in bag B .
This matches the probability ratio that each bag will be chosen. Apparently, the
individuals used simple heuristic rules (divide the green balls in proportion to the
probability that the bag will be chosen) instead of maximization behaviour, even
though this reduces the probability of gaining £20 with more than ten percent
(from 65 percent to 54.5 percent).
1.4 Applications
Most of the foregoing results were descriptive violations of standard economic
assumptions. However, one would also like to know why we ﬁnd these violations.
For example, why are individuals overconﬁdent, fair to others, work less with a
higher bonus, or do they ignore information? Exciting insights in these aspects
result from combining some of the above elements.
One of the most powerful results in the recent literature is the assumption
of imperfect self-knowledge. Bénabou and Tirole have used this assumption in
several domains. In this section I highlight some of their ideas.
Carrillo and Mariotti [2000] and Bénabou and Tirole [2002b] explain ignorance
of information by dynamic inconsistency and imperfect self-knowledge. Consider
an agent who has to decide the next period (period 2) whether to undertake a task
or not. Undertaking the task is costly. The beneﬁts of undertaking are received in
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imperfect self-knowledge and does not know exactly what his ability with respect
to this task is. The individual can, however, learn about his ability in period 1 at
n oc o s t s .A l lt h ei n f o r m a t i o nh ec o l l e c t si np e r i o d1i sk n o w ni nt h ef u t u r e ,b u th e
can only acquire the information in period 1 (for example by doing a related test
in this period). Finally, the individual is dynamically inconsistent: his discounting
function is hyperbolic (see (1.6)).
Suppose in period 1 the agent expects a net gain of undertaking the task and
hence that he is willing to undertake it. Normally, he could gain by acquiring
information. It may turn out that he comes to know that he is of low ability in
which case he better refrains from undertaking the task. However, he can also lose
from more information. Consider behaviour in period 2. In this period, the agent
has to decide to undertake or not, at some costs. But with hyperbolic discounting,
he puts extra weight on the current period. He inﬂates the importance of the
costs and may no longer be willing to undertake the activity. There is therefore
a potential dilemma: in period 1 the agents aims at undertaking, but in period 2
he may reconsider. This creates a ’time-inconsistency region’.
Will he acquire information in period 1? Not if there is a high probability that
the information reveals that he is in the ’time-inconsistency region’ where he
prefers to undertake from the current viewpoint but will reconsider in the next
period. On the other hand, he will not ignore information if the probability is high
that he is of low ability. In that case ignoring information is too costly because
he would undertake the task even though he should not.
Dynamic inconsistency combined with imperfect self-knowledge creates oppor-
tunities for ignorance of information for strategic reasons. Ignoring information
keeps self-conﬁdence high, and high-self-conﬁdence makes persistence more likely.
It also explains phenomena like self-handicapping such as drinking before an
exam. Drinking alcoholic beverages has the same function as ignoring informa-
tion. It makes the outcome of the test unreliable and it therefore reveals less
information. Finally, it learns us something about why individuals tend to mem-
orize achievements in a selective way: successes tend to be recalled whilst fail-
ures tend to forgotten. Similarly, successes tend to be attributed to one’s self
whereas failures are likely to be attributed to others (Baumeister [1998]). These
self-serving biases in memory can help keeping self-conﬁdence high, and minimize
the temptation to give up along the way.15 Applications
In another context, Bénabou and Tirole [2001] combine dynamic inconsistency
and imperfect self-knowledge to explain compulsive behaviour. Suppose you have
incomplete knowledge about your ability to cooperate, in the sense that you
do not know how present-biased your discounting is (you are uncertain about
β in (1.6), a measure of willpower). Sometimes you are involved in short term
relationships, for example in a restaurant where the waiter serves you well in the
expectation of a good tip. At other times you end up in long term relationships. In
relationships that are likely to be short-term of nature, there is a big temptation
to break up the relationship. You are better oﬀ leaving the restaurant, that you
will probably never visit again, without leaving a tip. Long term relationships
always pay oﬀ if you sustain them long enough. If you have no strong bias to the
present (high β), you will succeed in sustaining the relationship. With a discount
rate strongly biased to the present (low β), you are tempted to give up the long
term relationship making you overall worse oﬀ.
In long term relationships you are not exactly sure about your ability to co-
operate. If you knew you had a discount rate strongly biased to the present, you
also knew that a potential long term relationship will not last. There would be
no reason to get involved in a long term relationship. If, on the other hand, you
k n e wt h a ty o ud on o th a v eas t r o n gt e n d e n c yt oo v e r w e i g ht h ep r e s e n t ,y o uw o u l d
be able to sustain long term relationships with a high payoﬀ.
A forward looking agent may reason as follows. If I manage to cooperate even in
short term relationships, I will recall later that I must have no strong bias to the
present. So I also must be able to sustain a long term relationship. Even though
this person has no direct beneﬁts from cooperating in short term relationships,
he shows this compulsive behaviour to avoid that he will later be afraid to get
involved in long term relationships. This may explain tipping behaviour.
As a last application I discuss crowding-out of intrinsic motivation. As ex-
plained earlier (section 1.3.2), many people are intrinsically motivated to under-
take an activity. That is, monetary rewards are not always necessary to induce
people to work. It may still be the case that people are not enough intrinsically
motivated. Economists generally solve this problem by implementing an incentive
system based on monetary rewards, to increase motivation. Surprisingly, many
experiments from psychology show that these extrinsic rewards often undermine
motivation. This result extends to the workplace. It is therefore suggested that
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example, rewards imply competition between workers which discourages some of
them (see in particular Kohn [1993] for a survey, and Frey [1997b] for an early
treatment in economics).
Intrinsic motivation combined with, again, the imperfect self-knowledge frame-
work can also shed light on crowding out of motivation (Bénabou and Tirole
[2002a]). The elementary idea is as follows. Suppose that in a principal agent re-
lationship, the agent has imperfect knowledge over his own ability to do a certain
task. The only thing the agents gets is a signal, which is correlated with his ability
to do this task, but only imperfectly. The principal wants him to do this task,
and is aware of the ability of the agent. If he knows the agent has low ability,
he reckons that this agent probably has low self-conﬁdence. Thus, in order to
motivate the agent, he has to give a high bonus. However, the agent realizes that
he gets such a high bonus because the principal knows he is of low ability. The
bonus is therefore also a (bad) signal about his ability. Consequently, the high
b o n u sl o w e r ss e l f - c o n ﬁdence even more.
In the equilibrium of the above game, a high bonus lowers self-conﬁdence. The
bonus motivates the agent to work in the short run. But once removed, the agent
ends up with a lower self-conﬁdence and will be less motivated to work than
before (see Bénabou and Tirole [2002a] and chapters 6 and 7 for details).
1.5 Discussion
”How strange and confusing are people’s conceptions! Sometimes, when
you think about it, you don’t know whether to laugh or cry. Today it
occurred to me that self-sacriﬁcing love is nothing more than an ex-
treme form of egoism.” Alexander Herzen, W h oi st ob l a m e ?
The examples given in section 1.3 show violations of the standard assumptions
in economics. A growing literature combines psychology and economics to formu-
late alternative assumptions that describe the data better. Here are some of my
(I am afraid unorganized) views on the ﬁeld of psychology and economics.
First and foremost, combining insights from psychology and economics clearly
leads to interesting results, as section 1.4 and a bunch of other contributions
to the literature make clear. Patterns of behaviour can be explained that could
otherwise not have as easily and realistically been explained by the standard
economic assumptions. Ignorance of information is a good example.17 Discussion
Second, it is worthwhile to note that in many cases most of economic methodol-
ogy is being maintained. Bénabou and Tirole [2001] for instance, drop the assump-
tions of exponential discounting and perfect self-knowledge, but retain the idea
of maximizing agents playing Bayesian equilibrium strategies. Likewise, altruism
can still be modeled using the individualistic approach of economic methodology.
Perhaps literally (as suggested by Herzen) but at least in the ”as if” sense.
However, some disclaimers are in place. Some of the examples to illustrate
violations may be constructed for this purpose or at least constructed to make the
violations most visible. It is not always made clear how sensitive the experimental
results are to variations in the payoﬀ structure. This makes it diﬃcult to generalize
the results.
Moreover, the economic man can still be useful in a (conditionally) normative
way. Even if it does not describe people how they actually behave, it is still a
valuable framework for analyzing how people should behave in order to achieve
certain ends. Thus, I tend to agree with Luce and Raiﬀa who relatedly discuss
the use of game theory:
”It is crucial that the social scientist recognise that game theory is
not descriptive, but rather conditionally normative. It states neither
how people do behave, nor how they should behave in an absolute
sense, but how they should behave if they wish to achieve certain
ends” (cited by Zwick et al. [1999, 7]).
The same can be said about the economic paradigm, which gives directions for
how to behave conditional on agreement with the underlying assumptions.
Furthermore, it is not always useful to make more realistic assumptions about
individual behaviour. In many cases, though certainly not all, making more real-
istic assumptions drastically increases the complexity of analysis and this is not
always outweighed by an increased accuracy of predictions. Sometimes, it does
not matter at all. Fehr and Schmidt [1999] have showed that even though agents
behave as inequality averse in some experiments, in other experiments choices
are exactly as predicted by standard economic assumptions (i.e. selﬁsh). Smith
[1962] showed experimentally that in a double auction market, prices converge to
the competitive equilibrium.
Of course, it is still interesting to know when sentiments like inequality aversion
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psychological sentiments should immediately be disregarded. What it does mean
is that, depending on the context, it is sometimes no sacriﬁce not to include
such sentiments in the model. A bit paradoxically, more work on psychological
sentiments is needed in order to know when including these sentiments is not
needed.
Relatedly, one has to bear in mind that, taken as an ”as if” approach, the eco-
nomic paradigm is still a rough approximation of reality. In this context, Roth
[1995] rightly remarks that ”To the extent that utility maximization is viewed
as a useful approximation of behaviour, it can’t be easily displaced by coun-
terexamples, since approximations always admit counterexamples” (Roth [1995,
78]). Roth continues by arguing that it is nevertheless still valuable to know the
conditions under which the approximations break down. Is the Allais paradox
(discussed in section 1.3.3) an anomaly and sensitive to the parametrization, or
can it be generalized? In this thesis, I have tried to focus on cases where such
breakdowns occur and where it seems to me that a rough approximation does not
suﬃce.
It is also worthwhile to note the following. It seems that many psychological
phenomena have two sides: an intrinsic value and a strategic role. Donations to
charity are made out of love, but also to gain approval. The balance between
those sides is a delicate matter. Assuming an intrinsic value for a sentiment of-
ten suggests that a shortcut approach is taken, and that the more fundamental
motivations are ignored. Or, as Güth [1995, 342] puts it:
”Very often this [explaining anomalies] is done by including additional
arguments of utilities (...) Doubtlessly a lot can be learned from such
attempts to explain experimental phenomena, especially when they
are based on well accepted motivational forces. Very often, this type
of research resembles, however, a neoclassical repairshop in the sense
that one ﬁrst observes behaviour for a certain environment and then
deﬁnes a suitable optimisation or game model which can account for
what has been observed.”
However, it is easy to tip the balance too much in favour of strategic reasons.
Something should not be too easily dismissed as an intrinsic value. Evolutionary
forces can result in intrinsic values such as fairness and other emotions (Frank19 Overview of the thesis
[1985]). Here, research from other disciplines, notably psychology and biology, is
in particular useful.
In this thesis, and more generally in the ﬁe l do fe c o n o m i c sa n dp s y c h o l o g y ,
there is a relatively intensive interaction with experiments both from economics
and psychology. The advantage of these experiments are that situations are well
controlled, and that they give much more insight in individual behaviour than
aggregated data. Because of its importance, it is necessary to be aware of the
shortcomings. Therefore, as a ﬁnal consideration, I would like to point out some
of the limitations of experimental economics.
First, experimental results are sometimes very sensitive to the framing and
wording, and hence one should be cautious in generalizing the results. Secondly,
it is by no means obvious that results can be directly translated into out-of-
laboratory situations. Being fair in the ultimatum game is not the same (and
certainly does not imply) that these people are also fair in ”comparable” real life
situations. Thirdly, subjects often have relatively little time to learn the game
and understand the consequences. Experiments quickly become too complicated
to be understood within the available time frame5. Time constraints pose a nat-
ural limit on the complexity of games. Of course, in real life there is also not al-
ways enough opportunity to learn, so this argument does not always hold. Fourth,
experiments often use a relatively small sample and are not often replicated (Ru-
binstein [2001]). The latter is due to the fact that replications are unlikely to
be published. Thus, although experiments have the advance of creating nicely
controlled situations, and provide us with microdata, their shortcomings should
be reminded. In this thesis, I have tried to borrow evidence from experiments
which results seem robust, and otherwise to mention where more replications and
investigations are welcome.
1.6 Overview of the thesis
1.6.1 Main themes
This thesis considers various psychological sentiments that are implemented in
economic models. The purpose of this is to enrich economic models to account for
5It is therefore no surprise that the results in experiments are sensitive to things as whether or not a payoﬀ
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behaviour that is observed in reality but is normally not predicted by standard
economic models. The two central themes of the thesis will be to explain why
people give and how people react to monetary incentives. The main departures
from (or perhaps better: extensions to) standard economic assumptions are the
inclusion of social preferences, imperfect self-knowledge, and rationalization of
behavior (rather than rational behavior).
Gift-giving
Gift-giving is of interest because at ﬁrst sight it seems inferior to eﬃcient market
trade but gift-giving is nevertheless still widely observed. In chapter 2, I present
a survey on possible motivations why people give. I argue that two properties
of gift-giving deserve special attention. First, a gift almost never stands on its
own but is almost always followed by a countergift. This is called reciprocity.
Second, gift-giving seems inadequate in the sense that it rarely maximizes the
receiver’s surplus, as a cash gift would, according to standard microeconomic
theory. Chapter 3 then focuses on one possible motivation behind gift-giving
that can explain the two phenomena of chapter 2, namely the demand for social
approval.
Chapter 4 puts the analysis in a more broad perspective by contrasting the
institution of gift-giving to that of the market. It is argued that the market need
not necessarily crowd out gift-giving even though it may be a more eﬃcient insti-
tution. Chapter 5 takes an even more positive view on gift-giving by arguing how,
when properly designed, the market mechanism may become more eﬃcient if it is
complemented by gift-giving. The focus in this chapter is on the welfare aspects of
labeling. It is argued that the same motivations as behind gift-giving may account
for the willingness of people to pay price premiums for socially desired goods, e.g
environmentally friendly goods. This partly solves the information problem.
Rewards
The second central theme is how consumers react to monetary incentives, where
a t t e n t i o ni sp a i dt oe ﬀects of rewards that are usually not taken into account.
Economists normally assume that more monetary incentives have a positive and
monotonic eﬀect on people’s behaviour: a reward (bonus, subsidy) for an action
motivates people to take that action. The reason is that the focus is normally on21 Overview of the thesis
the direct impact of rewards on eﬀorts. The direct eﬀect is due to a preference for
money, or more generally, consumption goods, by agents. Then if, for example,
a reward is conditioned on performance, an agent is more willing to make eﬀorts
to obtain the reward. However, there are also indirect eﬀects of rewards. For
example, rewards interact with other motivations (a desire for approval, say), or
it signals information (such as the perceived ability of the agent).
Including the indirect eﬀects of rewards on behaviour has interesting conse-
quences. For instance, there is evidence that the positive relationship between
monetary rewards and behaviour does not always hold as such. Under some cir-
cumstances, rewarding behaviour leads to decreased motivation (see e.g. Deci
and Ryan [1985], Kohn [1993]). By examining indirect eﬀects of rewards, better
understanding of the relation between rewards and motivation is gained.
Chapter 3 argues that if people care about social approval, it may well be that
subsidizing gift-giving may reduce gift-giving rather than enhance it. A more pos-
itive result is obtained in chapter 6. Here, it is explained why principals may give
ab o n u st h a ti sn o ts p e c i ﬁed in a contract. Normally, in a relationship with a
ﬁnite number of periods and no contract, there will be no bonus in equilibrium.
However, things change if it is assumed that the agent is not perfectly informed
about his ability. In equilibrium, a reward may signal high ability, which increases
self-conﬁdence and motivation. Finally, chapter 7 examines the eﬀects of subsi-
dies when people try to rationalize their behaviour, and it is found that higher
subsidies have a less profound long-run eﬀect than smaller subsidies.
1.6.2 Detailed overview
The chapters are roughly organized according to the two themes giving and re-
wards, although some of the chapters combine these two themes. Chapters 2 to 5
focus on gift-giving, and chapters 3, 6, and 7 focus on the eﬀects of rewards. Of
course, this distinction is a bit artiﬁcial, since in a loose sense rewards are also
gifts.
I now give a somewhat more detailed description of the chapters’ contents as
a reading guide. All chapters can be read independently.
Chapter 2 is a ﬁrst examination of why people give. Many motivations are
possible: altruism, exchange, fairness, signalling, and social approval. A more
detailed look at the properties of gifts reveal that not all motivations are equally
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The most elementary properties are reciprocity and inadequacy. Reciprocity
means that nice behaviour is rewarded by nice behaviour (positive reciprocity),
just as stingy behaviour is being punished (negative reciprocity). It is indeed
observed that gifts are not one-way transfers as is often thought. Most of the time,
gifts are reciprocated by return gifts. By inadequacy I mean that generally gifts
do not maximize the receiver’s utility. According to standard microeconomics
arguments, cash-gifts are preferred to gifts in kind by receivers, but in reality
cash-gifts are relatively rare.
All motivations are scrutinized keeping these elementary properties in mind.
Altruism is likely to play a role for gift-giving, but not in those instances where
gifts are inadequate. Gifts as exchange can only be sustained for a suﬃciently
long time horizon. Fairness explains charity to some extent. Fairness does not
easily explain all the experimental data. Social approval can explain some of this,
and also inadequacy and reciprocity (see chapter 3). Signalling explains gifts
for situations with information asymmetries. If a person is not sure about the
trustworthiness of other players, the other player can signal to him that he is
indeed trustworthy by making a gift. It is also possible that a gift signals to the
giver himself that he is trustworthy and that he will be able to sustain long-term
relationships.
The chapter ends with a discussion where I argue for a hybrid explanation. For
example, people give not so much because they are fair, but because they like to
appear as fair and receive approval for being fair. Furthermore, I argue that in
order to design eﬃcient institutions, it is important to know what the motivations
behind gift-giving are.
Chapter 3 examines social approval as a motivation to give in more detail. First
I show that many individuals care about social approval and status. Then I argue
that these two elements together explain the basic elements of gift-giving: reci-
procity and inadequacy. The reasoning is as follows. For a gift, social approval
is awarded. For the receiver, this means a loss in status. This gives incentives
to give back (reciprocity). The ﬁrst giver may want to prevent the receiver from
giving back to keep his status high, and therefore gives in kind, making it more
expensive for the receiver to return a gift. I also argue that part of charity can
be explained by a demand for social approval. This explains why many individ-
uals donate more when their donations become public knowledge, and also why23 Overview of the thesis
donations tend to be more densely distributed near the boundaries of published
categories.
There is an interesting relationship with the other theme of this thesis: crowding-
out of motivation. Rewarding gifts reduces the sacriﬁc e .T h i si sl i k e l yt or e d u c e
approval for a gift. Hence, if people are motivated to give because social approval
is rewarded, monetary rewards may demotivate to give because less approval will
be received.
Then, in chapter 4 a macroeconomic perspective is taken on gift-giving. If one
assumes that gift-giving is a result of the desire to exchange goods, then it seems
plausible that the market mechanism will take over all gift-exchanges in the end.
As the market grows in size, it becomes more eﬃcient and gift-exchange becomes
ap o o r e ra l t e r n a t i v e .
In this chapter it is however argued that gift-giving is not only an exchange
mechanism but also adds symbolic utility to an exchange. For example, approval
is obtained in a gift-exchange relationship as argued in chapter 3. Symbolic utility
is not generated by the market because the latter is an anonymous institution.
This makes that gift-giving will not be crowded-out by the market mechanism.
It is possible that gift-exchange is sustained even though the market mechanism
is more eﬃcient.
In the foregoing chapter it is argued that utility is derived from giving for
various reasons, among which social preferences. This perspective is also taken in
chapter 5. It is assumed that people are willing to pay a price premium for goods
that are produced with methods that have less social externalities. Examples are
goods produced with environmentally friendly production methods, that avoid
child labour, or where fair wages are paid to employees.
Problematic is that consumers cannot distinguish production methods by ex-
amination of end products. Hence, they are not willing to pay a price premium
for goods that claim to have less social externalities of production. Producers are
therefore not willing to invest in more costly production methods.
Two ways are examined to improve upon the imperfect information equilib-
rium: standards and labels. If the government imposes a standard on production
this means that all consumers are forced to buy goods according to this standard.
Labels are certiﬁcates with information that are voluntary. This allows discrim-
ination between consumers. Consumers with a high willingness to pay consume
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beled goods. It is shown that labels can lead to a higher welfare compared to
standards for an interval of consumer heterogeneity. For suﬃciently low or high
heterogeneity, standards lead to a higher welfare.
Chapter 6 studies the eﬀects of rewards on self-conﬁdence. This chapter builds
on the work by Bénabou and Tirole [2002a] who found that a bonus can signal
low ability or a high task diﬃculty, thereby decreasing self-conﬁdence. Their focus
is on rewards that are speciﬁed in a contract. By contrast, in this chapter it is
assumed that the outcome is only perfectly observable to the principal. This
makes a contract impossible. It is then shown that a principal may want to give
an unexpected bonus anyway.
This chapter oﬀers an explanation why principals reward unexpectedly. A cru-
cial assumption is that the principal has more information than the agent about
the outcome of the task. Thus, the theory is more likely to apply in relationships
where the agent is in his learning phase: a child who is learning the piano, or
an employee undertaking a task for the ﬁrst time. Another possibility is that the
agent performs a small task which is part of a bigger project. If the principal can
judge what the individual contributions from all tasks are, then he can determine
whether a speciﬁc agent has been successfull or not. The agent himself may not
be able to make a good judgement about the value of his speciﬁcp r o j e c tb e c a u s e
there are too many interactions going on.
An unexpected reward signals a good performance, and raises self-conﬁdence.
On its turn, a higher self-conﬁdence increases motivation in the next period.
In this way, the chapter oﬀers an explanation why discretionary (that is, not
contracted for) rewards are sometimes given. The reward brings good news to
the agent, and motivates him to continue.
In the last chapter, chapter 7, I consider changes in preferences. While changing
behaviour by appropriate incentives has been subject to extensive investigation
within the ﬁeld of economics, changing preferences has been left largely unex-
plored. Social psychologists, on the other hand, have paid considerable attention
to the formation of preferences, trying to demonstrate that they are not stable.
Nevertheless, the preference changes are in many cases quite predictable once we
take up the idea that people ﬁrst make a rational choice, and then seek to ratio-
nalize their choice afterwards. Hence, in this chapter both incentives and attitude
changes are taken into account.25 Overview of the thesis
The idea is that people experience an unpleasant feeling (called cognitive disso-
nance) created by an inconsistency between behaviour and attitudes (you smoke
even though you believe it causes lung cancer). To reduce this unpleasant feeling,
individuals often try to rationalize their behaviour, for example by focusing on
certain arguments congruent with their behaviour or by disregarding information
that is incongruent.
As an application, I consider the eﬀects a subsidy will have on the consumption
of goods that have social externalities, e.g. environmental friendly goods (“green
products”). The main result is that a low subsidy stimulates a positive attitude
change towards the subsidized good but a high subsidy does nothing to the at-
titudes of people. This ﬁts the experimental evidence. I therefore conclude that
high subsidies are ’too much of a good thing’: they aﬀect current behaviour but
fail to aﬀect attitudes and therefore future behaviour. 2
The Economics of the Gift
”One dollar and eighty-seven cents. That was all.” So the Christmas story by
O’Henry begins. The main character, Della, had, with great pains, been able to
save one dollar and eighty-seven cents for a Christmas gift. As this was in her
opinion not enough, she went to the shops to sell her possession she was most
proud of: her hair. With the money earned, she could just aﬀord a splendid chain
for her husband’s watch, the only object of value he possessed. When the door
opened, her husband stared at her with a peculiar expression, bedazzled from what
he saw. He had just bought her a Christmas gift as well: a set of combs worshipped
by Della. And he had bought it by selling his watch. Two foolish young people had
sacriﬁced all their treasures for gifts that had no purpose. Were these two young
people foolish or, as O’Henry himself thought, did they give the wisest gifts of all
gifts given?
2.1 Introduction
Historically, exchange has been — and still is — one of the most fundamental objects
of study by economists. It is, for instance, one of the basic ingredients in general
equilibrium theory and modern theories of economic growth. Without exchange,
0Ia mi n d e b t e dt oJ e ﬀrey James, Theo van de Klundert, and Sjak Smulders for very useful comments and
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no specialization is possible. Without specialization, it is hard to imagine how
economies would ever grow rich. It is therefore of great importance to understand
the functioning of a society. The logical starting point for that is to understand
how exchange is organized.
If we were to give a very crude historical account of exchange, one could proba-
bly distinguish three phases, seemingly characterized by an ever higher degree of
security and eﬃciency. In the ﬁrst stage, exchange relied on gift-giving to organize
societies. If we look at today’s primitive societies, we indeed see a heavy reliance
on gift-giving. Since a gift is thought of as a one-way voluntary transference of
property, it is not particularly eﬃcient nor is a full exchange secured. A little
further in history, one would observe barter trade. Still ineﬃcient, it is secure
in the sense that it is a true exchange, not only a one-way transfer. In the last
phase we ﬁnd the most advanced institution to organize exchange, one that is
ubiquitous in developed countries: the price system. The price system is partic-
ularly eﬃcient in allocating goods by avoiding the need for a double coincidence
of wants, something that is not accomplished with barter trade. It also allows for
a much greater degree of specialization.
Seen from this perspective, gift exchange should not be of much importance
in today’s market oriented economies. The extravagance and importance of gift-
giving in primitive societies1 is therefore primarily studied by anthropologists,
and not so much by economists. However, viewing gift-giving as a primitive mode
of exchange does not do enough justice to this complex institution. For instance,
it does not explain why the tribal economies which are oriented towards gift ex-
change have not been destroyed but sometimes even ﬂourished in the presence of
the —supposedly superior— market economy (Gregory [1989]). The ’efﬂorescence
of gift exchange’ thesis, by which it is meant that gift exchange has not suf-
fered under the impact of market economies2, is therefore considered as a valid
d e s c r i p t i o no fm o d e r ne x c h a n g ee c o n o m i e s .
Fortunately, there have been a number of recent contributions by economists
which acknowledge the more complex role of gift-giving in modern market-oriented
economies, be it somewhat hidden in speciﬁc settings. Akerlof [1982] for instance,
argues that the amount of time that an employee works in excess of the minimum
1C a m e r e r[ 1 9 8 8 ,p .1 8 0 ] .
2The term is borrowed from Gregory [1989]. He relates it to the impact of colonization which is broadly
interpreted here as the introduction of a market economy.29 The Gift
requirement can be seen as a gift. Rabin [1993] considers gift-giving equilibria as
situations where fairness considerations lead to cooperative behavior. More clear-
cut examples include birthday, business, and Christmas gifts, voluntary labour,
and donations to funds. The amount of these gifts in terms of income is sizeable:
money spent on gifts alone by households already accounts for 3-4% of income
(Prendergast and Stole [2001]). Charity donations make up another 2% of income
in the US (Andreoni [2001]).
In this chapter, I intend to survey the economics literature on gift-giving. Other
motivations besides the wish to accomplish a trade are discussed. This is done
with respect to two recurring themes in the literature. One of them is the claim by
many anthropologists that although gifts appear to be voluntary, they create in
fact an obligation to the receiver to reciprocate the gift. The other is the ﬁnding
by sociologists that it is very often the case that gifts in kind are preferred to
cash gifts, something that may be regarded as a bit disturbing from an economics
standpoint. I examine to what extent each particular motivation to give can or
should account for these themes, and whether it is an eﬃcient institution as
compared to the market mechanism.
The setup is as follows. First, in section 2.2 some characteristics of gift-giving
are discussed. Diﬀerent approaches based on motivations are discussed in section
2.3. Each approach is examined on its potential of explaining the characteristics as
mentioned in section 2.2. A general discussion and some conclusions are provided
in the ﬁnal section.
2.2 The Gift
”To say, here I am. To do something. To give. This is what it means
to be a human spirit.” Levinas, Ethics and Inﬁnity.
There are probably as many occasions for gift giving as there are relationships.
In addition, each relationship is characterized by its own particular demands on
how the gift is given. Should the gift be unwrapped at the spot? Is even a quick
look into the envelope inappropriate? It is therefore not evident what these diﬀer-
ent kinds of gifts have in common: a Christmas gift is evidently unlike a business
present, and neither do an end-of-the-year bonus and a charity donation resemble
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of gifts. Two of these in particular form the backbone of the discussion through-
out the chapter: reciprocity and adequacy. These elements play an important role
in most of the gift exchanges.
Reciprocity
At ﬁrst sight it seems quite natural that a gift is voluntary in nature. Still, an-
thropologists stress that although voluntary on guise, factually gifts have strong
reciprocal properties (Mauss [1925], Codere [1950]). One has not even only a
duty to give, but also to receive and to return. The extravagance of gift-giving in
primitive societies is underlined by the fact that a failure of accomplishing one’s
obligations to reciprocate often eventuates in warfare and the loss of dignity.3 It
is therefore often thought that reciprocal behavior is necessarily connected with
gift exchange. Mauss called reciprocity one of the ”human bedrocks on which so-
ciety is built” [quoted by Arnsperger [2000, 72]. Or according to Binmore [1998,
24]: ”Love and Duty are not the cement of modern societies ... the mechanism is
reciprocity” (his emphases).
According to Camerer [1988] however, it is ”especially misleading to assume
that modern gift-giving must be reciprocal”. It is indeed reasonable not to assume
that it is a necessary aspect. Consider for example the case of blood giving. The
giving of blood is not directed to speciﬁc individuals but to an anonymous agent,
as carefully remarked by Arrow [1972]. Gifts or donations of this kind can by
assumption not elicit reciprocal gifts, albeit this not immediately signiﬁes that
non-reciprocity is also unlikely to occur in personal relationships. But consider
the higher eﬀort of workers above minimum ﬁrm standards. This is not always
reciprocated by the ﬁrm in the form of higher wages or bonuses (see Akerlof
[1982]). If we take this behavior as a gift of the worker to the ﬁrm, then reciprocity
is not connected with fairly personal relationships either. The correct conclusion
would be that gifts are not necessarily reciprocal in nature. If we are to explain
the existence of gift-giving, we also have to explain why certain kinds of gifts are
given with a reciprocal intention and why others are not.
Adequacy
3This occured for example among the Kwakiutl. It should be noted however that their use of warfare mostly
refers to warfare directed to an individual and not so much between nations. For a detailed description of the
Kwakiutl, see Codere [1950] and chapter 3.31 The Gift
Consider the following two quotes. According to Camerer [1988, 198]: ”A delib-
erate cash gift is a polite way of saying, we care about you less”. And Douglas
and Isherwood put it even more to our imagination by writing: ”...in our society
the line between cash and gift is ... carefully drawn. It is all right to send ﬂowers
to your aunt in the hospital, but never right to send the cash they are worth”
(Douglas and Isherwood [1978, 58]).
One wonders why it is so bad to make a gift in cash. Standard microeconomics
arguments tell us that it can never be worse to get money rather than a speciﬁc
good. The reason is simple: with a cash-transfer it is in principle always possible to
buy the same good as the intended in-kind transfer. Moreover, if existent, a more
preferred good may be purchased instead. Whenever an in-kind transfer forces
the recipient to consume more of that particular good than he would have done
with a cash transfer, the recipient prefers a cash gift (see e.g. Mankiw [1998]).
Because gifts in kind weakly lowers the recipient’s utility relative to a cash-gift,
Ic a l lt h e minadequate.
Besides the literary example from the introduction to this chapter, there is
ample empirical evidence of inadequate gift-giving. Calculations by Walfdfogel
[1993] show that for Christmas gifts, recipients valued the gift by 10-30% less
than what the givers had spent on them. An extreme example of inadequacy
is found among a tribe in Canada (the Kwakiutl) where some of the gifts are
worthless to the receiver (see also the introduction to chapter 3).
For sake of completeness, I should add that there are some notable exceptions
to the rule that gifts in kind are inadequate. First, it may be the case that the
gift is more expensive for the recipient than for the giver. For example, a souvenir
brought from abroad cannot be purchased from an amount of cash that equals
its retail price, as the recipient would have to incur transportation costs. Another
example is when the recipient has incomplete or imperfect knowledge about his
own preferences, such as when he is not aware that this particular good existed
so that he could never have bought this good with a cash-gift even though he
derives great pleasure from it (see also Camerer [1988]). Finally, a gift can help
recipients to stick to self-control. Thaler [1999] considers the example of a couple
who cannot aﬀord to spend more on wine than $10 on average. To retain self
control, they may decide never to spend more than $20 on a bottle, even though
they prefer to have a $30 bottle occasionally. A bottle of $30 as a gift may be
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self-control. Although interesting in its own right, in the rest of this chapter I
assume that gifts in kind are inadequate.
The challenge, then, is to ﬁnd theories of gift-giving that are capable of unifying
these dimensions of gift-giving. This is the purpose of the next section.
2.3 Motivations to give
Being familiar with the characteristics of gifts, I next review some approaches in
the literature and determine the potential explanatory power of each of them.
The aim of this section is to assess the diﬀerent, sometimes competing, models of
gift-giving with regard to the characteristics mentioned. In order to structure the
discussion I classify the diﬀerent models based on their underlying assumptions
with regard to motivation. To that end, I distinguish between exchange, altruism,
fairness, social approval, and signalling.
2.3.1 Gifts as exchange mechanism
Probably the most obvious approach lending support for gift-giving is to think
of gift-giving as accomplishing an exchange between agents. Above all, gifts are
found most profoundly in primitive societies. And indeed, it is not unreasonable
to assume that at least initially gifts served as a way to separate production
from consumption. In this way consumption could be diversiﬁed and production
could be increased through specialization. The market economy can in this way
be interpreted as a more eﬃcient way of exchange, one where gifts are replaced
by the use of money. Indeed, Kranton [1996a] argues that this is the case. In her
model, agents choose between reciprocal (gift) exchange and market exchange.
Since the market is characterized by a thickness externality —more agents on the
market reduces search costs— eventually all gift exchange relationships vanish
whenever the market size exceeds a threshold level.
While intuitively appealing, the model of Kranton [1996a] cannot account for
the coexistence of gift exchange and market exchange.4 If contemporary markets
are so eﬃcient as we think they are, why do people still partly stick to gift ex-
4This is not entirely right. The model is able to predict market size for which gift exchange is sustainable.
But the model cannot explain how evolution got us in this equilibrium except for some shocks that can be
responsible for this. If we start in a gift exchange relationship and some agents ﬁnd it attractive to enter the
market, then the model predicts that all agents enter the market.33 Motivations to give
change? Is it not just cheaper to buy all goods and services at the market? Of
course, one reason could be that some products cannot be eﬃciently produced
on the market. Another line of reasoning is provided in chapter 4. There, I argue
that gift exchange contains a social interaction element that is valued in itself by
the trading agents. Quite often there is a need for mutual sympathy and recog-
nition. These are suppressed entirely in the formal anonymous markets usually
studied (Bowles [1998]). But mutual sympathy is rooted in human nature, as is so
breathlessly described in Kropotkin [1904]. Thus workers develop sentiment for
their co-workers and institution (Akerlof [1982]) and gifts ”symbolize and convey
meaning” (Camerer [1988, 181]).
In the terminology of Khalil [1997], gift exchange provides symbolic utility on
top of substantive utility. A good consumed therefore gives its ordinary substan-
tive utility —in a market exchange as well as in a gift exchange relationship — and
on top of that the agent experiences symbolic utility but only if the trade has
been accomplished in a gift exchange relationship.
This symbolic utility has to be explained in somewhat more detail. Let the
valuation ratio refer to the ratio of utilities that one experiences in a gift exchange
relationship and on the market. It is suggested in chapter 4 that the valuation
ratio is dependent on the market size in two directions. First the valuation ratio
tends to increase as the market gets larger. This is so because mutual sympathy
and recognition are lacking in anonymous market exchange relationships, making
sympathy more valuable.
However, there is also a tendency for the valuation ratio to decline. This idea
builds on the literature on cognitive dissonance in psychology. People have a
resistance to change that is lower if more people are supporting a certain view. If
agents have to decide whether to stay in their personal gift exchange relationship
or to enter the market, then the decision to enter the market gets easier with a
l a r g e rm a r k e ts i z e ;i ne s s e n c ei fm o r ep e o p l ea r es u p p o r t i n gt h es a m ev i e w .
It is argued that these two opposing tendencies are likely to result in a valu-
ation ratio that is ﬁrst declining and then increasing in the market size. Under
appropriate conditions, this model predicts that the market can become eﬃcient
enough to attract part of the population. But as the market gets larger, the valu-
ation ratio becomes larger (lack of sympathy becomes more and more oppressing)
and the people who stayed in the gift exchange will decide not to enter the market
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larger size. This can be a stable equilibrium, no agent having the incentive to
switch regimes. As a result part of the population is involved in market exchange
and part of the population in gift exchange.
The model described is interesting in itself since it argues that the focus of eco-
nomics should not be a one-sided inquiry into the market as a possible exchange
mechanism. In addition, the model can explain a number of things mentioned in
the previous section.
First it is able to explain the seemingly inadequacy of gifts by taking sympathy
into account. For example, it can be that the market provides the same good at
lower costs. If people still consume the good within their gift exchange relationship
then this points to an inadequate gift. The reason is that part of the utility is
neglected; symbolic utility. Substantive utility is higher in the market (more goods
at the same costs) but the market provides no symbolic utility. Hence, on net gift
exchange is preferable. If in reality we only look at substantive utility, then the
gift seems inadequate. If we take into account symbolic utility, there is no matter
of inadequacy. Once we take this properly into account we are able to explain the
sustainability of gift exchange.5
Secondly, gifts have an obligatory element to reciprocate. It is even part of the
motivation to reciprocate gifts. If some agent does not return, the relationship
ends and both enter the market.6 As a consequence, an important class of gift-
giving, namely charity, cannot be explained by exchange as a motivation to give
as this usually takes place anonymously and without a countergift. Moreover,
the model is not able to explain why some gifts have no reciprocal character or
how we can trust people in short run relationships, something that is resolved in
section 2.3.5.
2.3.2 Altruism
Another motivation for gift-giving, perhaps a more natural one in the eyes of
people from countries with well developed markets, is to consider the idea that
persons have altruistic feelings towards each other. Within the economic method-
5There can still be ineﬃciency in that everybody could be made better oﬀ if all people would enter the
market or all would stay in their gift exchange. This is due to the existence of externalities that are present in
the model.
6This is partly due to the assumed tit-for-tat strategy of the players. But it seems that this or any such
strategy where the cheater is ultimately punished is reasonable.35 Motivations to give
ology, this can be modeled as individuals having either preferences for the con-
sumption level or the utility level of other individuals. The structure of a utility
function that represents such preferences is given by Ui = Ui(xi,U j(xj)),w h e r exi
is the consumption level of person i. If person j has altruistic feelings for person
i as well, there is an inﬁnite regress: Ui = Ui(xi,U j(xj,U i(xi,U j(...)). The regress
easily becomes an unbounded process but Becker [1974] shows an example where






Then the reduced form of the utility function follows straightforwardly by sub-








Clearly, this is ﬁnite for α ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ β<1.
Altruistic feelings will take care of a redistribution such that an optimal bal-
ance results between personal consumption and consumption of the other. If the
endowment of a particular individual is in his view relatively too high, he can
gain by giving some of it to the others. Existence of gift giving can therefore be
rationalized.
There are several aspects of this model with respect to eﬃciency that are note-
worthy. First, the equilibrium allocation is generally not eﬃcient because neither
one of the players acts like a social planner despite their altruistic feelings. To
see this, consider player i being altruistic towards j but not vice versa. Note that


































In other words, the social planner counts player j twice: once because player j
has his own utility, and one more time because player i derives utility from him.
In general, this means that the optimal choice of xi by player i diﬀers from that
by the social planner.
Within a family context, Becker [1974] has shown that an altruistic head of the
family internalizes externalities within the other selﬁsh family members by theChapter 2. The Economics of the Gift 36
appropriate transfers (the ’rotten kid theorem’). However, this eﬃciency result is
somewhat special (Bernheim and Stark [1988]). In particular, altruism can create
ineﬃciencies, such as is the case in the ’Samaritan’s dilemma’. This dilemma
concerns the problem that if a recipient knows that he will be helped out by an
altruist, he has less incentives to, say, self-discipline himself by saving money for
the future (Bernheim and Stark [1988] provide a more detailed discussion).
Another, related, eﬃciency result is obtained by Kranich [1994]. Suppose some
players have preferences over the entire allocation of the economy, rather than just
one’s own consumption level. This can be due to altruism, but also to a preference
for fairness. In this case, Kranich proves that the set of Pareto-eﬃcient equilibria is
a subset of the set of all gift equilibria. In other words, the equilibrium that results
when agents can freely redistribute endowments need not be Pareto-eﬃcient. This
can possibly be caused by the public good character that gifts can take. One can
think of a case with three players. Would players 1 and 2 both give to a third
player everybody may be better oﬀ, but if either one of the players gives then it
is not proﬁtable anymore for the other to give7.
Let us now consider the question whether altruism can account for reciprocity.
With only one good, the answer is negative.8 If we consider more goods, however,
one can easily see that a recipient may indeed have an incentive to reciprocate.
If the endowments are suﬃciently diﬀerent between persons, they may all gain
by redistributing, very much like the logic of international trade models. With
altruistic feelings, this redistribution may be accomplished without further moti-
vations, since each player gains indirectly by giving part of his or her endowment
to another person who would be made better oﬀ.
Concerning adequacy, however, we see that altruism as a motivation to give
is incongruent with giving in kind. Any cash gift would make the recipient bet-
ter oﬀ9, without changing one’s own consumption, and it therefore necessarily
increases one’s own utility. Hence we conclude that altruism alone is not a good
7Goldman [1978] puts less restrictions on preferences and ﬁnds that in that case the reverse also holds:
Pareto-eﬃcient equilibria need not be gift-equilibria. It is for example possible that a gift from person 1 to
person 2 may decrease the welfare of person 3 (because he cares, say, about the consumption level of person 1),
hence moving away from a Pareto-eﬃcient situation.
8T h i si st r u eb e c a u s ei ne q u i l i b r i u mi tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a ti fp l a y e r1g i v e st op l a y e r2 ,p l a y e r2h a s
no incentive to give back. For suppose he has, then his utility from giving some of the good to player 1 must
increase. But then player 1’s utility should also increase, since the utility of player 2 increases and his own
consumption as well. This would contradict player 1 playing an equilibrium strategy.
9With the exceptions mentioned earlier.37 Motivations to give
candidate to explain most of the situations where gift-giving takes place, as it
cannot explain the widely observed inadequacy of gifts. Still, there is at least one
important situation where altruism cannot be excluded, namely that of charity.
Empirical studies are indeed supportive of the view that altruistic motives lie be-
hind charity, although these studies at the same time demonstrate that altruism
alone cannot be the unique motivation (see section 2.3.4 for more on this).
2.3.3 Fairness
As a third motivation for gift-giving, the focus in this section is on fairness consid-
erations. This approach recently got most attention in the literature. It success-
fully accounts for a broad range of experimental games by assuming that people
not only care about their own monetary payoﬀs, but also about the distribution
of payoﬀs and the intentions that other players have.
To see the power of this approach, consider the ultimatum game. In this game,
the proposer gets to oﬀer a share of a certain amount to the responder. If the
responder accepts, the responder gets the share and the remainder is for the
proposer. May he reject, both players end up with nothing.
The game-theoretic prediction of this game is easy to see if only purely self-
ish players are assumed to participate. Since the responder is always better oﬀ
accepting any positive amount than rejecting it, the proposer oﬀers the smallest
possible positive amount. This prediction is, however, clearly refuted by the data.
Most oﬀers by the proposer are nowhere near zero. Typically, they are between
40% and 50% of the amount of money (Fehr and Schmidt [1999]).
Several authors have suggested that the data can be fruitfully explained by as-
suming that people are not purely selﬁs hb u th a v em o r e’ s o c i a lp r e f e r e n c e s ’( C h a r -
ness and Rabin [2002], Bolton and Ockenfels [2000], Fehr and Schmidt [1999]).
There are at least two important components to these preferences. Let us ﬁrst
focus on the ﬁrst component. The ﬁrst component consists of a preference for
equality. This explains why proposers give more than the smallest possible oﬀer
in the ultimatum game. They may consider the spread between payoﬀst o ol a r g e
if they oﬀer the smallest possible amount. By giving some of it to the responder,
they reduce the inequality a bit.
The same model can also explain reciprocity. In the so called gift-exchange
game, the proposer can give an amount of money from his endowment to the
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that, in the second period, the responder has a chance to make a countergift.
In this game, both players can be made better oﬀ by a gift and a countergift.
The structure with only selﬁsh preferences leads to an equilibrium with no gifts.
With inequality aversion, Fehr and Schmidt [1999] show that gift-giving can be
explained, something also found in the data.
The strongest evidence that people care about the distribution of outcomes
is in my opinion the result of another variant of the ultimatum game. In the
dictator game, the responder gets again to propose a share to the responder, but
this time the responder has no say in the outcome: every proposal is directly
implemented. It is found that some of the amount of money is still directed
towards the responder (see Bolton and Katok [1998]). This result is particularly
strong as in this game no strategic eﬀects on the part of the proposer should be
present: the responder has no power anyway.
The second component of social preferences is the part of intentions. People
not only care about outcomes, but also about how these outcomes are realized.
This is clear from for instance the game in ﬁgure 2.1 taken from Falk et al. [1999].
P
RR
accept accept reject reject
(8,2) (0,0) (x,y) (0,0)
propose (8,2) propose (x,y)
FIGURE 2.1. A variant on the ultimatum game39 Motivations to give
The game is a variation on the ultimatum game and goes as follows. In the ﬁrst
stage the proposer can propose the oﬀers (8,2) or (x,y),e . g .(8,2) means 8 for
the proposer, 2 for the responder. The values of (x,y) diﬀer among experiments.
In the second stage (after observing the oﬀers of the proposer) the responder can
accept, in which case each player gets the proposed oﬀer, or rejects, in which case
none of the players gets anything.
In the ﬁrst variant of the experiment (x,y) was set to (8,2). Note that the
proposer can in this case only make the oﬀer (8,2). Clearly, if the responder
only cares about monetary payoﬀs he will accept the oﬀer giving him a payoﬀ
of 2 rather than rejecting and getting nothing. But in fact, in 20 percent of the
cases the oﬀer is rejected. A possible explanation can in fact indeed be inequity
aversion. Accepting would yield a higher payoﬀ but also an increased inequality
between the two players.
This is, however, not the complete story. Another variant was played in which
(x,y) was set to (5,5). The proposer can in this case oﬀer (8,2) or (5,5).T h e
situation for responders remained unchanged for those whose proposer sticked
to the oﬀer of (8,2). He still ends up with either 2 when accepting or 0 when
rejecting, and the inequality is the same for him as in the ﬁrst variant. The
prediction is therefore that if he accepted (rejected) in the ﬁrst variant then he
should accordingly also accept (reject) the oﬀer (8,2) in the second variant. But
apparently something did change for the responder because the rejection rate
increased from 20 to 45 percent when (8,2) was proposed. The explanation of
Falk et al. [1999] is that intentions matter as well. In the ﬁrst variant proposers
had no choice but to oﬀer (8,2). What matters is that in the second variant
they could have chosen to propose (5,5) but they did not. As a consequence, the
bad intentions of the proposer were punished by the responders. Therefore, they
conclude, both unfair outcomes and unfair intentions matter.
Reciprocity is replicated in many experiments, either in the form of reward-
ing good behavior (positive reciprocity) or by punishing bad behavior (negative
reciprocity). Whether this is due to responders who try to change outcomes or
to responders who try to reward or punish intentions, in both cases the possibil-
ities for cooperation are increased. Recall however also the negative result from
section 2.3.2 that if people have preferences over the distribution of outcomes, a
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Less obvious is how inadequacy can be explained by fairness models. If gifts
are a means to reduce income inequalities, then the most eﬃcient way to do so is
to give adequate gifts (unless, of course, players only have the possibility to give
inadequate gifts or nothing). Also, if the intention is to reward good behavior,
it does not make sense to give inadequately since this makes the reward more
costly.
The in my view most problematic part of social preferences as an explanation
for giving behavior is due to a variant of the ultimatum game introduced by Güth
and Van Damme [1998]. In their variant, a third player is added. In the ﬁrst stage
the proposer proposes an allocation for all three players. In the second stage, the
responder accepts or rejects. The third player remains inactive. One of the main
results is that only marginal oﬀers were proposed to the dummy player. Although
Bolton and Ockenfels [1998] have shown that this is not necessarily incompatible
with their inequality aversion model, it is my personal belief that this experiment
shows that the proposer was not intrinsically motivated by fairness considerations.
I come back to this point in the general discussion at the end.
2.3.4 Warm glow & social approval
Searching for motivations for charity-giving, Andreoni [1989] assumes that people
have a taste for giving. He reasons that, if people have purely altruistic motives
for donating to a public good, they should only care about the total supply of it.
His ”egoists” and ”impure altruists”, on the other hand, do not only care about
the supply of the public good that they donate for, but also experience a ”warm
glow” from having ”done their bit.” (Andreoni [1989, 1448]). Thus in his model
contributions to a public good are made not only for the beneﬁts of public good
supply but also for experiencing the (egoistic) warm glow feeling.
The distinction between pure and impure altruists is a useful one and an at-
tempt is made to test the hypothesis whether or not people donate to public
goods out of purely altruistic motives. Interestingly, it is found that generally
people are impure altruists: part of their motivation is attributed to the warm
glow feeling (Andreoni [1990], [1993], Bolton and Katok [1998]).
Here I go one step further in trying to explain why people get this warm feeling
from giving. The basic hypothesis, for which there is ample evidence, is that
people are searching for social approval. The following passage that is taken from
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”That a man with small skill in physick and hardly any learning,
should by vile arts get into practice, and lay up great wealth is no
mighty wonder, but that he should so deeply work himself into the
good opinion of the world as to gain the general esteem of a nation,
and establish a reputation beyond all his contemporaries, with no
other qualities but a perfect knowledge of mankind, and a capacity of
making the most out of it, is something extraordinary.” (B. Mandeville
[1714, 262].
This passage concerns the, at that time illustery, Dr. Radcliﬀe, who gained the
general esteem of a nation by donating his wealth to Oxford University. As he
was aware of, making gifts is a way to be approved by others. The warm glow
is therefore due to the social approval received and not so much for the act of
giving itself. That is, the gift is a means to get a warm glow and has no intrinsic
v a l u ei ni t so w ni nt h i sr e s p e c t .
Since social approval as a motivation to give is the subject of chapter 3, only
the main ideas are brieﬂy discussed here. The important premises are that people
get approval for a gift and they care about this, and that there is a status element
in the approval domain in the sense that people want to get more approval than
others. It is thus argued that people not only want to be admired, but also want
to be more admired than others (see Holländer [1990]).
With these building blocks, chapter 3 tries to account for reciprocity and ade-
quacy. This is done in a sequential gift-giving game with two players. In the ﬁrst
period, player 1 has the opportunity to transfer some of his endowment to player
2. Player 2 gets a chance to make a transfer to player 1 in the second period.
Both players have a utility function of the form (for current purposes slightly
simpliﬁed):
ui = ux(xi)+us(si − sj), (2.5)
where xi is the consumption level of player i, si his social approval obtained, and sj
the social approval obtained by player j. Total utility consists of a consumption
and an approval part. Social approval is increasing in the size of a gift, i.e. a
transfer of x.
Solving this model, one can see that player 1 has an incentive to make a gift to
player 2 in order to gain approval. This has two eﬀects on the utility of player 2.
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now behind in the race for approval, his marginal utility of approval has increased.
Both eﬀects give incentives to player 2 for making a countergift, explaining reci-
procity.
In some cases, the countergift of player 2 is appreciated by player 1 because his
consumption increases. However, he also gives in in terms of net approval. If this
latter eﬀect dominates, player 1 may have an incentive to give inadequate gifts. To
see this, note that an inadequate gift has less impact on the utility of consumption
for player 2, resulting in a higher marginal utility of consumption. This makes a
countergift more expensive, resulting evidently in a smaller countergift.
The analysis of chapter 3 also sheds light on the eﬃciency, or rather ineﬃciency,
of gift-giving. Because players are involved in a race to be more approved than
the other, gift-giving is generally ineﬃcient. This results in a standard example
of a prisoners’ dilemma-like game. Both would be better oﬀ keeping their en-
dowments, but each player has an incentive to deviate from this situation. When
both deviate, they all lose since net approval sums up to zero and resources are
wasted.
Another ineﬃciency results from the strategic power of player 1. Although he
does take into account the behavior of player 2, he does not take it into account in
a socially eﬃcient way but only insofar as it concerns himself. That is, he ignores
the eﬀect of his behavior on player 2’s utility.
Note also the positive result. In a situation where no explicit contracts can
be written down, and implicit contracts are infeasible, a mutually beneﬁcial ex-
change can still take place. Due to the need for approval, players give part of
their endowment away. Their gift is related to, but not necessarily dependent on
whether other players will give something back. The desire for approval does not,
of course, guarantee an exchange whenever there are mutual beneﬁts possible,
but at least creates some opportunities.
It is not immediately obvious how the social approval approach is capable of ex-
plaining charity since the benevolences of these gifts are most often unobservable
to the recipient. Recall however that social approval was obtained from the fact
that a gift was made, not necessarily to the person who shows approval. Surely
it is often socially approved to donate to developing countries by the people from
the developed countries. Similarly, you can give blood which is anonymous for
the receiver, but by telling your friends of your act it is not a truly anonymous
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make donees visible. This can, for instance, be done through the provision of cof-
fee mugs or label pins with the funds’ name, or by publishing the names of the
donees. There is indeed evidence that some people are sensitive to such actions
(see Harbaugh [1998], Andreoni and Petrie [2000]) and in addition that this is
related to the need for social approval (Satow [1975]).
2.3.5 A gift as signalling device
As argued in section 2.3.4, there is more to giving than altruism alone. In chapter
3 I elaborate in much more detail on social approval as a motivation to give, trying
to make a case for it. There certainly seems something to it, as it explains many
of the characteristics of gift-giving for a wide range of circumstances, including
”anonymous” donations. However, as it stands, the model misses one important
element: why should one give to get approval from others?
Social approval may be an important motivation but is perhaps only a deriv-
ative of even deeper more fundamental desires. It seems easy to come up with
candidates for which one could get approval: status, being kind, honest, trustwor-
thy, etc. However, it remains to be seen why a gift is necessary to get approval.
Why does the recipient not approve of me without a need of giving? Of course,
one can argue that the gift itself is approved. A gift itself is a kind act indeed,
approval worthwhile. Another interesting line, taken up in this section, would be
to assume that there is an information asymmetry which can be partly or com-
pletely resolved by making a gift. The recipient does not approve of me because
he cannot tell what kind of person I am without making a gift. For example,
being fair may be approved by others. But it is not obvious to judge who is fair
or not from the outside. Still, a person who gives may signal that she is fair just
by doing this. Because information asymmetries are so common in everyday life,
Barkow [1989, 100] has even coined humans ’impression managers’ rather than
decision makers.
There are many more possibilities for gifts having the role of signalling some-
thing, including income, fairness, and even your own personality. This section
reviews the role and scope of gifts as a signal. I start with a relatively detailed
description of an early contribution by Camerer [1988]. This makes clear how a
gift can be used as a signal. The other variants are then more easily understood.
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other motivations mentioned, but may rather be complementary. I come back to
this, together with a general discussion, in the next section.
A gift signals trustworthiness
To enhance cooperation, it is necessary that agents trust each other. In section
2.3.1 it is already being discussed how a gift exchange can take place. There, the
agents could trust each other to complete an exchange by the threat of losing
the trading partner in future exchanges. This is only possible insofar as agents
are not too impatient and if the time horizon is suﬃciently long. Camerer [1988]
has shown how a gift itself can signal trust, making even short-run cooperation
feasible.
The essential mechanism is the following. It is assumed that there are two
(groups of) players. Exchange can be realized between those groups. Each group
consists of two types of players: trustworthy players and cheaters.10 The fractions
of these types in the groups are known but the individual type cannot be observed
directly. The main diﬀerence between the types is their payoﬀ. Trustworthy play-
ers are resistant to cheating. They would feel ashamed if they did, lowering their
payoﬀ. Cheaters on the other hand ﬁnd it proﬁtable to cheat, they have no feel-
ings of shame or guilt whatsoever. The problem now is that an agent cannot know
beforehand if his trade partner can be trusted. If he is of the trustworthy type
the deal will work out ﬁne, but if he cheats, the payoﬀ will be considerably lower
for the befooled agent than if he would not have traded at all.
What does the model predict? One result is that if the fractions of honest
players in both groups is large enough, then the honest players will trade at
the risk of being cheated. A more interesting result however is that even if the
fractions of honest players are low, trade can still occur. The chances of meeting
an honest trade partner are low, but if there is a possibility of giving a signal of
trustworthiness then this does not need to be so much of a problem. The signal
is to make a gift. This strategy can be explained as follows. If the fraction of
cheaters players is high, then without gifts nobody would be trading. The payoﬀs
are in this case not very large, but trading would on average be even worse for
the honest players. Now, if a honest player makes a gift of a size that a cheater
10Nothing depends on the assumption of two diﬀerent groups. One may also interpret them as two single
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is not willing to make because it is not proﬁtable enough for the latter, then this
is a signal to the other player that this person is honest. And if both players
are honest, then they can trade. In principle the cheater can make a gift as well,
but if the gifts made by the honest person are expensive enough, the cost of
the gift does not compensate for the payoﬀ by cheating.11 If such a separating
equilibrium exists, honest players can signal the trustworthiness of trade partners
by inspection of the size of the gift received.
Example. As an illustration of the above, consider the following example. There
is a honest player (H1) who wants to trade with another person on the market.
There are two players that he can trade with but he doesn’t know which one of
them is the honest (H2) and which one is a cheater (C) (he meets each player
with probability 0.5). He has to decide whether to invest (I) or not (N).A f t e r
investing or not, the trade partner makes a decision. Players that do not meet a
trading agent have a payoﬀ 0. The rest of the payoﬀs are as in the matrices below.
H2
IN
H1 I 6/6 −10/5
N 5/ − 10 0/0
C
IN
H1 I 6/1 −10/2
N 5/ − 10 0/0
As one can see, both the honest and the dishonest players are worst oﬀ when
they invested but their trade partner did not. Moreover, both types prefer not
to invest if the other doesn’t. The diﬀerence is that the honest player prefers to
invest if the other invests whereas the cheater prefers not to invest if the other
invests. (An economic example may be two persons trading where cheating is
beneﬁcial for both in pecuniary terms, but where honest players have a sense of
guilt outweighing the pecuniary payoﬀs and the cheaters have no sense of guilt.)
It is readily seen that the dominant strategy for the cheater is not to invest.12
What should H1 do? If he invests, he meets with probability 1/2 H2 who then
also invests and with probability 1/2 C who does not invest. His expected payoﬀ
11Thus a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game does not satisfy the assumptions needed for a separating
equilibrium. A necessary assumption is that honest players gain by cooperating with another honest player and
lose by cooperating with a cheater. By the structure of a PD-game, cooperating is never a best-response no
m a t t e rw h a tt h et y p eo ft h eo t h e rp l a y e r .
12Mixed strategies are not considered here as they are not equilibrium strategies (see the appendix in Camerer
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is therefore −2. His expected payoﬀ by not investing equals 0.A sar e s u l t ,t h e
honest player will not invest and consequently H2 experiences expected utility of
0 by also not investing. What H2 c a nd oi st om a k eag i f tt op l a y e rH1 before
H1 decides.
Suppose that he decides to give an amount of 3 to H1. The net payoﬀsa r et h e n
given in the left part of the matrix below:
H2
IN
H1 I 9/3 −7/2
N 8/ − 13 3/ − 3
C
IN
H1 I 9/ − 2 −7/ − 1
N 8/ − 13 3/ − 3
If C does not do the same then it is obvious for H1 what to do. Now he knows
that if he gets a gift after meeting his trading partner, then the other is honest
and so he should invest. Note that the expected utility of H2 is now equal to 1.5
which is still an improvement for him even considering the costs of the gift. What
remains to be shown is that the cheater does indeed not make a gift. Consider the
right part of the matrix above. If the cheater makes the gift of 3, then whatever
the strategy of H1 is, he is worse oﬀ than the payoﬀ of 0 when he didn’t make
the gift. The best thing he can do is therefore indeed not to make a gift. ¤
Obviously this model is able to explain the existence of gift giving. It can also
account for some other aspects of gifts mentioned in section 2. It can explain
one-sided gift giving. If the fraction of honest players in group 1 is large and
if group 2 consists mainly of cheaters, then an equilibrium can be that honest
players of group 2 must make a gift to signal their honesty, but for group 1 it is
not necessary to give. The extreme case is where all players in group 1 and only
one player in group 2 are honest. Obviously the players in group 1 do not have to
give to signal whereas the player in group 2 does have to give. This can explain
why gift-giving is not always reciprocal in nature and also when it is: if in both
groups the number of cheaters is relatively large.
Additionally, with a slight modiﬁcation the model is able to explain inadequate
gift-giving. Recall that the gift must be large enough to make it unproﬁtable for
the cheaters to give. But if gifts are adequate, under some circumstances it can
still be proﬁtable for cheaters to give since they beneﬁtal o tf r o mt h eg i f tt h e y
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cheaters. Whenever the cheaters ﬁnd it relatively more proﬁtable also to signal,
gifts should be more inadequate or else they fail in their aim.
Example (ctd.) Suppose for simplicity that the honest player H1 in the above
game also makes a gift. This does not change the strategy of the cheater since
both his payoﬀs from playing N or I are now increased. The adequacy also does
not matter in this case since it does not change the strategy. But suppose that
another pre-stage is constructed. In this pre-stage, some entering costs must be
paid. If the entering costs, T, are paid then the rest of the game is as in the above
example. If the entering costs are not paid by a player, then he is not allowed to
play the second stage and both will not invest. The purpose of the entering costs
in the pre-stage is that the adequacy of the gift can now inﬂuence the strategy
that will be played by the cheater. To see this, consider a gift size of x.O n l ya
fraction δ of the gift adds to the payoﬀ of the other player. The parameter δ is
a measure of the adequacy of the gift. The cheater now has to choose to pay the
entry costs or not, and if he pays the entry costs then he has to decide whether
to give or not. We know that in equilibrium, once entry costs are paid, he will
not give (otherwise the signal is useless). But he may still pay the entry costs
and then collect the possible gift of the other. This would give him an expected
payoﬀ of .5(−T + δx). To prevent him from doing this, the entry costs must be
such that it is not proﬁtable for the cheater to enter the second stage in the ﬁrst
place: T>δ xor δ<T/ x .A sar e s u l t ,t h ea d e q u a c ym a yn o tb et o oh i g h .¤
T h e r ea r es o m eo t h e rm o d e l si nt h es a m es p i r i tw h e r eg i f t sa r et a k e nt ob es i g n a l s
of the willingness to cooperate. Carmichael and MacLeod [1997] derive Nash-
equilibria where inadequate gift-giving signals the right intentions for long-term
cooperation.13 Bolle [2000] presents a similar model as Camerer and explicitly
derives how adequate gifts should be. Kranton [1996b] derives a strategy for
the formation of relationships by incurring a cost at the beginning of a new
relationship and gradually increasing the level of exchange. In Iannaccone [1992]
it is tried to explain sacriﬁcial behavior within social clubs. Again, sacriﬁces are
inadequate gifts that signal the good intentions of the players. By demanding a
gift from members of a social club that oﬀers a good which is anti-congestible14
free riding behavior is prevented.
13In their setup gifts are necessarily inadequate.
14Anti-congestible indicates that each member’s participation increases beneﬁts for the other members,
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A gift signals income
People care about consumption goods and a gift may help them to cooperate
and exchange goods. A gift need not necessarily signal trustworthiness though.
To see this, note that people not only care about consumption but equally about
status (see section 3.2.1). One main source of status is, no doubt, the wealth of
a person. The exact amount of wealth that a person possesses is however often
not directly assessable. Glazer and Konrad [1996] show that the level of wealth
can be demonstrated by making gifts. The mechanism is like above. Both the
poor and the rich care about status. For the poor, however, the marginal utility
of status is lower relative to that of consumption. A gift is then a credible signal
of a certain amount of wealth since the poor are not willing to spend as much
resources on status enhancing activities.
A gift signals what you know about the recipient
Also of interest is the idea put forward by Prendergast and Stole [2001] that
a person derives utility from knowing how well they are believed to know the
preferences of the other. This can be an important element in friendships. Besides
this, they assume that people are altruistic. The altruistic motive is a reason to
make a gift to the other. The interesting aspect is what kind of gift they give. The
choice is between a cash gift or a gift in kind. By making a gift in kind he reveals
to what extent he knows the recipient’s preferences. If the good is desired by the
recipient, he will believe that the giver was aware of his preferences, something
that the giver appreciates. A utility loss arises when the gift was improperly
chosen, making the recipient believe that the giver is unaware of his preferences15.
Suppose that the giver is not completely informed about the recipient’s pref-
erences. If he now gives in kind, he risks a loss of utility because he may end
up buying the wrong gift, deriving no utility from knowing the recipient’s pref-
erences and because the recipient’s utility is lower than a cash gift. If he believes
he knows the recipient’s preference quite well, he may nevertheless be willing to
take this risk. Hence, a gift in kind signals the belief of the giver that he knows
15A somewhat related model is that by Ruﬄe [1999]. Instead of deriving utility from knowing the recipient’s
preferences, he assumes that utility is derived from surprising the recipient, e.g. by making a larger gift that was
expected. This makes it a so called psychological game because beliefs enter the payoﬀ function. Interestingly,
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the recipient’s preferences. Notice that the story at the outset of this chapter ﬁts
this interpretation particularly well.
There are also situations in which the information asymmetry concerns the
payoﬀs for the giver. In a principal-agent relationship, it often happens that the
principal is more informed than the agent about the diﬃculty of a task or the
ability of the agent (Bénabou and Tirole [2002a]). A variant of this is studied in
chapter 6. There, the principal observes the outcome of a task, in essence whether
it has been successful or has resulted in a failure, whereas the agent only gets to
know this information through an imperfect signal. Neither the principal nor the
agent have any direct assessment possibilities of the agent’s ability. It is shown
how a gift (a bonus in this case) by the principal may signal a success, which
indicates that the agent is more likely to be of high ability. A gift then stimulates
the agent to continue making eﬀorts, because he is more self-conﬁdent after a
reward.
A gift reveals your self
So far, the informational asymmetry existed in the receiving party having imper-
fect information about the giver. Relatedly, the giver may have imperfect knowl-
edge over his own preferences. Although the human organism has the capacity to
be conscious about its self, it is by no means the case that each person is totally
aware of his personality. It is also the case that the self is not directly perceived
but built up through experience about one’s own behavior or reﬂection by others.
For example, Baumeister [1998, 684] writes: ”Consider what is involved in know-
ing that you are shy. You notice that you always get nervous in the presence of
others, and you prefer to avoid large social gatherings and meeting new people;
these observations permit the conclusion that your are shy”. You can only know
that you are shy through encounters with others. In this way, you learn something
about your self by reﬂecting on your own behavior.
With imperfect information about the self, there is room for ’self-reputation’.
Bénabou and Tirole [2001] provide an interesting application. Their assumption
involves imperfect knowledge about one’s own willpower. A person may have a
strong or weak willpower, but his type is ex ante u n k n o w nt oh i m .I nar e p e a t e d
setting, past behavior may (partly) reveal the type. By not giving in to tempta-
tions today, the individual may later draw inferences that he must have strong
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Within this framework, Bénabou and Tirole try to explain tipping behavior.
The individual may get involved in proﬁtable long term relationships. Cooper-
ation in many of these situations would be beneﬁcial. However, the individual
also has short term interests conﬂicting with long term cooperation. Only if the
individual can think of himself as having the willpower to sustain long term re-
lationships will he get involved in these. The individual may therefore wish to
show strong willpower in short term relationships as well, to signal to himself
that he can sustain long term relationships. Tipping can, according to Bénabou
and Tirole, be regarded as a compulsion: the individual is so motivated to signal
a strong willpower to himself that he is even willing to show cooperativeness in
situations where any direct long term gains are absent.
A gift reveals a strategy
Whereas in the above references signals serve to reveal one’s type,t h e r ei sa l s oa
variant of signalling that reveals one’s strategy.H e r e ,i ts u ﬃces to consider only
one type. Consider the battle-of-the-sexes. The essence of the game is that both
players beneﬁt only by choosing the same strategy. Each player has a preference
for one strategy over the other and these preferences are diﬀerent for both players.
However, choosing diﬀerent strategies makes both players worse oﬀ.N o ws u p p o s e
that both players can actually make a worthless gift to the other. This is in fact
a reinterpretation of the example taken from Van Damme [1989] where there is
an opportunity to burn a certain amount of money. By forward induction, Van
Damme shows that a gift is made with positive probability. The gift serves as a
credible threat of playing a particular strategy.
Generally, in accordance with empirical data, gifts as signals should be inadequate
or need at least not necessarily be adequate. For example in the games by Camerer
[1988] and Kranton [1996b] inadequacy is a prerequisite. In the model of Van
Damme [1989] inadequate as well as adequate gifts are possible16. Reciprocity
can also be explained by most signalling models. This is a strong point of the
signalling approach. An obvious restriction of this approach is that it is related
to informational asymmetries. This is likely to be most relevant for relationships
16This is simple to prove. The argument in Van Damme [1989] (see in particular his ﬁg. 5) is independent of
what the other player gets. The strategy of each player takes the other player’s strategy as given and as a result
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that are short in nature or are in their beginning phase. Business gifts may belong
to this category, Christmas gifts less so.
2.4 Discussion
The main focus of this chapter has not been to provide a unique uniﬁed theory of
gift-giving. Rather, it aims at exposing competing theories and to evaluate them
on their explanation power of accounting for the two characteristics reciprocity
and adequacy. The possibility of coexisting motivations for gift-giving should not
be disregarded. Perhaps the motivations diﬀer between diﬀerent kinds of gifts,
diﬀerent people, or diﬀerent time periods.
The chapter did, however, shed some light on which motivations to look for
in a wide range of situations. Gifts with the purpose of exchange can only be
expected when players have a suﬃciently long horizon and where the players are
familiar to each other. Altruism cannot explain inadequate gifts, although it is
likely to partly explain charity. Social approval can to a certain extent explain
charity, although the scope is somewhat limited: at least some people should
get to know about the act. Fairness may explain charity as well, and describes
many experimental games relatively well. Signalling explanations are powerful to
explain short-run or beginning relationships. They seem not applicable to long
run relationships, where information asymmetries have dissolved over time.
I would also like to argue for a hybrid model of gift-giving: one where diﬀerent
motivations act and interact simultaneously. Emotions and strategical actions
may both play a role. What I have in mind here is for example that people are
not intrinsically fair but still like to appear to other people as fair, and accomplish
that by giving a signal that one is fair. This combines the diﬀerent motivations
fairness, a need for approval, and signalling. This particular example comes also
out of the experiment by Güth and Van Damme [1998], where a third dummy
player is added to the ultimatum game (see section 2.3.3). Recall that one of
the main results is that only marginal oﬀers are proposed to the dummy player.
They conjecture that the proposer was not intrinsically motivated by fairness
considerations but that they do not want to be fair, but rather want to appear
fair, e.g. to prevent a rejection by the responder.
Knowing the motivations helps to design eﬃcient incentive systems. There is
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ening of the situation. When Titmuss [1970] examined the blood market, he found
that when it was tried to stimulate blood donations to reduce the shortage of
blood, by giving monetary compensations, this resulted in less blood donations
rather than more. If altruism were the only explanation of blood donation (which
is not very likely, see section 2.3.4) the decision to compensate would be under-
standable. If other factors play a role, such as a need for approval, the eﬀects of
monetary compensations on these motivations should not be disregarded. Indeed,
in chapter 3 I show that monetary compensations may decrease the willingness
to give by obstructing possible approval (less approval is rewarded if the sacriﬁce
is less).
The blood market is not the only example. In another example taken from
Gneezy and Rustichini [2000] the other way around is also found, namely that the
parents that arrived too late to collect their children at day-care centers increased
in number after a ﬁne was imposed (the gift is here the additional time that was
spent by the employees). In the interpretation of opening markets, the creation
of a market is in this case the cause of crowding out of the gift, something that is
indeed often observed (see for instance Frey [1997a,b], and Frey and Jegen [2002]
but also the discussion in Arrow [1972]). This conclusion is similar in spirit to
that of Holländer who concludes that it may well be the case that ”the opening of
a market (...) reduces voluntary contributions” (Holländer [1990, 1165]). I refer to
section 3.2.4 for a more detailed discussion about the interaction between markets
and gifts. As one can see already, the appropriate incentive mechanism takes into
account other motivations than selﬁshness. A name in the records may have more
impact than a reward.
Aﬁnal note on where all these motivations come from. Carmichael and MacLeod
[1997] have shown that gifts as a signal at the beginning of a relationship can lead
to cooperation. They also showed that this institution is evolutionarily stable. The
intuition is as follows. A gift is a signal of trustworthiness and has to be given at
the beginning of any new relationship. If both agents in a partnership conform
to this custom they only have to give once and stay in the partnership forever. A
free rider, on the other hand, is detected after one period and has to search for
a new relationship again. This cannot be a strategy that often pays oﬀ,s i n c ef o r
every new relationship a gift has to be incurred.
Other authors have shown that many other emotions such as anger and altru-
ism can also be evolutionarily stable (see e.g. Güth and Kliemt [1994], [1998]).53 Discussion
Emotions like anger may result in lower current payoﬀs, since punishing is usually
also costly to the punisher, but may still induce behavior that is evolutionarily
successful. Defectors are deterred away by the threat of punishments. This ex-
plains such sentiments as having emerged from selection pressures, which has
resulted in modern institutions such as gift-giving. 3
The Demand for Social Approval as a
Motivation to Give
The Kwakiutl were once one of the major tribes of the Norhwest Coast. They
were quite wealthy, often even richer than many of the other settlers in that
area (see Codere [1950]). They have intrigued anthropologists not in the least
because of their ceremonies. The best known ceremony is the so called potlatch,
a gift-giving ceremony. During the potlatches, many blankets and large amounts
of copper were being given away to other tribesmen. However, this was done in
a way that seems particularly ineﬃcient: many of the gifts are destroyed on the
spot. The anthropologist Mauss observed that during these potlatches ”they go as
far as the purely sumptuary destruction of wealth” (Mauss [1926, 6], witness also
the following quote:
(...) she ordered one of her kinsmen to tow it [copper] to sea behind a
canoe and to cut it adrift in deep water and let it sink. ”This is my
gift to you, O chief.” (Drucker and Heizer [1967, 105]).
Although less visible and certainly less extreme, the same behaviour can also be
found in gift exchanges that take place in modern societies. Rather than giving
0A shorter version of this chapter appeared in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2002
vol. 158 (3), 464-482 under the title: The Demand for Social Approval and Status as a Motivation to Give. I am
indebted to Michèle Belot, Jeﬀrey James, Luuk van Kempen, Fieke van der Lecq, Sjak Smulders, participants
at the European Economic Association Conference (Lausanne, 2001), and especially to Theo van de Klundert
and two anonymous referees for very valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions.Chapter 3. The Demand for Social Approval as a Motivation to Give 56
in cash, gifts are mostly in kind, thereby destroying some of the monetary value
to the receiver. This chapter tries to shed some light on the motivations behind
such, and other related behaviour.
3.1 Introduction
Gift-giving has mainly interested anthropologists because it has been taken as a
primitive mode of exchange. Relying both on a double coincidence of wants and on
the existence of trust between the agents, gift-giving clearly seems to be inferior to
the market mechanism. Yet, gift-giving is still widely observed even in countries
with well-developed markets. Indeed, gift-giving sometimes even ﬂourished in the
presence of a market economy (Gregory [1989]).
The diﬃculty is not to explain gift-giving per se. One can simply attribute
utility to the act of giving, or, in the terminology of Andreoni [1990], a warm
glow feeling. Rather, there are some stylized facts related to gift-giving that have
to be explained but are puzzling from a standard economics point of view. These
stylized facts include reciprocity, inadequate giving, and a negative correlation
between monetary compensations for gifts and the level of gift-giving. Reciprocity
refers to the observation that, although voluntary on guise, gifts appear in fact to
have strong reciprocal properties. Inadequacy points to the fact that gifts should
be in cash in order to maximally satisfy the preferences of the receiver, but often
they are not. Finally, it is observed that gift-giving is sometimes reduced after
compensation is oﬀered. Neither one of these stylized facts can easily be explained
by standard economic arguments.
The main point to this chapter is to explain gift-giving by means of a demand
for social approval and status; two factors deeply rooted in human nature. The
idea that approval motivates gift-giving is in my opinion intuitively an appealing
hypothesis. Public goods experiments show that familiarity with the identity and
actions of other players leads to signiﬁcantly higher contributions (Andreoni and
Petrie [2000], Gächter and Fehr [1999]). Earlier Satow [1975] has shown that the
increase in donations in public conditions as compared to private conditions is
strongly correlated to the individual’s need for approval.57 Introduction
Although not entirely neglected in the economics literature,1 the concepts of
social approval and status have, above all, found an eminent place in sociology
and social psychology. It plays the same part there as money does in economics:
recognition by others is regarded as a primary source of satisfaction (see for
example Homans [1961]; Kenrick, Neuberg, and Cialdini [1999]; and Coleman
[1990]). Social approval in this sense appears to be a functional substitute for
money. Hence, a transaction that is unequal in monetary terms — as a gift is —
can in principle still be in balance as long as approval is awarded.
Gift-giving indeed appears to be a virtue and a source of prestige (Polanyi
[1957], Schwartz [1967]). The way in which approval is obtained is however com-
plex. Evidently, approval will be higher the more the gift is valued. But it also
turns out to depend on the sacriﬁce incurred by the giver. Moreover, approval
seems to be closely linked with status. Recognition and status are often mentioned
in one and the same breath (for example in Schwartz [1967, 7], and Harsanyi
[1969, 523]). Taking these factors into account, the stylized facts become natural
implications of the model.
Other implications of taking into account the taste for social approval follow
from relating gift-giving to the market institution. Since the market is in its purest
form an anonymous institution, no social approval is obtained in a market ex-
change. On the other hand creates the market incentives to maximize adequacy.
Gift-giving as an exchange mechanism does allow for acquiring approval but in
general fails to maximize adequacy. Hence, in choosing between a gift-exchange
or a market exchange the trade-oﬀ to be made is that between approval and ade-
quacy. However, spontaneous order does not necessarily lead to the most eﬃcient
institution because the links between the institutions are shot through with exter-
nalities (Dasgupta [2000]). Unfortunately, trying to correct for any ineﬃciencies
with a standard economic tool like money compensations does not always resolve
this and may even have the opposite eﬀect of worsening the situation. This is in
line with what the model is able to predict and with ample empirical evidence.
Roughly, the basic line of argument runs as follows. In the model, two individ-
uals are playing a sequential move gift-giving game. Each of them has preferences
for both a consumption good and social approval. Player 1, then, makes a gift
for which approval is awarded. But lagging behind in the status race for wanting
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more approval than the other, player 2 ﬁnds it proﬁtable to react by making a
countergift. This explains the so often found reciprocal behavior. Inadequacy is
just as easily explained. In trying to prevent player 2 from catching up in terms of
status, player 1 can deliberately devalue his gift by giving in kind rather than in
cash. This makes it more expensive for player 2 to reciprocate. Finally, note that
a compensation reduces the sacriﬁce needed to make a gift. This is positive in
terms of consumption, but it is also likely to reduce the awarded social approval
for the gift. Whereas with standard assumptions on preferences a compensation
should increase gift-giving, with a preference for approval it is ambiguous whether
compensation increases or reduces gift-giving in equilibrium.
The setup is as follows. The subsequent section is concerned with deriving
the basic properties of gift-giving from a simple model. Building on empirical as
well as experimental evidence, an extensive account is given on what the social
approval function should look like and what kind of consequences it has for the
way economists think about the workings of the market institution. Section 3.3
relates the model to the existing literature. Finally, section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Social approval, status, and gift-Giving
“Gratitude is bestowed on a giver.” Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics.
3.2.1 The basic model
In this section, the tentative explanations of the stylized facts are made more
precise. The model is highly stylized and is only meant to be suggestive in ex-
plaining how social approval can aﬀect decisions. I believe however that the key
insights are not sensitive to the speciﬁcation of the model and that they would
survive in a more general framework.
In the model there are two players. Player 1 is the ﬁst mover in a sequential gift-
giving game, and player 2 follows. Their decision variable is the amount of time
spent doing volunteer work (lv
i ). The rest of their available unit of time (1 − lv
i)
is devoted to working in the market sector at wage wm
i .With the income that is
earned on the market, wm
i (1 − lv
i), the consumption good x can be purchased,
which is available at unity price.
The time spent doing volunteer work is a gift and contributes to the other
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consumption good x. The gift increases the other person’s consumption by the
amount of δilv
i. This way, the parameter δ can be interpreted as a measure of
adequacy. By adequacy is meant how the receiver’s utility of consumption is
increased relative to the costs incurred by the giver. A more adequate gift increases
the receiver’s utility of consumption more given the costs incurred by the giver.
Note that standard microeconomics arguments tell us that it can never be worse
in terms of utility to get a gift in cash rather than in kind. As a result, a cash-gift
is in general more adequate than a gift in kind. This can be translated back into
the model as follows. If δi = wm
i then the gift is exactly identical to giving money.
Hence, this case is interpreted as if it were a cash-gift. If δi <w m
i , the gift is worth
less than the cash-equivalent. The latter case is interpreted as a gift in kind.2
In sum, total consumption of good x by player i is given by:
xi = w
m





If utility is only derived from consumption, as is usually assumed in economics,
neither one of the players will give. Whatever player 1 gives to player 2, it is
optimal for player 2 not to make a countergift. Foreseeing this behavior, player 1
does not make a gift as well.
The main departure from standard models is the inclusion of a preference
for social approval as well as for status. There are good reasons to do so. The
worry about status and the ’thirst for approval’ are among the most recurring
themes in anthropology (Wright [1994]). They thus seem to be deeply rooted in
human nature. The existence of suchlike sentiments possibly has emerged from
selection pressures because emotive motivations indirectly induce behavior that
is evolutionary successful (see Güth and Kliemt [1994], [1998]). Each of these
emotions is explained in more detail below.
Social Approval
The ﬁrst building block is to take into account the taste for approval. It is beyond
any doubt that a preferences for approval exists. Man is a ’social being’ whose
economy is submerged in his social relationships. Polanyi [1957, 46] considers this
2If δi >w m
i , a gift is worth more to the receiver than its cash-equivalent. As said, this is not the standard
case, but one can think of examples where it is a possibility, for instance when the receiver has incomplete
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to be the “one conclusion [that] stands out more clearly than another from the
recent study of early societies.”3 Indeed, the preference for social approval may
very well be as important as the preference for consumption goods (Harsanyi
[1969], Sugden [1989], Dasgupta [2000]). But it seems that the actual obtaining of
approval is a rather complex process. In order not to complicate matters any more
than is necessary for current purposes, the focus is on two elementary properties.
First, the higher the value of the gift as judged by the receiver, the more the
gift is approved. The social approval function for player i should consequently be
increasing in δi.4 Second, approval is increasing in the sacriﬁce made by the giver.
Sacriﬁce is likely to be something relative to what you earn. A gift of one dollar
by the poor is approved more than the same donation by a millionaire. This is
exactly the behavior that Pruitt [1968] ﬁnds. In his experiment, more reward was
provided by the receiver if the giver had sent out 80% of his endowment of $1
than if he had sent out 20% of his endowment of $4, presumably because the
sacriﬁce is larger in the former case. The simplest measure of sacriﬁce is the wage
level. The higher the wage, the more consumption is forgone in order to give. So,
a higher wage corresponds to a higher sacriﬁce. This amounts to a social approval
function that is increasing in wm
i . Further empirical evidence for this is found by
Robben and Verhallen [1994].
Status — Why humans get ulcers
“Men have an immoderate love of pleasure, inﬂuence, prestige, power
—i naw o r d ,w e a l t h . ”F. Bastiat, Economic Sophisms.
It is conventional in economics to assume that a higher income generates a higher
well-being. When psychologists try to measure the happiness of people they in-
deed ﬁnd such a relationship on the individual level. Paradoxically, however, the
average satisfaction level is remarkably stable over time, despite signiﬁcant in-
creases in per capita income (see for example Frank [1997]).
It seems that the disappointing increase in happiness is closely related to a
question that occupied Hume more than two centuries ago: How can it be that
3For a similar account in modern sociology see Coleman [1990].
4This seems evident but may in fact not be entirely trivial. In some cases a very large gift may actually
cause embarrassment thereby decreasing approval, as in the case one would get diamonds on a ﬁrst date. I do
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our impressions of the same object can at one time be an admiration of its bulk,
and at another to despise it for its littleness? Hume found the solution in a careful
examination of human passions:
”So little are men governed by reason in their sentiments and opinions,
that they always judge more of objects by comparison than from their
intrinsic worth and value” (Hume [1886, 158]).
Comparison is the keyword here. Much like a certain mountain looks big next
to a smaller mountain yet only little next to a bigger one, the same amount of
wealth is pleasurable if you have more of it than your neighbours, but becomes
frustrating when you have less. In other words, the apparent solution to the
paradox in question can be found in the supposition that people deeply care
about status. That is, they certainly do care about wealth, but only insofar as
it increases their prestige, a form of status. This role of wealth, also present in
the quote by Bastiat at the outset of this section, implies that the increased well-
being of an individual from a higher income dissolves once the other people in her
reference group reach the same level of prestige that she was privileged to enjoy
before. A general increase of the wealth of a nation has thus no profound eﬀect
on the general happiness of people.
The idea that people care about status has often been recognized before in
the economic literature5. The reason for that is clear, as already as far back as
Veblen [1899/1953, 80] it is acknowledged that in many articles ”... the traces of
conspicuous waste, or at least the habit of ostentation, usually become evident on
a close scrutinity”. Darwinian anthropologists have put forward the hypothesis
that worries about status is one of the most recurring patterns in all cultures
(see Wright [1994]). Furthermore, research in biology conﬁrms that up to the
present day humans are equipped with a hard-wired preference for status. The
achievement of status involves physiological consequences. For example, it turns
out that more of the neurotransmitter serotonin (which is, as it happens, also
used in many antidepressants) is being secreted when humans (or animals) are in
the position of a leader (see Wright [1994] and Frank [1985] for a more elaborate
5For an early contribution that employs status as an assumption: see Leibenstein [1950]. More recent
contributions include Cooper et al. [2001] and Corneo and Jeanne [1997]. Van Kempen [2003] points out that
even poor people have status concerns. See also the references therein and in the main text of this chapter for
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treatment). In his Why zebras don’t get ulcers, Sapolsky [1998] even goes as far
as associating sudden cardiac deaths (and human ulcers, for that matter) with
major stressors such as the loss of status, and cites several studies that are indeed
congruent with this view. Evolutionarily speaking, all this makes sense: a high
level of status gives better access to resources, such as food, and increases the
probability of successful reproduction as it attracts partners (Frank [1985], Wright
[1994]).
Much of the research done has focused on domination-oriented status, and
mostly among animals. But, according to Barkow [1989], as a consequence of
selection contemporary human prestige has a more symbolic nature than the
agonistic dominance found among primates. Prestigious objects or acts signal an
increased ability and willingness to make paternal investments in oﬀspring.
Giving can be a source of status as well, in the form of prestige. This is for
example the case in the consumption domain. Wealth increases prestige. When
wealth is not so visible to outsiders, gifts can enhance status by giving a signal
about the wealthiness of a particular person.6 I, however, follow Holländer [1990]
in employing status eﬀects in the approval domain. Holländer [1990] cites several
studies in which it is argued that people not only want to be admired, but also
want to be more admired than others. This is also experimentally veriﬁed by
Gächter and Fehr [1996]. They ﬁnd that social approval decreases in the average
level of contributions by other subjects and point to the similarity with status
eﬀects. Implicitly, Forge [1972] ﬁnds this also to be the case in the more archaic
societies in New Guinea when he remarks that a gift exchange is never perfectly
balanced so that if the recipient fails to outdo the giver, it is the giver who gains
and the receiver who loses. Or, in the more explicit words of Gregory [1989, 110]
”... gift exchange necessarily introduces status inequalities”.7
Preferences





j,α ≥ 0. (3.2)
6See Glazer and Konrad [1996] for a formal model.
7And how many others will not be as tempted as Ng is to give as expensive gifts as the schoolmates of one’s
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Every unit of voluntary labor is weighted by the function βi = β(δi, ˜ wi), which
is increasing in both of its arguments: the weight is larger if the value of gift is
higher (δi) and if the sacriﬁce (˜ wi) is greater, as measured by the forgone wage
of the giver (wm
i ). The parameter α in equation (3.2) reﬂects the degree of status
orientation.
Finally, preferences are represented by a utility function that is for simplicity
additive in consumption and net social approval:
ui = ux(xi)+us(si). (3.3)
It satisﬁes the usual assumptions with respect to x and s: u0
x,u 0
s > 0 and u00
x,
u00
s ≤ 0, where (double) primes denote ﬁrst (second) derivatives. At this point it
should be noted that in practice the degree of status orientation is not uniform
among people (see Wright [1994]) and neither is the intensity of the need for
approval (Satow [1975]). Including such heterogeneity would not alter the basic
arguments of this chapter and is for that reason left for future research.
Equation (3.3) is a possible representation of the theory of social behavior that
Homans has in mind when he speaks of ’social behavior as exchange’ (Homans
[1958, 606]). In his view, social behavior is an exchange of goods, including non-
material ones such as approval. Now note that although an exchange of material
goods can be accomplished in any social setting, the accomplishment of approval
is tied to social interaction. That the utility derived from a good depends on
the social context is a simple extension of Lancaster’s theory of consumption
(Lancaster [1966], Hirsch [1976, 85]). In the view of Lancaster [1966], goods as such
are not the direct object of utility. Instead, utility is derived from characteristics
and goods are bundles of characteristics. The environment of exchange can be
seen as one of those characteristics. Compare also Bowles [1998, 87] who notes
that “the terms on which [people] are willing to transact depends on the perceived
relationship.”
This amounts to a useful interpretation of equation (3.3) in that it captures
various exchange regimes characterized by diﬀerent intensities of social interac-
tion, with the strictly anonymous market exchange as the extreme where no social
interaction exists at all (us =0 , although practically speaking even the market
is characterized by some social interaction rather than by complete anonymity).
Hence, in studying market trade there are good reasons to neglect the role of
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ferent when studying gift-giving where, contrary to abstract markets, trade is
not anonymous. Gift exchange is above all a social relationship (Gregory [1989]).
In such a case the taste for approval strongly inﬂuences behavior. Suggestive in
this respect is the recent ﬁnding by Gächter and Fehr [1999] that in experimental
settings some minimal social familiarity generates a signiﬁcant rise in cooperation.
3.2.2 Sequential move equilibrium












for any given lv
1. Ignoring parameters, this gives a reaction function of player 2 of
the form lv∗
2 = f2(lv












The solutions to (3.4) and (3.5) constitute an equilibrium. Throughout the focus
is on an interior solution since this is the only interesting case.
Reciprocity
The ﬁrst result is obtained from the properties of player 2’s response function
f2(lv
1). Since this function relates the optimal gift of player 2 to the gift of player 1,
it predicts whether reciprocal behavior should be observed or not. Note ﬁrst that,
as argued earlier, without a preference for approval (us =0 )the optimal response
of player 2 is not to make a gift, independent of the gift by player 1. Without a
preference for approval, the only eﬀect of a gift would be a loss of consumption.
Player 1 foresees that f2 =0 , so that it is also for him optimal not to give. No
gift-giving occurs even if there are mutual gains of giving (δ1 >w m
2 and δ2 >w m
1 ).
The cause of this is that player 1 has to rely on a countergift by player 2, but
he has no reason to trust player 2 on this. An explicit or implicit contract can
of course solve this problem of trust. But reciprocal gift-giving is also observed
i ns i t u a t i o n sw h e r en oe x p l i c i tc o n t r a c te x i s t s ,o ra tm o s ta ni n c o m p l e t eo n e ,
and where an implicit contract is not credible. Mauss [1925/1980], for example,
portrays gift-giving among tribes, and ﬁnds that reciprocity is one of the basic
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are set above the minimum acceptable standard and these are reciprocated in the
form of higher eﬀorts. These results of reciprocal gift-giving without complete
explicit contracts are replicated in many laboratory experiments (see for example
Fehr and Schmidt [1999] and Bolton and Ockenfels [2000]). In many cases these
were one-shot games so that reputation cannot enforce credible implicit contracts
either (see for example Cooper et al. [1996], and Gächter and Falk [1999]). The
point of all this, is that apparently contracts are not always necessary to induce
reciprocal gift-giving. As it turns out, a preference for social approval is enough.
That gifts can be positive in equilibrium is quite obvious: all one needs to
assume is that the gain in net social approval outweighs the loss of consumption
in utility terms. More interesting is to account for reciprocity. This is established
in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Reciprocity): With a preference for social approval, the optimal
gift of player 2 is positively related to (i) the gift of player 1 (∂f2/∂lv
1 > 0),a n d
(ii) the degree of status orientation ( ∂f2/∂α > 0).

































the second order condition of maximization, the denominator of the right hand





























. The ﬁrst term in brackets is strictly positive. The
second term is zero if α =0 ,in which case ∂s2
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If the players care about approval, they behave in a reciprocal manner. This
result in itself (i.e. (i) in Proposition 1) holds in principle for every degree of
status orientation (including α =0 ), but is strengthened by a higher degree of
status orientation (see (ii)). This partly solves the trust problem. Player 1 has
now reason to believe that player 2 makes a countergift, simply because it is
in player 2’s own beneﬁt to do so. This does not mean that player 2 always
reciprocates the gift of player 1, just like an altruist not always gives something.
What it means is that the more player 1 gives, the more he is likely to get
something back. The intuition behind this result is the following. The gift of
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utility of consumption. Insofar as status plays a role, the gift also decreases the
net social approval received by player 2, thereby increasing the marginal utility of
net social approval. Because a countergift has opposite eﬀects on the consumption
and the net approval level, a gift by player 1 creates incentives for player 2 to
give as well.
The foregoing has concentrated on reciprocity in the sense of rewarding gener-
ous gifts with countergifts, also called positive reciprocity. The other side to the
coin is negative reciprocity, by which it is commonly understood that players who
are stingy are punished for being so. For instance, low oﬀers in ultimatum games
are often rejected, making both players worse oﬀ.
The terms ’rewarding’ and ’punishing’ seem to imply a (fairness) norm to which
players are expected to comply to. Positive deviations are rewarded, negative
ones punished. Rejections in anonymously played ultimatum games and other
public good games with the option to punish is indeed best explained by feelings
of resentment, negative reciprocity in other words (Fehr and Gächter [2000]).
This has not much to do with approval. Nonetheless does a demand for social
approval and status give some hints as to what will happen in those games when
there would be some familiarity among the players. First, players would have
the opportunity to get approval for punishing stingy players, strengthening the
incentives for punishments. Second, apart from feelings of resentment, players
might be less willing to accept low oﬀers in the ultimatum game for fear of a loss
of status. Since player 2 can either accept (A) or reject (R) in the ultimatum
game, his gain in utility from accepting the gift of player 1 is8:









which is the sum of the gain in consumption and the loss in net approval. To accept
but not being able to reciprocate means a sure loss in net approval, hence the
observation that “Charity is still wounding for him who has accepted it” (Mauss
[1925/1980, 65]). For high levels of status orientation this status loss outweighs
the consumption gain and makes rejection sensible. Note that the receiver would
have preferred to give back (f2 > 0) but is by construction forced to lv
2 =0( with
lv
1 > 0), or to refrain from any gifts at all (both lv
1 = lv
2 =0 ) .






1 − 0 since the
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Interestingly, and perhaps related, Mauss [1925] also points out that the root
of the word gift is the same as that of poison. Harm befalls on the recipient of
a gift, as he is challenged to catch up in the competitive race for status. This
imbalance that is created by a one-sided gift is also nicely captured in the Indian
verb quoted in Brigham [1991, 300]: ”Why do you hate me? I’ve never even helped
you”.
A cautious remark should be made here. A rejection itself can be perfectly
rationalized within the current model. But it turns out that while low oﬀers
are sometimes rejected, high oﬀers are normally accepted. It is easily checked
that with u00
s < 0 this behavior is inconsistent. This indicates that the approval
function is more complex than the one operated, for instance, one that is convex
above a reference point and concave below. Although most of the results would
go through under this extension, it leaves open the question how such a reference
point is determined, and is therefore left for further research.
One would thus expect that rejections are more often observed in ultima-
tum games where there is familiarity among the players. Translated to out-of-
laboratory situations, one would expect a needy person to more easily accept
a gift from an anonymous source than from a person he can identify, since the
latter introduces a loss in net social approval. Finally, one would expect that if
possible, players would rather want to give something back. At least for the lat-
ter statement there is already some evidence (see Kenrick, Neuberg, and Cialdini
[1999]) but it would certainly be worth to investigate these and related issues
more thoroughly.
Adequacy
The presence of a taste for approval secures that a gift is usually reciprocated.
This allows an exchange to take place without the support of contracts. But
in the current gift-giving game, the exchange is only an intermediate variable
with approval as the ultimate objective. It is interesting to see how this role of
exchange aﬀects the properties of the gift. This relates to a puzzle that concerns
the adequacy of gifts. A cash-gift is more adequate than a gift in kind. But on
many occasions, it is quite unusual to give cash. Research by Webley and Wilson
[1989] is illustrative of this. Their questionnaires reveal that subjects prefer to
give presents rather than money. Likewise, Caplow [1982] ﬁnds that in the data
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This behaviour is puzzling at ﬁrst sight because of the assumption that gifts
serve to gain approval and presumably less adequate gifts are less approved. But
on closer inspection, there is a rationale behind this behavior. Player 1 likes
getting a countergift in that it increases his consumption. But he dislikes it in
that it decreases his net approval. Clearly, if the gift of player 2 would be a little
bit lower, he can be either better or worse oﬀ, depending on the relative decrease
in consumption as compared to the relative increase in net social approval. This
means that there are incentives for player 1 to manipulate the gift of player 2.
Suppose he indeed wants to lower the gift of player 2. According to the following
lemma, he can do this by decreasing the adequacy of his own gift.
Lemma 1 : Player 2 reciprocates more if he receives more adequate gifts, that
is, ∂f2/∂δ1 > 0.
Proof. With the introduction of the second decision variable for player 1, δ1,t h e
optimal gift of player 2 is dependent both on lv
1 and δ1: lv∗
2 = f2(lv
1,δ1) (ignoring
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The intuition behind this intermediate result is that by lowering the adequacy
of his gift, player 1 contributes less to the consumption level of player 2, keeping
the marginal utility of consumption for him at a high level. This makes it more
expensive for player 2 to give. Besides this eﬀect, it also increases the net status of
player 2, decreasing the marginal utility of social approval. Both eﬀects reduce the
incentives for player 2 to make a gift. The behaviour by the kwakiutl of destroying
gifts (see the introduction to this chapter) can also be understood along to these
lines.
To derive the desired result formally, I say that the gesture is relatively impor-
tant if the approval rate is not very sensitive to the value of the gift: i.e. ∂βi/∂δi
is low. In this case, it is the act of giving that counts, and not so much the gift it-
self. This is not so unreasonable. As Holländer [1990, 1161] puts it: “we generally
approve of cooperative behavior even if it does not make us signiﬁcantly better
oﬀ.”
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Proposition 2 (Adequacy): With a preference for social approval, player 1 has
an incentive to reduce the adequacy of his gift (du1/dδ1 < 0) if the degree of
status-orientation (α)is suﬃciently high and the gesture is relatively important
(∂β1/∂δ1 low).
Proof. Player 1’s utility is given by: u1 = u1(lv
1,f 2(lv
1,δ 1),δ1). The total derivative
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ﬁrst term in brackets is the direct eﬀect and is positive ∂u1/∂δ1 =( ∂β1/∂δ1)l1u0
s:
ah i g h e rδ1 increases net approval at the rate (∂β1/∂δ1)l1u0
s. This term vanishes
as ∂β1/∂δ1 becomes smaller. The second term in brackets in the indirect eﬀect
due to the response of player 2. Since by Lemma 1 ∂f2/∂δ1 > 0, the sign of the




s. Using the FOC and the
additional assumption that wm
1 >δ 2f0
2 it is easy to show that the sign is negative
for α>(β1/β2)·(δ2/wm
1 ). Hence, the total eﬀect is negative if ∂β1/∂δ1 is low and
αis suﬃciently large. The assumption that wm
1 >δ 2f0
2 merely states that gifts
require a sacriﬁce and are made to gain approval, not to increase consumption.
This seems reasonable when one speaks of social approval as a motivation to give.
Let me reﬂect for one moment on the results so far. In the introduction to this
chapter, I have described the gift-giving ceremony of the Kwakiutl: the Potlatch.
Here, I would like to argue that the need for social approval and status may be
an accurate description of their gift-giving practices. Many of Mauss’ observa-
tions which often clearly point to status concerns, including his observations that
”Face is lost forever if [a return gift] is not made” (Mauss [1926, 41] and that
large gifts are made by men ”in order to outdo their rival” (Mauss [1926, 6]9.
Also congruent with a demand for social approval and status is his mentioning
of the fact that gifts are often ostentatious. Interestingly, we also saw that the
Potlatch is characterized by an extreme degree of inadequate gift-giving, in line
with proposition 2. According to Godelier [1996, 56], the goal of this is explicitly
to ”make it diﬃcult or impossible to give back the equivalent”. The broken cop-
per is seen as a victory much like as a killing of a rival would have been. It is a
9It is in this respect also interesting to note that Mauss [1926] traces the origin of the word "gift" back and
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ﬁght for prestige, a war that is fought with property as weapons, to paraphrase
Codere [1950]. The last thing you want is to provide your enemy with weapons.
The destruction of copper does exactly prevent that.
Eﬃciency
The incentive to give inadequate gifts has warranted researchers to conclude
that gift-giving creates a deadweight loss. Subsequent calculations accredited to
Christmas gifts a deadweight loss in the range of 10-30% of their value (Waldfogel
[1993]). Yet, one cannot conclude from inadequacy itself that gift-giving creates
an ineﬃciency, in the sense that everybody could be made better oﬀ.I nt h er e -
search done by Waldfogel [1993], and also in the follow-up studies by Solnick and
Hemenway [1996] and Waldfogel [1996], it is tacitly assumed that the giver is in-
diﬀerent between giving in cash and in kind. However, as found in questionnaires
(see e.g. Webley and Wilson [1989]) and in line with Proposition 2, givers are not
at all indiﬀerent but clearly prefer to give in kind. Hence, inadequacy does not
imply ineﬃciency. However, the following proposition nevertheless shows that in
equilibrium gift-giving is ineﬃcient.
Proposition 3 (Eﬃciency): There exists a feasible distribution of endowments
that is a Pareto-improvement upon the gift-giving equilibrium.
Proof. The proof follows in a fairly straightforward way from proposition 1.
Note that the reaction function f2 of player 2 is an upward sloping curve in the
(lv
2,l v
1) plane. Recall that this curve is the set of points where player 2’s utility is
maximized for any given lv
1. Thus, the line f2 cuts each of player 2s indiﬀerence
curve at its maximum. Hence, the indiﬀerence curve has slope zero everywhere
along f2. Player 1 chooses a point on this curve that maximizes his utility. This
is necessarily a point where the slope of his indiﬀerence curve is tangent to the
reaction function of player 2. Hence, in equilibrium the slope of the indiﬀerence
curve is positive for player 1. Since the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves diﬀer
between the players, there exists a point where both could be made better oﬀ.
The cause of this ineﬃciency is twofold. First, the preference for status introduces
an ineﬃciency. This is clear: both players put resources in the race for status, but
only the net result counts. This is most clearly seen for the case where α =1 .
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utility from it with regard to social approval, since net social approval would equal
zero. Second, player 1 acts strategically by taking the optimal response of player
2 into account. He does not, however, take into account the eﬀects on player 2s
welfare. To derive the social optimum, he would have to take into account the
welfare of both players.
3.2.3 Simultaneous move equilibrium
So far, the focus has been on the sequential move gift-giving game. The reason
is that the inclusion of time is necessary to have a meaningful interpretation of
reciprocity. After all, reciprocation is a notion of giving back. But in an important
class of gift-giving, namely charity, gift-giving occurs anonymously and therefore
necessarily without any countergift.
Quite obviously does the absence of countergifts not preclude gift-giving. The
diﬃculty therefore lies in the anonymous aspect of charity. Can approval be ob-
tained in such a setting? The answer, perhaps surprisingly, is sometimes yes.
Status is often awarded on the basis of events that do not directly aﬀect the
person who awards status (Coleman [1990, 130]). The receiver may very well be
anonymous, but the giver can make his act known to other persons than the re-
ceiver. This is most clearly described by Schwartz [1967, 2] who states that “it
is common knowledge that men present themselves publicly by the conspicuous
presentation of gifts. Generous contributions to charity have always been a source
of prestige in the United States.” This is acknowledged by fund raisers by provid-
ing people with “I gave” stickers to be aﬃxed to the front door (Schwartz [1967])
or coﬀee mugs, lapel pins, and bumper stickers and so on (Andreoni and Petrie
[2000]). In this way, donors can signal their contributions.
Clearly, if approval is indeed the motivation of charity then behavior should
depend heavily on whether or not the possibility exists to make the act of giv-
ing publicly known. In a clever designed experiment Andreoni and Petrie [2000]
have tested for this. They found that, if faced with the opportunity, virtually all
subjects that donated choose to be publicly known as having done so. Moreover,
average contributions in last rounds are more than twice as high as in anonymous
settings. Satow [1975] has found a similar eﬀect in an experiment where subjects
could voluntarily donate part of their earnings to a research fund. Not only did
they donate signiﬁcantly more to the research fund when they were observed by
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condition), the amount donated was also signiﬁcantly related to their need for
approval, as measured by a ’social desirability scale’. Subjects with a high need
for approval donated signiﬁcantly more than those with a low need for social
approval. Furthermore, there was also a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect: under the
public condition the eﬀect of a high need for approval was greater than under the
private conditions. The main results are reproduced in the table below. Unfortu-
nately, I am not aware of any other experimental study that relates gift-giving to
the need for approval, so the evidence remains circumstantial.
TABLE 3.1
Mean Percentage of Earnings Donated to the Research Fund
Need for approval Private condition Public condition
Low need for approval 4.45 17.27
High need for approval 3.11 38.71
Source: Satow [1975].
As a last piece of evidence, I report an empirical study by Harbaugh [1998].
He found that when charities report names of contributors in categories rather
than in exact amounts, a large proportion of donations is at the boundaries of
those categories. Social approval as a motivation predicts this: it is impossible
for the public to discriminate between diﬀerent donations within each category.
The donor can therefore as well contribute the lowest amount within a certain
category.10
3.2.4 Gifts and markets
Thus far the focus has been on the properties of gift-giving. In this subsection
these ﬁndings are related to another exchange mechanism: the market.
Recall once again that gifts in kind are usually taken to be a social waste be-
cause the recipient could have achieved a higher utility level from an equally costly
cash-gift. Problematic in this respect is that in the environment of gift-giving, in-
dividual rationality sometimes prescribes to give in kind rather than in cash (see
10Though a reasonable alternative explanation is that framing eﬀects play parts. Note also that the signiﬁ-
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proposition 2). The market mechanism does not suﬀer from this tendency. This
has warranted researchers to conclude that, compared to the market, gift-giving
creates a deadweight loss. Subsequent calculations accredited to Christmas gifts
a deadweight loss in the range of 10-30% of their value (Waldfogel [1993]).
In the research done by Waldfogel [1993] and in the follow-up studies (Solnick
and Hemenway [1996] and Waldfogel [1996]) it is tacitly assumed that the giver is
indiﬀerent between giving in cash and in kind. However, as found in questionnaires
(see e.g. Webley and Wilson [1989]) and in line with Proposition 2, givers are not
at all indiﬀerent but clearly prefer to give in kind. This has consequences for
the measurement of the deadweight loss. True, turning to the market prevents
inadequacy. But insofar as the market is an anonymous institution, it does not
realize this valuable psychological sentiment called approval. It is for that reason
not obvious that gift-giving creates a deadweight loss. The trade-oﬀ to be made is
that between adequacy and approval. In neglecting the latter part of this trade-oﬀ
one tends to overestimate the size of the deadweight loss, if there is any.
Of equal interest is how the market institution interacts with gift-giving. There
are instructive examples that show how the opening of a market leads to a
crowding-out of gift-giving (Hirsch [1976], Yellen [1990]). There are hints that
this crowding-out is detrimental to social welfare. The keypoint is that the links
between the market institution and gift-giving are shot through with externalities
(see in particular Kranton [1996a] and Dasgupta [2000], and chapter 4). As Hirsch
[1976, 78] puts it, “social relationships do not, by their nature, have the character
of private economic goods.” Indeed, when the !Kung tribe gained access to mar-
kets which were superior in the supply of goods, they abolished gift-giving and
at the same time retreated from their social life, eroding the cohesion of society
(Yellen [1990]).
Yet, there is also another side to the coin. Where the market is an eﬃcient
institution, gift-giving can be a hindrance. Kranich [1994] points out that when
gifts are permitted, an eﬃcient equilibrium need not be reached. For instance,
gift-giving acquires the character of a public good in case agents have preferences
over the economy’s entire allocation of income rather than just their own income.
As another example, recall that due to moral hazard the market does not pro-
vide full insurance. Nonmarket insurers (such as a family) may therefore want
to supplement the market. Arnott and Stiglitz [1991] then show that when these
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assistance not only crowds out market insurance but is also harmful and therefore
dysfunctional.
On the more positive side can gift-giving be a useful complement to the market
institution in case the latter fails. Consider the supply of a public good. The
market creates no incentives to contribute at all because individually it does not
pay oﬀ i nt e r m so fc o n s u m p t i o n .S o c i a la p p r o v a la tl e a s tg i v e ssome incentives,
although there is nothing that guarantees that gift-giving for the sake of obtaining
approval continues up to the point where the supply is optimal. Gift-giving can
complement the market to a certain extent, though additional incentives are likely
to be needed in order to reach the optimal amount of gifts.
In providing these additional incentives, it is probably not unfair to say that the
eﬀects on social approval are usually neglected when it comes to institutions being
recipients. The right way to stimulate giving then seems obvious: compensate
donors directly for the eﬀorts. This is exactly the measure that was expected to
alleviate the shortage of blood donations. However, quite unexpectedly to many,
the actual change in the supply of blood turned out to be negative (see Titmuss
[1970]). Other studies that show this pattern emerges in diﬀerent settings as well
include Gneezy and Rustichini [2000] and Frey [1997a], [1997b] (see also chapter
7). Yet, this kind of behavior is only surprising insofar as the object of human
behavior is material gain. A higher compensation makes you richer and it makes
giving relatively cheaper. For that reason one should indeed, if anything, increase
one’s gift. On the other hand is there the eﬀect on social approval. Rewarding
gift-giving reduces sacriﬁce, and as argued before, there is evidence that sacriﬁce
is positively correlated with social approval. Hence, rewarding gift-giving deprives
the agent from the opportunity to realize social approval. This latter eﬀect reduces
the incentives to give and makes the end outcome ambiguous.
Consider therefore the case where the receiver does not make a countergift but
gives a monetary compensation instead. Thus, set lv
2 =0 and denote by wv the
compensation the institution oﬀers for each unit of voluntary labor. The forgone
wage of giving is now ˜ wi ≡ wm
i −wv > 0. Is a yt h a ts a c r i ﬁce is relatively important
if the approval rate is sensitive to the sacriﬁce made: i.e. ∂βi/∂ ˜ wi is high.
Proposition 4 (Compensation): With a preference for social approval, the op-
timal gift size of player 1 is decreasing in compensation (dlv
1/dwv < 0) if the75 Social approval, status, and gift-Giving
absolute elasticity of u0
s is less than unity and if sacriﬁce is relatively important
(∂β1/∂ ˜ w1 high).
Corollary 1 If compensation crowds out gift-giving then welfare is reduced:
∂u1/∂wv < 0 if dlv
1/dwv < 0.
Proof. With lv
2 =0 , player 1’s utility function becomes (ignoring ﬁxed para-
meters): u1 = u1(lv
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s < 0 ⇔ ∂β1/∂ ˜ w1 >
u0
x/u0
s.W i t ht h ea b o v ed e ﬁnition of ξ we have
∂β1
∂ ˜ w1 >ξ>u 0
x/u0
s so that if beta is
high enough such that compensation reduces gift-giving, then compensation also
reduces welfare.
The intuition is again straightforward. If sacriﬁce is relatively important then
every unit of voluntary labor is valued a lot less when sacriﬁce is a little bit
lower. This reduces the incentives to give if compensation is oﬀered. There is also
a positive eﬀect on social approval since a lower β reduces s and this increases
marginal utility of giving. But this latter eﬀe c ti sa l w a y sd o m i n a t e db yt h ef o r m e r
eﬀect as long as the absolute elasticity of u0
s is smaller than one. Furthermore,
by Corollary 1 the deprivation of social approval is in this case enough to reduce
utility.
A result similar to proposition 4 is obtained by Holländer [1990] who argues
that the opening of a market reduces incentives to give to a public good. If the
market (or government) provides some of the public good, then the marginal
beneﬁts of the public good declines and under his speciﬁcation this means that
less approval is obtained for each contribution.
It should be emphasized that crowding-out is not a general phenomenon, but
Frey and Jegen [2002] conclude that there exists compelling empirical evidence
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its fullest extent, note that gifts in the form of bequests can aﬀect the long-
run growth of an economy (see Galor and Zeira [1993]). The insight gained is
therefore of importance, so much the more Frey [1997b] argues that in addition
there are spill-over eﬀects.11 For example, spill-over eﬀects to other activities or
spill-overs over time may occur. Thus, the social approval that can be obtained for
giving this particular good can inﬂuence the approval for giving some other good.
Or, not unreasonably, social approval is time dependent.12 Giving an inadequate
gift reduces social approval now, but persistently giving inadequate gifts reduces
social approval even more in the future. Albeit these are interesting extensions
of the model, it would be too speculative to elaborate upon them at the present
state. More should be known about the exact determinants and shape of the
social approval function, as well as its dynamics. Nonetheless, the conclusion
c a nb ed r a w nt h a to n es h o u l db ev e r yc a r e f u lw i t ht h ei m p l e m e n t a t i o no fm a r k e t
incentives in non-market institutions. This can result in unintended consequences
that are harmful to social welfare.
3.3 Related literature
The idea of social approval seems intuitively plausible. It is therefore no surprise
that social approval takes a prominent place in other social sciences. This makes
it all the more remarkable that the economics literature is mostly silent on this.
The works that are most closely related are that of Holländer [1990], Frey [1997a],
[1997b] and Andreoni [1990]. But there are some notable diﬀerences. Holländer
relies on the seemingly unintuitive assumption that sacriﬁce is negatively cor-
related with approval. Compensation would then increase gift-giving, contrary
to many empirical ﬁndings. Frey [1997a], [1997b] and Andreoni [1990] use other
emotive concepts that are very close to approval, namely intrinsic motivation and
warm glow respectively. Both concepts attribute the act of gift-giving to the fact
that people derive utility from the act of giving per se.T oac e r t a i ne x t e n tt h e s e
concepts are compatible with the current framework.13 The advantage of the cur-
11The approach of Frey [1997a], [1997b] to explain crowding-out is taken up in Section 3.3.
12Some of the evidence reported in Frey [1997b] as well as in Gneezy and Rustichini [2000] indicates persis-
tence over time.
13One diﬀerence is that the concepts of intrinsic motivation and warm glow feeling also work in a strictly
anonymous setting whereas social approval does not. But see the discussion in Section 2.3 where it is argued
that even charity is often not truly anonymous.77 Related literature
rent framework is that an attempt is made to further uncover the exact channel
through which the intrinsic motivation or a warm glow feeling is obtained. This
leads to a better insight in what the properties of gift-giving and the gift itself
will be. For example, if social approval is indeed the real source of the warm glow,
then the assumption of Andreoni [1990] that the warm glow is independent of the
subsidy is doubtful since a subsidy reduces sacriﬁce. This doubt is strengthened
by the fact that this assumption rules out a negative relation between subsidy
and gift-giving, contrary to the empirical ﬁndings. Neither do the theories of An-
dreoni [1990] and Frey [1997a], [1997b] in their current state have anything to say
about the optimality of the adequacy of the gifts even though this property is of
critical importance in making welfare judgements. Central in the theory of Frey
[1997a], [1997b] is that intrinsic motivation is crowded out by extrinsic motiva-
tion. Although this may be costly, the extrinsic motivation perhaps results in a
higher level of adequacy.
There is by now a fast-growing literature that tries to explain the properties of
gift-giving through other causes than social approval, see in particular chapter 2.
These include altruism, signaling, and fairness. Alike the current approach, each
of these alternative theories has its own deﬁciencies. For example, if altruism is
the motivation to give as suggested by Becker [1974], then the higher the utility of
the recipient the better, so that inadequate gifts cannot be explained. Neither can
crowding-out be explained, since a compensation would make gifts less eﬀective
so more would be given to obtain the desired distribution. On the other hand,
with social approval compensation creates costs to the giver since he is deprived
from some approval and this cannot be costlessly compensated by giving more.
In case information is asymmetric, gifts can also act as a signal. Exemplary
in this respect is the work by Camerer [1988]. In his model, honest players can
make gifts to signal themselves as being trustworthy. Cheaters do not ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to make gifts. As a corollary, this explains the inadequacy of gifts,
because with adequate gifts cheaters would participate in the gift-giving game
anticipating that they will collect valuable gifts. However, a compensation would
increase gift-giving since it would make current gifts less eﬀective as signals. More
should be given to reveal one’s type.
The fairness approach has probably gotten most attention in the literature (see
especially Fehr and Schmidt [1999], and Bolton and Ockenfels [2000]). It success-
fully accounts for a broad range of experimental games by assuming that peopleChapter 3. The Demand for Social Approval as a Motivation to Give 78
not only care about their own monetary payoﬀs, but also about the distribution
of payoﬀs and the intentions that other players have. The theory is especially
productive in explaining reciprocity: just think of the saying “an eye for an eye,
a tooth for a tooth.” Inadequacy seems not to be easily explicable: if one gives
to make the distribution more equal, then the most eﬀective way to do this is
to give as adequately as possible. People would therefore prefer to give adequate
gifts and only give inadequately if no better alternative is at someone’s disposal,
e.g. if the only choice they face is to give inadequately or not to give at all. For
similar reasons should a compensation increase gift-giving: more should be given
to achieve the desired equality in the income distribution.
As it stands, no single theory can explain everything. The current approach
should therefore be considered as being complementary to the existing literature,
not as an alternative theory. Future research will aim at synthesizing the diﬀer-
ent theories, for example by arguing that people are intrinsically motivated by
principles of fairness and at the same time also want to be seen as such, that is,
to be approved by others for being fair.
3.4 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that at least part of gift-giving can be
sensibly understood as the result of a desire for social approval. At the cost of
a loss in predictive power, the analysis is kept rather general. The motivation
for that is simply because little is known about the exact shape of the approval
function. However, under weak but nevertheless (at least in my view) reasonable
assumptions I have been able to derive some qualitative properties that I think
a r en o ts e n s i t i v et ot h es p e c i ﬁcations of the model.
The foregoing shows that social approval may indeed play a role in people’s
behavior. This is not to say that social approval is the unique motivation next to
one’s own payoﬀ or that social approval plays a role in every kind of exchange.
Indeed, it is very probable not the unique motivation. The gift-giving behavior
found in truly anonymous games cannot be attributed to a taste for social ap-
proval. But insofar as it does explain part of the behavior, its implications are
far reaching. Wherever social approval is important the superiority of the market
institution to gift-giving must be reconsidered, despite the fact that gift-giving
elicits inadequate gift exchanges. And where the market is considered to be su-79 Concluding remarks
perior but does not arise from spontaneous order, the incentive schemes based on
price incentives as designed by typical economic arguments should be rethought
so as to take into account the eﬀects they have on social approval. A better so-
lution might be to make the gifts more visible to outsiders, rather than to give
monetary compensations.
Prior to that, more research is needed to assess when social approval is a main
driving spirit, what the exact determinants are, and furthermore to substantiate
the role of inadequacy of gifts as a strategic variable. Perhaps a promising direc-
tion to go in is to design experiments that not only reveal the identity or actions
of players, but in addition communicate more precise information on the approval
of players. Because the propositions are stated in terms of how social approval is
aﬀected by diﬀerent actions, information on the approval allows the propositions
to be more speciﬁcally tested. More concretely, one possibility is to include an
index of how each player approves the gift. This allows players to reveal their ap-
preciation of the gift. It is then possible to see how the other player responds to
changes in that index. If this index is designed carefully, the propositions in this
chapter lend themselves to being tested. Proposition 2 can be tested by making
the adequacy of the donation in a public goods games a choice variable. This is
in the spirit of Goeree, Holt, and Laury [2002]. They test the eﬀects of changing
the external rate of the contribution. The external rate is the rate at which other
players proﬁt from your gift, the adequacy level in other words. In their experi-
ments the external rate is a given variable for the subjects. Finally, Proposition
4 can be tested by examining whether the existence of crowding out is related to
the approval obtained in a way corresponding to the conditions stated. 4
On the Viability of Gift-exchange in a Market
Environment
In the harsh Kalahari Desert in Africa, a group of people known as the !Kung
lived for a long time by the principles of reciprocity and sharing. These principles
provided enough security not to live on the brink of starvation, despite the apparent
diﬃcult circumstances. Then, the access to the market caused an inﬂux of money
and goods. This was partly responsible for the eroding traditional values and social
cohesion. To which extent can we expect that, over time, access to the market
crowds out reciprocity?
4.1 Introduction
Reciprocal exchange in its pure form can be observed in special places where the
market is not strong enough to break personal connections. On the other hand,
there are fascinating stories by anthropologists showing how reciprocal exchange
arrangements vanish when tribes encounter markets. This chapter studies the
relationship between market exchange and reciprocal exchange.
In an interesting paper Kranton [1996a] shows that in order to become bene-
ﬁcial, markets need enough participants to reduce search costs. Therefore, recip-
rocal exchange may survive if initially the proportion of the people that engage
0This chapter is coauthored by Theo van de Klundert. We are indebted to Jan Boone, Lans Bovenberg,
Patrick François, Richard Nahuis, and Sjak Smulders for useful comments on an earlier version of the paper.Chapter 4. On the Viability of Gift-exchange in a Market Environment 82
in market exchange is not too large. There are other determinants which may tip
over the balance in favor of market exchange, such as a lack of trust. In reciprocal
exchange people have to trust each other, because production and consumption
are separated over time. Moreover, reciprocal exchange may involve a less elabo-
rate division of labor.
Kranton [1996a] borrows evidence documented by Yellen [1990] that describes
how the !Kung tribe abandoned reciprocal exchange once they encountered the
market economy of Botswana. But reciprocal exchange is not limited to tribal
communities nor to some corners of the economy but is an element of impor-
tance in developed market economies as well. Reciprocity or gift exchange is an
essential aspect of culture. There are social and moral dimensions to economics
so to say (see for instance Etzioni [1988]). Even Adam Smith already knew that
”moral sentiments” are important, something also recognized by Kenneth Arrow
: ”ethical behavior can be regarded as a socially desirable institution which fa-
cilitates the achievement of economic eﬃciency in a broad sense” (Arrow [1972,
354]). People have a sense of belonging to society at large, and care for social
interactions. This induces cooperative behavior in diﬀerent guises. Self-interest
seeking behavior is a sine qua non for coordination in the economy, but there are
limits to opportunistic behavior. People want to be respected by others. To a cer-
tain extent respect follows from success in the accumulation of wealth, but there
are limits to respectfulness in this sense. Mutual aid and sympathy are important
values of their own. For this reason producers may take pride in the quality of
the product they deliver, workers may be motivated to do a good job, and people
in general may take account of each other’s interests in diﬀerent situations. Ex-
periments in economic settings indeed conﬁrm that people may behave diﬀerent
from what standard neoclassical economics predicts. Take for instance, Gächter
and Fehr [1999] who ﬁnd that social approval and social familiarity generate a
signiﬁcant rise in cooperative behavior (see also chapter 3).
Casual observation learns that people are concerned about a loss of commit-
ment in recent times. This is often associated with commodiﬁcation, meaning that
markets are expanding into almost every territory of human life. In our interpreta-
tion this means that the market system crowds out reciprocal exchange, bringing
about a lack of close personal relationships. The questions to be answered are
then the following. What are the main factors causing such a crowding-out? Is
reciprocal exchange in the sense of moral behavior completely wiped out or are83 Introduction
there conditions such that both regimes can coexist in a long-run equilibrium?
To answer these questions we apply the analytical framework based on Kranton
[1996a] and Diamond [1982] in a modiﬁed way, and with a diﬀerent interpretation.
In the model used, people can make a deliberate choice between two regimes: a
reciprocal relationship or market exchange. In reciprocal exchange agents value
social behavior as they have a sense of belonging to society at large. Applying the
terminology introduced by Khalil [1997], it can be argued that agents produce
goods from which they derive substantive utility, but sticking to the moral codes
of the group provides also satisfaction in the form of symbolic utility. Initially
we assume that the terms of trade between substantive and symbolic utility are
deteriorating over time. Extending the model later on, it will be argued that the
terms of trade typically depend in a non-linear way on the fraction of agents
engaged in reciprocal exchange.
In the regime of market exchange agents behave as prescribed in neoclassi-
cal theory. If the fraction of agents engaged in pure market activities rises, the
market operates more eﬃciently. People are then less hampered by tradition and
can seize every opportunity for making a proﬁt .T h ed i v i s i o no fl a b o rc a nb ee x -
ploited more fully. The set of goods produced generally diﬀers from that in case
of reciprocal exchange. This has an impact on substantive utility. The idea that
market eﬃciency is related to the number of people in the market is characteristic
for search models. We generalize this idea by assuming that more encounters be-
tween people induce more production by leveling organizational and institutional
restrictions. However, both ideas can be modelled in the same manner.
The model applied here diﬀers in a number of aspects from that in Kranton
[1996a]. First, in modelling the search externality we follow the original set-up
of Diamond [1982], [1984] more closely. Second, to simplify further we assume
that goods are produced at constant cost instead of introducing a distribution
from which agents draw randomly. Finally, it should be observed that we not only
obtain corner solutions as in Kranton. Assuming that the terms of trade between
regimes depend on the fraction of agents engaged in the market system we ﬁnd
interior solutions with agents operating under diﬀerent regimes.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2.1 we ﬁrst specify
what is meant by sympathy and substantive utility. This sets the stage for mod-
elling reciprocal exchange in section 4.2.2. Market exchange is discussed in section
4.2.3. In section 4.3 we consider equilibrium solutions under diﬀerent assumptionsChapter 4. On the Viability of Gift-exchange in a Market Environment 84
with respect to the shape of symbolic utility. Complete commodiﬁcation obtains
in section 4.3.1. Interior solutions with partial commodiﬁcation are considered
in section 4.3.2. The role of discounting is scrutinized in section 4.3.3. Welfare
considerations are taken up in section 4.4. The chapter closes with concluding
remarks in section 4.5. Proofs of propositions are deferred to the appendix.
4.2 Exchange mechanisms
In this section we describe the formal model. The general setup is one in which
each agents starts in a situation in which he is involved in a personal relationship
with one other agent. A key feature of such a reciprocal exchange relationship is
the element of trust. Production and consumption are typically separated over
time. Contrary to the market where money serves as a medium of exchange, no
such security exists in a reciprocal relationship. It is therefore possible that agents
who did produce last period see their relationship end without having the pos-
sibility of consuming in return. Although this favors the existence of markets,
market exchange has disadvantages of its own. The market is typically charac-
terized by anonymous agents, without relation-speciﬁc commitments, and search
c o s t sh a v et ob em a d ei no r d e rt oﬁnd a trading partner. On the other hand is it
generally acknowledged that the market is capable of supplying a larger array of
goods.
Before turning to a detailed exposition we present an outline in ﬁgure 4.1. This
facilitates the reading of the subsequent sections. The arrows denote possible
ﬂows. Agents start in a reciprocal exchange relationship. They can end their
relationship and enter the market as unemployed. The distribution of agents in
each period is given by the fractions r,u, and m that correspond to the diﬀerent
states as in ﬁgure 4.1. The market is characterized by a search process that
describes how agents become employed with a good, sell that good and become
unemployed again. This search process is determined by the technical parameters
a and b to be explained later on.
We start with an exposition of reciprocal exchange and postpone a treatment
of the market part to the next section. First however, we discuss the agents’












4.2.1 Substantive and symbolic utility
Following Khalil [1997] we distinguish between substantive utility (ordinary tastes
for material goods) and symbolic utility (tastes for selfhood and alike). Consumers
derive substantive utility from a basket of goods, which may diﬀer across regimes.
Substantive utility for each representative consumer is denoted by xi,w h e r et h e
index i = r,m denotes reciprocal or market exchange. Symbolic utility can be
taken into account by introducing extended preferences (see for instance Becker
[1996]). Here we take a short-cut by introducing a mark-up (θi) on substantive
utility. Extended utility is then deﬁned as:
yi = θixi,θ i ≥ 1,i = r,m. (4.1)
It is assumed that under market exchange extended utility coincides with sub-
stantive utility (θm =1 ) . Reciprocal exchange conveys symbolic utility as people
value social interaction as such (θr > 1). The above set of equations can be
combined to:
yr = θym, (4.2)
where θ ≡ (θrxr)/xm.As substantive utility is ﬁxed xr and xm can be treated as
constants. It seems plausible to assume that θr,a n dt h e r e f o r eθ, depends on theChapter 4. On the Viability of Gift-exchange in a Market Environment 86
fraction of people engaged in market exchange, m. If the number of people in gift
exchange declines it will be harder to uphold a sense of community spirit. As the
market regimes expands, individualism spreads and solidarity may become less
attractive. These considerations lead to a negative relation between the valuation
ratio θ and the fraction of people in the market regime. However, according to
Adam Smith it can be maintained that the need for mutual sympathy and re-
spect is deep-rooted and cannot be suppressed entirely. A similar view based on
biological principles is expressed in Kropotkin [1904]. It is not unreasonable to
assume that the ramiﬁcation of this becomes more distressing as the market gets
to dominate exchange relations. This could imply a positive relation between θ
and the market size after some threshold level of market participation has been
passed. Thus we have that θ = θ(m) is ﬁrst decreasing and after some critical
point, say m0, increasing, because the market becomes ”too large”.
More speciﬁcally, the U-shaped θ(m)-curve can be seen as the result of several
opposite forces. For instance, as more people leave the regime of reciprocity the
cost (in disutility terms) of changing beliefs for the remaining people decline.
This idea builds on the literature on cognitive dissonance in psychology. Following
Festinger [1957] it can be stated that changing beliefs induces a negative arousal.
Moreover, the resistance to change crucially depends on the diﬃculty of ﬁnding
people who support the new belief. Therefore, the more people are already in
the market regime the easier it becomes for people to switch regimes. It is in
particular hard for the ﬁrst few individuals that are to switch. This is shown by
the dashed downward sloping RC-curve (resistance to change) in ﬁgure 4.2 .
Furthermore, as the market system expands the social deﬁcit becomes more
important. As argued in Bowles [1998] markets are characterized by impersonality
and ephemerality of contact. But people also want to socialize. There is a need for
mutual sympathy and recognition. If reciprocal exchange is relatively large market
participants may have the feeling that the social deﬁcit can be easily repaired.
The more people are available as potential candidates to socialize with, the easier
it is to change back to reciprocal exchange. Therefore, the opportunity costs (in
disutility terms) of switching to the market regime increase as the market system
becomes dominant. The social deﬁcit is felt more heavily for a larger market share.
This gives rise to the dashed upward sloping SD-curve (social deﬁcit) in ﬁgure
4.2 . Under appropriate conditions the summation of both curves may lead to an
U-shaped function θ(m) as illustrated by the bold curve in ﬁgure 4.2. To analyze87 Exchange mechanisms
diﬀerent possibilities, the equilibrium solution discussed in section 4.3.1 will be
b a s e do nam o n o t o n i cd e c r e a s i n gθ-curve. This case eventuates in the corners as
the only solutions. The U-shaped θ-curve will be introduced in section 4.3.2. As





It should be noted that there is a close parallel with the descriptive approach
of Fukuyama [1957]. In his latest book Fukuyama describes ”the great disrup-
tion” of the social system starting somewhere in the sixties under inﬂuence of the
upcoming information technology. The change of a traditional industrial society
towards an economy dominated by the service sector leads to a certain disorien-
tation and as a consequence of this to a decay of moral values. But according to
the author things have changed lately. The reason is that human nature is geared
towards cooperation and reciprocity. Fukuyama bases his view on the biological
approach going back to Kropotkin [1904]. The reconstruction of the social order
is reﬂected in declining criminality statistics and a more positive evaluation of
social relations in systematic surveys. Such a change may lead to a new equilib-
rium with a certain amount of gift exchange in the current market economy. In
our model it is the upward sloping branch of the θ(m) curve which reﬂects theChapter 4. On the Viability of Gift-exchange in a Market Environment 88
views of Fukuyama and others on the viability of the moral system in modern
times.
4.2.2 Reciprocal exchange
The timing in a reciprocal exchange relationship is as follows. Each two periods a
complete reciprocal gift exchange can be accomplished. In the ﬁrst period, one of
the agents produces ﬁrst and the other consumes the good. In the second period
they switch roles. Whenever they consume, they derive utility yr, and whenever
they produce they bear a cost in disutility terms of c1. The discount factor for
the next period equals δ = e−ρ ,w h e r eρ i st h es u b j e c t i v ed i s c o u n tr a t e 2.A g e n t s
are inﬁnitely lived.
Let Vrp and Vrc denote the lifetime discounted utility of the agent that is in-
volved in reciprocal exchange and starts as producer and consumer respectively.
The agent starting as a producer incurs a cost (c) and expects to be in the position
of a consumer next period:
Vrp = −c + δVrc. (4.3)
Similarly, the lifetime discounted utility of the agent that starts as consumer, Vrc,
is given by:
Vrc = yr + δVrp. (4.4)
It is further assumed that each agent ends up being ﬁrst consumer or producer
with equal probability. Expected discounted lifetime utility of staying in a recipro-
cal exchange relationship is then given by Vr = 1






The element of trust is introduced by the possibility of ending the relationship.
An agent can decide to consume ﬁrst, but not to produce in return. He then
consumes and enters the market. Whenever he does, the other agent will of course
take notice of being cheated and as a punishment he will end the relationship3.A s
1For simplicity we assume that the complete production of an individual is exchanged. A more realistic
extension would be that individuals exchange only part of their production.
2A natural restriction on the discount factor is that δ ∈ (0,1): future revenues are valued positively but less
than current revenues.
3This tit-for-tat is only one of many possible strategies. The strategy is common in the microeconomic
literature. The classic defence is given in Axelrod [1984]. More interestingly, the strategy is defended by Aristotle
on principles of justice: ”Now if proportionate equality between the products be ﬁrst established, (...) then89 Exchange mechanisms
a consequence, both agents will have to enter the market. Obviously, the agent
will deliberate upon producing in order to sustain the relationship or to cheat
upon his partner. Whether the agents decide to cheat and enter the market or
stay in the reciprocal exchange relationship is dependent on the derived utility
of being in the market regime, Vu (to be speciﬁed later on), and of the derived
utility in the reciprocal exchange relationship, Vr. The following deﬁnition shows
a Nash-equilibrium constraint under which both agents will decide not to cheat
(a derivation is given in the appendix).
Deﬁnition 1 (enforceability) A reciprocal exchange relationship is enforceable if
−c + δVr(·) ≥ Vu(·).
The constraint is more likely to be satisﬁed when the discount factor is high (low
subjective discount rate) or when the market size is small. The higher the future
is valued, the less beneﬁcial it is to cheat and so reciprocal exchange is more eas-
ily enforceable. Alternatively, we can interpret the subjective discount factor as a
measure of trust. If the discount factor is low, then the faith in getting consump-
tion in return is poor. The lower the discount factor, the harder it is to uphold
the relationship. The market, on the other hand, is characterized by increasing
returns to scale. The larger the market, the more easy it is to ﬁnd a partner to
trade with. This implies that the value of trading on the market is positively de-
pendent on the market size4. The enforceability constraint is therefore harder to
satisfy at larger market sizes. Detailed comparative statics are provided in section
3 . 3 .W en o wt u r no u ra t t e n t i o nt ot h ed e t e r m i n a t i o no ft h ev a l u eo fe n t e r i n gt h e
market.
4.2.3 Market exchange
Agents that have decided to enter the market do not have a ﬁxed trading partner.
They enter the market ”unemployed”, that is with no goods, and have to search
for production possibilities. This will be represented by a Poisson process with
arrival rate a. They can either accept or not accept the production opportunity.
After they have found and accepted one they bear the same disutility costs c as
in reciprocal exchange. Being employed they still have to search someone to trade
reciprocation take place (...) but if this is not done, the bargain is not equal, and intercourse does not continue.”
(Aristotle [1994, 283]).
4From (4.9) introduced later in the text, it is easily proved that Vu is indeed (weakly) increasing in m.Chapter 4. On the Viability of Gift-exchange in a Market Environment 90
with. They ﬁnd someone with probability b(m). Having found a trade partner they
exchange and derive utility ym.5 The market is characterized by increasing returns
to scale in the form of an externality. As the fraction of the population on the
market, m, gets larger, average search time decreases or equivalently b
0
(m) > 0.
Recall that r,u,m are the fractions of the population in reciprocal exchange,
unemployed on the market, and employed on the market respectively (see also
ﬁgure 4.1). If we normalize total population to unity then u =1− r − m.T h e
ﬂow dynamics in the market can then be described by the diﬀerential equation:
˙ m = a(1 − r − m) − b(m) · m. (4.6)
Here, ˙ m ≡ dm/dt. The fraction of people on the market increases with the number
of agents ﬁnding a production possibility and decreases with the number of agents
accomplishing their exchange.
In the remainder of the chapter the focus is on steady state solutions. Steady
states are marked by a constant distribution of agents over states, hence we
have a constant rate of employment: ˙ m =0 . Based on this assumption we can
derive the value equations of the agents on the market. Let Vuand Vm denote the
discounted lifetime utility of being unemployed and employed respectively. Under
the assumption of a steady state, dVu/dt = dVm/dt =0and the value equations
are given by:
ρVu = a(Vm − Vu − c), (4.7)
ρVm = b(m)(ym + Vu − Vm). (4.8)
This set of equations can be rewritten in terms of Vu. Since unemployed agents on
the market always have the possibility of not accepting a production possibility,
due to high costs, Vu is always nonnegative6:











deﬁnition 1 is now completely determined by equations (4.2)-(4.9). Together with
the steady state condition that ˙ m =0this describes the long-run equilibrium.
5The market is typically characterized by the use of money. Diamond [1984] explicitly takes money into
account by distinguishing between unemployed, buyers, and sellers. Here we assume that buying and selling
simultaneously take place. None of the results are sensitive to this assumption.
6We exlude negative values of Vu by assuming that agents can choose for complete idleness with Vu =0 .91 Equilibrium
4.3 Equilibrium
Based on the steady state assumption, this section explores the consequences of
diﬀerent assumptions on the shape of the valuation ratio θ(m).W es t a yc l o s et o
the disquisition in the introduction and section 4.2.1. Thus in section 4.3.1 we
examine the steady state solutions when the valuation ratio θ is monotonically
decreasing in the market size and in section 4.3.2 we allow for an increasing part
of the θ-curve for large market sizes. Finally, comparative statics are provided in
section 4.4. Throughout we use the notion of a short-run equilibrium whenever
˙ m =0 , and of a long-run equilibrium when ˙ m =0and, in addition, deﬁnition 1
is satisﬁed.
4.3.1 Complete commodiﬁcation
Where markets replace social relations we speak of commodiﬁcation. Complete or
full commodiﬁcation indicates a situation in which markets expand to an extent
where all social relations are abolished. Under incomplete or partial commodiﬁ-
cation social relations are still embedded in the community, but are partly driven
out by the existence of markets. In this section we consider the case where θ
is monotonically decreasing in the market size (for reasons given in the intro-
duction and section 4.2.1). As it turns out, this is a situation where, if any, full
commodiﬁcation results.
Figure 4.3 depicts this case7.T h eEr and Eucurves show respectively the LHS
and the RHS of the enforceability constraint in deﬁnition 1. Therefore, whenever
the Er lies above the Eu curve reciprocal exchange is enforceable, and for market
sizes where Eu lies above Er agents maximize expected utility by entering the
market. The value of being unemployed increases in the market size and is there-
fore upward sloping. The value of reciprocal exchange depends on the valuation
ratio θ(m) and is therefore downward sloping. The curves are drawn for the range
[0, ˜ m]. These are the possible short-run equilibrium market sizes. The upper limit
is given by ˜ m; the maximum possible market size for which no agents are involved
in reciprocal exchange, i.e. r =0 .8 T h ec r i t i c a lv a l u eo ft h em a r k e ts i z ea tw h i c h
7The following set of parameters is used to obtain the ﬁgure: {a,b,c,g,h,ym,δ} = {.8,.6,1,−.1,.3,8,.8}
where we assumed that the probability of ﬁnding a trading partner on the market is linear in m: b(m)=b · m
and the subjective valution is given by θ(m)=h + gm. This set of parameters assures that both exchange
mechanisms are enforceable for some market sizes for a value of θin the range: θ <θ<θ. (see section 3.3).
8Thus from equation 4.6 and the deﬁnition of short-run equilibrium ˜ m is such that a(1 − ˜ m)=b(˜ m) · ˜ m.Chapter 4. On the Viability of Gift-exchange in a Market Environment 92
the enforceability constraint holds with equality is given by m1.A ta l lm a r k e t
sizes m ≤ m1 reciprocal exchange is enforceable. Whenever the market size for
some reason exceeds the critical size m1 the market size is too large for reciprocal
exchange to be enforceable and eventually all agents will enter the market. This
cannot be a long-run equilibrium. The only possible long-run equilibria are when
economy ends up in a corner solution9. As appears from equation (4.6) the long-
run equilibrium in case people opt for the market regime equals ˜ m. Thus we see
that for some market sizes reciprocal exchange is enforceable and that for larger
market sizes the economy will converge to a market exchange economy. It is clear
from the picture that if the Eu curve is everywhere above the Er curve then recip-
rocal is never enforceable no matter what the market size is. Similarly, if the Eu












9Strictly speaking, it is possible that the economy sticks to its initial market size (possibly at a positive
level) or converges to a market size of ˜ m.With slight abuse of notation, we speak of corner solutions even if the
initial market size is positive.
10However, Vu =0at m =0and if Er is everywhere below Eu then Er must be negative. But Vr can still
be positive and the case is therefore meaningful.93 Equilibrium
4.3.2 Partial commodiﬁcation
In the previous section, the valuation of reciprocal exchange was assumed to be
monotonically decreasing in the market size. However, as mentioned earlier (no-
tably in section 4.2.1) it is more likely that the valuation depends on the market
size in a slightly more sophisticated way. Despite the decreasing disutility costs
of changing beliefs, the feeling of a social deﬁcit that cannot be repaired becomes
distressingly oppressive and the wish for sustaining existing reciprocal relation-
ships becomes increasingly weighty. Thus we have that θ(m) is ﬁrst decreasing in
m and after some point increasing in m.T h eEr curve will for that reason behave













An interesting feature of the variable subjective valuation is the possibility
of multiple interior equilibria. For example, in ﬁgure 4.4 there are two interior
equilibria, of which one is stable (m3). For small market sizes below m2 the search
costs are too high to enter the market. However, at larger market sizes the search
costs are lower and the subjective valuation of the market is higher. This is true for
11Here {a,b,c,g,h,j,ym,δ} = {.8,.6,1,−.24,.24,.7,8,.8} where b(m)=bm and the subjective valution is
given by θ(m)=h + gm+ jm2.Chapter 4. On the Viability of Gift-exchange in a Market Environment 94
all market sizes between m2 and m3. Reciprocal exchange is no longer enforceable
and agents enter the market. But contrary to the case in the previous section
where θ is monotonically decreasing and where eventually everybody would be
engaged in market exchange, there is a point m3 at which the market is so large
that agents have relatively high preferences for reciprocal exchange again. At
this point, the market will stop growing and part of the population will stay
in their reciprocal exchange relationship. An interior long-equilibrium solution is
therefore obtained, potentially explaining why gift exchange continues to exist in
the contemporary environment that became more market oriented until now.
4.3.3 Valuation, patience, and viability.
Next, we turn to comparative statics. In general, reciprocal exchange can be
enforceable for some small market sizes but not for large markets. The extent
to which reciprocal exchange is enforceable is ﬁrst of all obviously depending
on the relative valuation (θ) of reciprocal exchange. Likewise, it depends on the
discount rate (δ)which can alternatively be interpreted as a measure of trust (see
also section 4.2.2). The next two propositions characterize the general relation
between the two variables.
Proposition 5 For every δ ∈ (0,1) there exist positive θ(δ) such that ∀θ(m) ≥
θ(δ) reciprocal exchange is enforceable and ∀θ(m) <θ (δ) reciprocal exchange is
not enforceable. θ(δ) is ﬁrst decreasing in δ and then, if θ(m) >θ (0) for some m,
possibly increasing in δ.
Proposition 6 For every δ ∈ (0,1) there exist positive θ(δ) such that ∀θ(m) ≥
θ(δ) market exchange is not enforceable and ∀θ(m) < θ(δ) market exchange is
enforceable. θ(δ)is ﬁrst decreasing in δ and then possibly increasing in δ.
Proof. All proofs of the propositions appear in the appendix.
Based on these propositions, ﬁgure 4.5 represents the typical shape of the θ-curve
and the θ-curve for all possible combinations of θ and δ.
In this ﬁgure, we plotted the areas for which reciprocal exchange is not en-
forceable for any market size, for which it is enforceable at positive market sizes,
and for which it is enforceable at any market size. The latter implies that market
exchange is not enforceable at any market size. Thus for example, at e1 reciprocal









change is not enforceable at any market size (θ>θ).T h ep o i n te2 is an in-between
case where at some market sizes, but not all, reciprocal exchange is enforceable,
and at some market sizes market exchange is enforceable. The latter case is ex-
actly the one which ﬁgures 4.2 and 4.3 are based on. In contrast, e3 for instance
would describe the case where the Eu curve lies entirely above the Er curve.
As can be seen from Figure 4.5, at higher discount factors reciprocal exchange
is enforceable at lower values of θ. In other words, when the discount factor or
the measure of trust is low, cheating is relatively proﬁtable and the subjective
valuation of the reciprocal good must consequently be high for reciprocal exchange
t ob ee n f o r c e a b l e .E x a c t l yt h er e v e r s ei st r u ef o rt h ec a s eo fm a r k e te x c h a n g e ,
i.e. at higher discount factors, it becomes less likely that market exchange is
enforceable12.
Here we have a resemblance with optimal contract theory. For example in
Baker et al. [1994] a ﬁrm has to choose an optimal bonus system. They can
either rely on an objective but imperfect performance measure or on an unbiased
but not objectively measurable variable. In the former case the ﬁrm can rely
12The interpretation that for high discount rates the θ and θ curves can be increasing is somewhat complicated
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on an explicit contract (we loosely interpret this as the money reward in case
of the market exchange), in the latter only on an implicit contract (i.e. based
on trust). They show that under appropriate conditions, the optimal contract
is a combination of the implicit and the explicit contract. But whenever the
discount rate is suﬃciently high only implicit contracts should be used whereas
for suﬃciently low discount rates one should rely on explicit contracts only.
4.4 Welfare
I nt h i ss e c t i o nw et a k eaw e l f a r ep e r s p e c t i v eb yc o m p a r i n gt h ee ﬃciency of stable
equilibria. We follow Kranton [1996a] by taking the weighted discounted lifetime
utility of agents on the market as the measure of comparison, but none of the
results hinge on this. The weights are the shares of the employed and unemployed











Evidently, Vu ≤ Vw ≤ Vm. Since both Vu and Vm are increasing in the market
size, so is Vw. We now state:
Proposition 7 It is possible that there exist stable equilibria which are Pareto-
dominated by other equilibria. As a consequence, ineﬃcient market sizes can be
sustained.
Proposition 7 relies on a rather strong criterium of Pareto-optimality, namely
where state i is socially preferred to state j if in state j no agent is worse-oﬀ than
in state i and at least one is better oﬀ, without taking into account the possibility
of income redistributions. This is stronger than the Kaldor-Hicks criterium and
the Pareto-criterium where income redistribution is allowed. Clearly, under the
weaker versions of Pareto-optimality proposition 7 is as well satisﬁed.
The rational behind proposition 7 is intuitively clear. The reason that domi-
nated stable equilibria can be maintained is caused by the existence of an exter-
nal eﬀect and a coordination failure. In essence, if reciprocal exchange is initially
large, search costs on the market are high, even though search costs would be low
if the market was large. Similarly, if the market starts out large, search costs are
low and reciprocal exchange relationship may not be enforceable even though if97 Welfare
the market was small they would be preferable in value terms. Besides this thick-
market externality there is also a coordination failure. People do not take into
account the full value of a reciprocal trade in deciding between market and recip-
rocal exchange. A social planner would value reciprocal exchange by its present
value: Vr. But individuals only take into consideration the value of reciprocal
trade for which it can be trusted upon that the relationship can be maintained:
−c+δVr (see deﬁnition 1). The gap between those values can be considered as a
coordination failure caused by mutual distrust. As a consequence, if the market
starts out large, there can be a degree of trust that is insuﬃcient to maintain the
reciprocal exchange relationship even though if it could be maintained it would
be superior to market exchange in value terms. Proposition 7 is illustrated below







In Figure 4.6 the initial market size is denoted by m◦.A tm◦,d e ﬁnition 1 is
not satisﬁed, and the economy tends to move to ˜ m, the maximum sustainable
market size (r =0 ) 13. It is immediately seen that at ˜ m the value of being in
13It is evident that the economy could as well converge to a stable interior equilibrium such as m3 in ﬁgure







a reciprocal exchange relationship is higher than that of being on the market:
Vr >V w. Therefore, if all agents would be involved in reciprocal exchange they
would all be better oﬀ. Figure 4.7 illustrates the case where reciprocal exchange
is sustainable although everyone could in principle be better oﬀ by entering the
market.
The preceding analysis shows that individual agents need not necessarily select
the socially most eﬃcient exchange mechanism nor that there is any tendency
towards a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. There are of course ways to change incen-
tives towards the ﬁrst best solution, such as a subsidy on entering the market or
lowering search costs in one way or another. Due to the hysteresis present such
a subsidy need only be a temporary one. Stimulation to form reciprocal relation-
ships seems to be of a more diﬃcult order. A one-sided inquiry into the market
mechanism clearly would disguise aspects of critical importance.
4.5 Concluding remarks
Many economic activities imply a certain gift-dimension. In the literature gifts
are discussed from diﬀerent perspectives (see chapter 2). In this chapter we hold99 Concluding remarks
the view that the logic of the gift contains some notion of reciprocity. There are
no free gifts in case the institution of gift-giving is considered as a coordination
mechanism to cope with the state of nature. Market exchange and gift exchange
have therefore something in common: the reference to the notion of reciprocity.
But reciprocal exchange is based on personal relationships and trust whereas
market exchange is based on anonymity and money.
Here we assume that market exchange and reciprocal exchange can be made
commensurable by extending preferences. Gift-giving, and thus reciprocal ex-
change, renders symbolic utility as people value the idea of belonging to a group
or society at large. Symbolic utility and substantive utility, which relates to tradi-
tional economic activities, are diﬀerent components of the extended utility func-
tion.
Starting from these premises the main question to be answered is under which
circumstances reciprocal exchange is viable and not crowded-out by the market
regime. Such a form of crowding-out can be conceived as a complete commod-
iﬁcation of society. Following Kranton [1996a] reciprocal exchange is modelled
in a strict manner. Agents expect a counter-performance. Market exchange is
modelled as a search process where in case of matching goods are exchanged im-
mediately. The model is closed by introducing an enforceability condition showing
under which conditions agents defect in case of reciprocal exchange. The condi-
tion critically depends on the market size and on the discount factor. The latter
has its resemblance in the optimal contract literature once we loosely interpret
market exchange as an explicit contract and a reciprocal relation as an implicit
contract.
It is shown that complete commodiﬁcation obtains if symbolic utility declines
as the relative size of the market increases. However, reciprocal exchange may
survive for low subjective discount rates which are in some sense indicative for a
high level of trust. There is another reason why full commodiﬁcation may not be
the equilibrium outcome. Symbolic utility may rise if reciprocity becomes scarce
as the market takes over. In the end people may be aware of a social loss and
revalue reciprocal exchange accordingly. As a result commodiﬁcation will stop
at some point and there will be an interior equilibrium solution with market
exchange and reciprocal exchange coexisting.
From a welfare point of view, full or partial commodiﬁcation is not necessarily
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the exchange mechanism that is Pareto-optimal. This result is related to the
search externality in market exchange and the coordination failure in reciprocal
exchange. If the market is large initially, search costs are low and the economy
may converge to an ineﬃcient outcome. Similarly, the economy may converge to
an ineﬃcient outcome if the coordination failure with respect to the choice of
reciprocal exchange is important.
What seems most urgent in additional research is a more ﬂexible way of mod-
elling reciprocal exchange to cope with the diﬀerent aspects of gift-giving. In
particular, it may be rewarding to shed some light on intergenerational gifts,
w h e r er e c i p r o c i t yi nt h eu s u a ls e n s ei so u to fr e a c ho rw h e r et h et i m ei n t e r v a li s
extremely long. The latter is for example the case in family relationships where
parents take care of their children in the hope of mutual care once they themselves
become dependent on their children’s readiness to support them. In addition it
m a yw e l lb em o r er e a l i s t i ct oa s s u m et h a ts o m eg o o d sa r em o r es u i t e dt ob ep r o -
duced on the market (e.g. bread), others to be oﬀered in a reciprocal relationship
(e.g. baby-sitting), or in a combination of these (e.g. insurance, see Arnott and
Stiglitz [1991]. Individuals can be assumed to be heterogeneous and spend their
time in diﬀerent proportions over the two exchange mechanisms. Another inter-
esting question emanates from the paradox formulated by Etzioni [1988, 250]:
”The more people accept the neoclassical paradigm as a guide for their behavior,
the more the ability to sustain a market economy is undermined”. The paradox
suggest that market exchange becomes less eﬃcient if morality is on the retreat.
This need not be true, as our analysis suggests, but it certainly deserves serious
consideration.101 Appendix
4.6 Appendix
In this appendix we ﬁrst show that deﬁnition 1 characterizes a Nash-equilibrium
and subsequently proof propositions 5 to 7. Where no confusion can arise we
simply write θ instead of, for example, θ(m).
Proof that deﬁnition 1 is a Nash-equilibrium.
Consider the payoﬀ matrix below. Players are denoted by P and C, the agent
that produces and the one that consumes ﬁrst respectively. They can either be
honest, H, or cheat, D (defect). The pay-oﬀs are in utility terms. As an example,
consider P playing honest and C cheating, then P produces the good, bearing
cost in utility terms of c and enters the market the next period after ﬁnding out
of being cheated, δVu.Cconsumes yr, does not produce in return and enters the
market getting δVu. Thus in the upper-right cell we have the pay-oﬀs −c + δVu
and yr+δVu. Consider then the strategies {H;H}. This can, by construction, only
be a (weak) Nash-equilibrium if it is in both players advantage not to deviate:
−c + δyr + δ
2Vr ≥ δVu and −c + δVr ≥ Vu. Fortunately, we can show that ﬁrst
inequality is implied by the second. Note that 1
(1−δ)yr ≥ 1
2(1−δ)(yr − cr)=Vr (see
equation 4.5). Then δyr + δ
2Vr ≥ δVr.I fn o w−c + δVr ≥ Vu (second constraint)
then it is surely the case that −cr +δyr +δ
2Vr ≥ Vu ≥ δVu which proves the ﬁrst
inequality. Finally note that {D;D} is always a (weak) Nash-equilibrium.
P ↓;C → HD
H −c + δyr + δ
2Vr;yr − δc+ δ
2Vr −c + δVu;yr + δVu
D δVu;δVu δVu;δVu
Proof of Propositions 5 and 6.
We try to ﬁnd values of θ for which deﬁnition 1 is satisﬁed with equality: −c +
δVr = Vu. Label this equality D1. For this value agents are indiﬀerent between
reciprocal exchange and entering the market given the market size. For higher
values of θ they prefer reciprocal exchange, for lower values they prefer market
exchange. In particular we try to ﬁnd values of θ,s a yθ, for which the equality
is satisﬁed but will not be satisﬁed for any lower θ for any market size. It is
instructive ﬁrst to consider the case where θ is (weakly) monotonically decreasing
in m and then generalize the results, as in the main text. The advantage of this
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m =0since Vr is decreasing in m and Vu increasing in m.T h u s ,w ec a nf o c u so n
m =0 . Then D1 reads, by restricting Vu to R+:
1
2δ(θym + c) − c
1 − δ
=0 . (4.11)
Since we put no restrictions on θ,g i v e na n yδ ∈ (0,1) there exists a θ such that
the equality holds (and is in this particular case easy to ﬁnd). (As a marginal
comment, note that as δ → 1, the numerator of the LHS of (4.11) approaches
1
2(θym − c) which equals zero for some 0 <θ≤ 1.). Since the LHS of D1 is
increasing in δ, θ is lower for higher values of δ.
Generalizing the argument, we see that the RHS can be positive for markets
m>0, but also that θ(m) may be larger than θ(0).S oe v e ni ft h ee q u a l i t y
holds at m =0 , it may well be that the LHS is larger than the RHS at positive
market sizes. The critical value of θ (i.e. θ)can therefore be lower than the value
of θ for which the equality holds at m =0 . The caveat in the generalization is,
however, the fact that Vu is now increasing in δ as well. At m =0 , Vu =0no
matter what the rate of time preference is. This remains true up to the market
size where Vu becomes strictly positive. For the range of values for which Vu is
strictly positive, Vu is also increasing in δ.T h u sb o t hs i d e sc a nb ei n c r e a s i n gi nδ
at some market sizes, and the relation between θ and δ becomes ambiguous. We
stress however that for low values of δ, Vu =0 , and hence there exists an interval
where θ and δare negatively correlated. The intuition behind this increasing part
is that because on the market costs are made before revenues, for suﬃciently
low discount rate the present value is negative, whilst in a reciprocal exchange
with some probability you consume before you produce and so even for low (but
positive) discount rates expected gains are positive for some valuation ratio.
As a special case, if θ(m) ≤ θ(0) ∀m (in other words θ is nonincreasing), then θ
can be determined by inspection of m =0alone (since if then reciprocal exchange
is not enforceable at m,a n ds i n c eVu is nondecreasing and Vr nonincreasing in
the market size, then it is not enforceable at any m). Since at m =0 ,V u =
0, if the discount rate increases a little, Vu remains zero but Vr increases so θ
unambiguously declines. But note that such an unambiguously declining θ-curve
is only a special case and that it is not directly related to the shape of θ(m).
The same line of argument can be used to derive proposition 6. Here the aim
is ﬁnding the θ such that market exchange is just enforceable at one particular
market size, and not for any higher θ.W eﬁrst try to ﬁnd θ in the case of non-103 Appendix
increasing θ so that the focus can be restricted to m =1 . We do not state the
proof here.
Proof of proposition 7.
The proof consists of showing that it need not be contradictory to have a stable
equilibrium that is ineﬃcient in the sense that it is Pareto-dominated by another
stable equilibrium. Denote the two equilibria under investigation by mi and me
(the subscripts stand for ineﬃcient, eﬃcient). Let the initial point be the inef-
ﬁcient equilibrium mi. Three cases are to be considered: 1. mi is at one of the
corners of the economy. If mi =0then it is stable if −c + δVr ≥ Vu. 2. If m =˜ m
then it is stable if −c + δVr >V u. 3. mi is an interior solution. It is stable if
−c + δVr = Vu and if δ dVr
dmi ≥ dVu
dmi.
We have to show that the following set of equations need not be inconsistent:
Vr(me) ≥ Vr(mi), (4.12)
Vw(me) ≥ Vw(mi). (4.13)
Additionally, the enforceability constraints have to be satisﬁed as indicated at mi
and me. Consider for example the case where mi is the corner solution m =0
and me is an interior stable solution that Pareto-dominates the corner solution.
Thus we have:
Vr(me) ≥ Vr(0), (4.14)
Vw(me) ≥ Vw(0), (4.15)
−c + δVr(0) ≥ Vu(0). (4.16)
−c + δVr(me)=Vu(me) (4.17)
The second inequality is naturally satisﬁed. (Indeed, since V
0
w(m) > 0,t h eo n l y
case where an equilibrium can be dominated by a smaller market size is where
m =0since otherwise all remaining market participants would lose some welfare.
Except, of course, when nobody stays). Since we put no restrictions on θ the ﬁrst
inequality can be satisﬁed as well (not, however, when θ(m) is nonincreasing in the
market size). Combining the (in)equalities we see that as long as Vr is increasing
over the interval [0,m e] (but remember that it may be decreasing in the ﬁrst stage
and increasing thereafter), but not as fast as Vu there is no inconsistency and it
cannot be ruled out that m =0is indeed ineﬃcient. Other cases can be analyzedChapter 4. On the Viability of Gift-exchange in a Market Environment 104
in a similar manner and are omitted. The result of possible ineﬃciency is easily
extended to the nonweighted case for Vm,V u, and Vw all behave in a similar way
(namely increasing in the market size). ¥5
Welfare Gains of Labeling with Heterogeneous
Consumers
Diamonds are a girl’s best friend. But not only her’s: they are no less a rebel’s best
friend. Rebel armies use guns to force labourers to dig holes and earn hundreds
of millions of dollars by selling the ”blood stones”. To stop these activities, many
countries have now signed to support a system of certiﬁcates for diamonds without
ac o n ﬂicting history. When does this lead to welfare gains?1
5.1 Introduction
Implicit in the standard formulation of the fundamental welfare theorems is that
the characteristics of commodities are observable to all market participants (Mas-
Colell et al., [1995]). However, in many cases the consumer cannot observe all
characteristics of a speciﬁc good, such as the safety or the quality level. Due to
these informational asymmetries, the consumer is not willing to pay price premi-
ums for diﬀerent goods. No distinct markets can therefore exist for goods that
are diﬀerentiated with respect to unobservable characteristics. As is well known,
this can have dramatic consequences for the eﬃciency of the market mechanism.
Famous in this respect is the market for lemons as described by Akerlof [1970].
0This chapter is coauthored by Theo van de Klundert. We are thankful to Richard Nahuis and Sjak Smulders
for helpful comments.
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An in particular interesting class of goods where some characteristics are un-
observable is that of goods with social externalities of production. For example,
some production methods have damaging eﬀects on the environment, involve
child labour, or rely on what are perceived as unfair wages. These externalities
are not taken into account by the producers and are therefore not reﬂected in the
consumer price. And even though it seems that many consumers are in principle
willing to pay premiums for the use of production methods that do not, or to
a lesser extent, involve such social externalities, they cannot observe from the
end product which production method has been used. Hence, goods with social
externalities of production fall into the class of asymmetric information. As in the
case of the lemons market, without improving the consumers’ information, there
is little hope that the equilibrium will be eﬃcient.
In this chapter, it is argued that goods with social externalities of production
pose an even more severe problem to the eﬃciency of markets than most other
goods with unobservable characteristics. In other cases where some characteristics
are not directly observable, producers can often still signal them to the uninformed
party. For example, the price, advertisements or warranties can sometimes provide
a credible signal to the consumer that the product in question is of high quality
(Tirole [1988]). However, such signaling strategies often do not exist for goods
with social externalities of production (see the next section).
Lacking the possibilities of the usual market responses to informational asym-
metries, the government can decide to intervene. One obvious way is to impose a
standard on production methods. Under some circumstances this can be welfare
improving. However, during recent years government regulation is increasingly
relying on information provision to alter behavior (Magat and Viscusi [1992]).
One example is labeling. Labels are certiﬁc a t e si s s u e db yat h i r dp a r t yt h a tp r o -
vide credible information about the contents of a product. By now there exists a
variety of such labels that concern, among other things, the environment, working
conditions, fair trade, and child labour. Should they wish to do so, consumers can
contribute to a reduction of social externalities by buying these labeled products.
The crucial diﬀerence between standards and labels is the fact that labels are
voluntary. Firms can decide whether or not to apply for the label, and adjust their
production technology conform the requirements. In contrast, standards imposed
by the government are mandatory for all ﬁrms in the market. Labeling schemes
therefore allow for more ﬂexibility in the choice of production technology. This107 Background
has the advantage that labels serve the consumers’ needs better than standards
when consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for reducing the
social externality. The scope of diﬀerentiation is however limited by the costs
of passing on informational contents to the consumers. These costs consist of
designing the label, screening costs of the ﬁrm made by the third party, and the
costs of information acquisition by the consumers, each of which can be signiﬁcant.
Given this trade-oﬀ between ﬂexibility and costs, the aim of this chapter is to
examine under which conditions labeling is preferred over standards.
The setup is as follows. The next section ﬁrst reviews background informa-
tion concerning markets with asymmetric information and some of the aspects
of labeling. In section 5.3, the model is described and a derivation of the welfare
under imperfect information is given, together with the optimal standard and
label technology. Section 5.4 presents the main proposition where a comparison
is made between the welfare level under a standard and under a labeling policy.
The chapter ends with a discussion and conclusion.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 General background
In this chapter the class of goods is considered whose production methods directly
aﬀects the well-being of the consumers in the economy. This may for example
occur because of the emissions it generates, or because the consumers are altruistic
towards other people who are in some way aﬀected by the production (emissions
in their neighborhood, the wage or working conditions of involved employees
etc.). This class of goods will be referred to as goods with social externalities of
production, in short social externalities.
It is now being recognized that some consumers are willing to pay a price pre-
mium for goods whose production methods involve less social externalities (see
for example Kirchhoﬀ [2000]). Their motivations to pay more can stem from as
diverse reasons as a ’warm glow’ feeling from donating (Andreoni [1989]), a sense
of equity (Fehr and Schmidt [1999]), a feeling of guilt or responsibility (Frank
[1988]), or the bestowal of social approval (Holländer [1990], chapter 3). Despite
the willingness to pay a premium, however, producers are discouraged from sup-
plying goods with less social externalities. As pointed out in the introduction,
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duction method has been used. A producer with a more expensive production
method that generates less externalities has to charge a higher price for his prod-
uct in order not to make losses. The higher price is however not always a credible
signal to consumers of a more expensive production method: producers with a
cheaper production method can raise their price and pretend to have an expensive
production method as well. Clearly, if the low cost producers have an incentive
to imitate the high costs producers, this cannot be an equilibrium.
The above arguments are reminiscent to markets where diﬀerent producers
oﬀer a variety of quality levels but the quality diﬀerence is unobservable to the
consumers. The literature on industrial organization has studied in detail when
and how it would still be possible for producers of high quality to give a signal
to the consumers that their quality is high. The conditions under which this is
possible depend on the type of goods under consideration.
In Tirole [1988] a distinction is made between search goods, experience goods,
and credence goods. In case of search goods, the consumer can determine the
quality in advance by simple inspection. Here, no signalling is needed at all.
With experience goods, the quality is only revealed after consumption. Possible
signalling strategies include advertisements and introductory prices (see Milgrom
and Roberts [1986]). The basic mechanism is that consumers will return to the
producer if they ﬁnd out that the quality is good. A producer of high quality goods
can then, for instance, give low introductory prices, knowing that the consumers
will return, and reap the lost proﬁts back later. A producer of low quality goods
cannot imitate this strategy, since low introductory prices mean lower short-
run proﬁts and this loss will not be made up in later periods. In eﬀect, a low
introductory price signals that the quality must be high. Finally, credence goods
oﬀer almost no opportunity to learn the quality, even not after using the product
for a long time. In this case, signalling strategies break down because consumers
stay uninformed about the quality even after consuming the good. Hence, there
is no particular reason why consumers should return to this particular producer,
and the strategy to give up short run gains in exchange for long run gains loses
credibility.
The class of goods that is considered in this chapter belongs to the latter group
of goods, in essence credence goods, since the consumer cannot learn anything
about the production method either on beforehand nor by experience, a view
shared for example by Kirchhoﬀ (2000). Labeling may in this case be a good109 Background
alternative to communicate the information of the production method. We now
turn to a brief overview of the practice of labeling.
5.2.2 Labeling
Labeling provides information. A label can be a statement about the production
method of a good. For example, it can state that fair wages are paid or that no
CFKs are used. Another possibility is that labels are “trademarks” that are asso-
ciated with certain contents, like some so called ’fair trade’ labels are associated
with fair wages. Of course, labeling is a very crude way of passing on information.
For instance, the statement that ‘fair wages’ are paid leaves a lot of discretion to
the actual wages that are paid. However, the contents of such a message can be
subject to legal restrictions.
In principle, labels do not have to be diﬀerent from brands, like in the case of
the fair trade label. However, when a lot of small ﬁrms are active on the mar-
ket, they may want to signal their environmental quality collectively to target a
broader public. One way to achieve this is to participate in collective labeling, sep-
arated from the individual brands. Collective labeling can also be demand-driven.
Consumers have to invest time in studying the labels, as they have cognitive lim-
itations in absorbing information. Not only do they have to recognize the labels,
they also have to understand what they say, for example what it means that
no CFKs are used. Several studies show that the limitation on human cogni-
tion to process information from labels is signiﬁcant. For example, in one study
concerning labels containing hazard warnings, it is found that as the amount of
information is increased, the consumer’s recall of other information on the prod-
uct’s label declines, and furthermore that label clutter easily leads to problems of
information overload (Magat and Viscusi [1992]). Naturally, consumers will only
incur these learning costs when these are outweighed by the beneﬁts, which is
more likely when there are only few labels. This favours collective labeling.
Labeling is voluntary. An important feature of labels is that ﬁrms voluntarily
participate. A standard, on the other hand, is enforced by the government. The
crucial diﬀerence therefore is that under a labeling scheme, some ﬁrms may decide
not to participate at all, to serve that part of the market which values quality less.
With minimum standards all ﬁrms are required to meet the speciﬁed standard.
This latter observation gains importance when consumers are heterogeneous in
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Certiﬁcation is performed by a third party. The intervention of a third party,
possibly the government, ensures credibility. Consumers that buy labeled goods
must be able to trust the certiﬁcate otherwise they buy non-labeled goods.
Examples. There are numerous of instances where labels are used. Most labels
concern the environment, working conditions or fair trade. Some of the more well
known examples include the German Blue Angel and Scandinavian Nordic Swan
eco-labels, and the international Fair-trade label, to name just a few. Another
more recent attempt is the Kimberley process, which has as purpose to certify
diamonds. The latter label is an attempt to prevent rebel armies from using
revenues to buy weapons (The Economist [2003]).
5.3 Description of the model
This section describes the general features of the model.
Producers. The focus is on goods that have social externalities of production.
There are many producers competing on a market of perfect competition. Each
producer can choose a production technology. The available production methods
are characterized by a ’social responsibility index’ s. One may think of s as
representing investments in green technologies or the wage level paid to employees.
Henceforth we refer for simplicity to s as the quality level. It is supposed that
s belongs to [s,∞). Ah i g h e rs is interpreted as more investments in reducing
negative social externalities tied to production and is therefore more costly in
terms of production.
The unit costs of producing a good of quality s is denoted by c(s) and this
function is assumed to be convex. In order to derive closed form solutions, it is
assumed that the unit cost is quadratic in quality:
c(s)=αs
2,α > 0. (5.1)
The timing of the game will be that ﬁrms ﬁrst simultaneously choose their quality
levels and then they simultaneously set their prices.
Consumers. As pointed out in the previous section, consumers may care about
the social externality because it directly concerns them (as with eﬀects on the
environment) or because they are altruistic towards the victim (as with child
labour and underpaid workers). To model this, we consider a vertically diﬀeren-
tiated product space where each consumer consumes either one or zero units of111 Description of the model
the good. Let the consumers’ preferences be given by:
(
U = θs− p if he buys at a quality level of s at price p,
U =0 if he does not buy.
(5.2)
In this case, a higher θ implies a higher willingness to pay for a higher quality,
which represents more concern for the production method. This can be reasonably
attributed to a higher income level but surely also to other exogenous factors, such
as education.
Consumers are heterogeneous in the sense that they have a diﬀerent willing-
ness to pay to reduce social externalities, e.g. because their incomes diﬀer. The
parameter θ appears to distinguish between diﬀerent types of consumers. It is
assumed that θ is uniformly distributed on [θ,¯ θ] with density f(θ), c.d.f. F(θ),
and θ ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, assume that their total mass is unity. Also
deﬁne θ
a to be the arithmetic average type: θ
a ≡ (θ + ¯ θ)/2. Furthermore, to cut
down on the many possible cases and in order to focus on the interesting ones,
the following assumption on the taste parameter is made:
Assumption 1 θ >α s .
This assumptions states in eﬀect that when the lowest possible quality is supplied
at its competitive price, the market is covered, in the sense that even the lowest
type is willing to purchase a good on the market.
Welfare. For the comparative statics we rely on interpersonal comparable utilities
and deﬁne welfare as the sum of total consumer and producer surpluses. By the






We now examine the welfare level under diﬀerent policies.
5.3.1 Imperfect information
As a ﬁrst benchmark, consider the case where consumers have no way to determine
the quality of the product. As the ﬁrms cannot discriminate themselves from each
other, it will be clear that there can only be one price in equilibrium. Furthermore,Chapter 5. Welfare Gains of Labeling with Heterogeneous Consumers 112
competition implies that this price equals the marginal cost of supplying at quality
s: p(s)=c(s). Moreover, it will be clear that given the demand functions in the
second stage, producers have an incentive to cut on quality in the ﬁrst stage.
Consumers foresee this and (rightly) expect the minimum possible quality level
s.
Note that assumption 1 implies that θs >α s 2 = p(s), so that under imperfect
information the market is covered. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 8 In the imperfect information equilibrium all ﬁrms supply a good
of quality s at price p = αs2. Total welfare is given by W I = θ
as − αs2.
Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix.
5.3.2 Standards
Suppose next that the government wants to improve on the imperfect information
equilibrium by imposing standards, i.e. the government requires the quality to be
at least σ ∈ [s,∞).
It is assumed that the consumers are aware of the standard. As in the case of
imperfect information, consumers also rightly foresee that producers will supply
the good at the minimum quality allowed, that is σ. Competition leads again to
marginal cost pricing.
The consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying or not has a taste parameter
˜ θ such that ˜ θσ = p = c(σ). All consumers with a taste parameter equal or greater
than ˜ θ = ˜ θ(σ) b u yt h eg o o d ,a l lt h eo t h e r sd on o t .I ft h eg o v e r n m e n tw a n t st o







(θσ − c(σ))dF(θ). (5.4)





(θσ − c(σ))dθ − (˜ θσ − c(σ))
∂
∂σ
˜ θ(σ) ≤ 0, (5.5)
with equality if σ>s . The second term drops out since this is the utility of the
consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying or not buying and he has zero utility113 Description of the model
by deﬁnition. When integrated out, one can write the ﬁrst order condition as:




(¯ θ + ˜ θ) − 2ασ
¸
≤ 0, (5.6)
with equality if σ>s . I tc a nb es h o w nt h a ta tt h eo p t i m u mt h ei n d i ﬀerent
consumer is not the highest type: ˜ θ 6= ¯ θ. The intuition behind this is that no
standard should be chosen such that no type consumes. This would give a welfare
equal to zero, whereas welfare would be strictly positive for a standard equal to
s. Hence, the term in brackets must be equal to zero in equilibrium. If ˜ θ>θthen
equation (5.6) has solution σ∗ = ¯ θ/(3α). This, implies that ˜ θ = ¯ θ/3 which is only
compatible with ˜ θ>θif ¯ θ ≥ (3/2)θ
a. For all other values of ¯ θ,i tm u s tb et h a t
˜ θ = θ (covered market) and σ∗ =( ¯ θ + θ)/(4α).
Proposition 9 Suppose the government imposes a minimum standard σ on s.
Then, if ¯ θ<(3/2)θ
a the optimal standard is given by σ∗ =m a x{s,θ
a/(2α)} and if
¯ θ ≥ (3/2)θ




.W e l f a r e
is equal to to Ws =( θ
a)2/4α for σ∗ = θ
a/(2α) and W s = ¯ θ
3/(27α(¯ θ − θ
a)) for
σ∗ = ¯ θ/(3α).
For low values of ¯ θ all consumers consume the standard. The optimal standard
and welfare are in this case only dependent on the average taste parameter θ
a.
An equal increase in ¯ θ and decrease in θ, hence keeping the average constant, has
thus no eﬀect on the optimal standard or welfare. For higher values of ¯ θ, it does
not pay oﬀ to make the low types consume. The optimal standard is increasing
in ¯ θ because this means that the high types are willing to pay more.
Notice that social welfare with optimal standards is always weakly higher than
under imperfect information. This must be true since the government can always
reach the same welfare level of imperfect information by setting the minimum
standard equal to s. However, in many case can the government do strictly better
than under imperfect information by increasing the minimum standard above
what is minimally feasible for producers. Note however, that a minimum standard
can be, but is not always a Pareto-improvement upon the imperfect information
equilibrium. The consumer of type θ
0 is indiﬀerent between the minimum quality
and a standard if θ
0s − αs2 = θ
0σ − ασ2 or, provided that σ>s :
θ
0 = α(s + σ), (5.7)Chapter 5. Welfare Gains of Labeling with Heterogeneous Consumers 114
and trivially at σ = s. The minimum standard σ lowers welfare for all types
θ<θ
0. In particular, if θ <θ
0 then some consumers are worse oﬀ under the
minimum standard. Their consumer surplus decreases because they now pay a
higher price that does not outweigh the quality increase for them. Some of them,
namely for whom θ<α σ ,even stop consuming.
Lemma 2 The introduction of a minimum standard is a Pareto-improvement if
and only if σ ≤ (θ/α) − s.
It is easy to show that a higher s or α create less opportunities for Pareto-
improvements. To relate Pareto-improvements to heterogeneity consider the fol-
lowing measure of heterogeneity:
Deﬁnition 2 Consumers are more heterogeneous if the taste parameter of the
highest type, ¯ θ, is higher and the average taste parameter, θ
a, is kept ﬁxed.
Thus, consumers are more heterogeneous if the spread of types (¯ θ − θ) increases
keeping the average constant. With this deﬁnition, the the following proposition
is obtained:
Proposition 10 The optimal minimum standard is a Pareto-improvement if and
only if consumers are not too heterogeneous in their taste parameter, that is, if:
¯ θ ≤ 3
2θ
a − 2αs.
It follows that if consumers are ’suﬃciently’ heterogeneous, the optimal minimum
standard beneﬁts the high type consumers and hurts the low type consumers.
5.3.3 Labeling
The latter proposition is interesting, because it lays bare the limits of standards:
with a minimum standard, all consumers are forced to buy at or above the min-
imum standard, or refrain from buying, including those who have no speciﬁc
interest in buying high quality. In this section we discuss another mechanism
mentioned in the previous section that also provides information about the qual-
ity but leaves the option of supplying at low quality: labeling.
Characteristic about labeling is that it is voluntary: each ﬁrm can freely de-
cide whether or not it wants to carry a certain label and conform to the label’s
speciﬁed standards. The government (or another third party) will set up controls
to guarantee that certiﬁed ﬁr m sk e e pu pt ot h es t a n d a r d si na g r e e m e n tw i t ht h e115 Description of the model
label’s content. Consumers, on their side, can freely choose whether or not to pur-
chase a labeled product. If they decide to buy a labeled product, they can read
the quality from the label’s description. If they purchase a non-labeled product,
they infer that it must be of the lowest possible quality.
We already pointed out that there are several cost factors speciﬁc to a labeling
policy. First, consumers are limited in their cognitive abilities and therefore have
to make some costs in order to process the information carried on the label. Sec-
ond, producers may have to restructure their production process, design a label,
and draw public attention to their labeling policy through advertising campaigns
and social responsibility reports. Of course, in order to ensure credibility of the
label’s contents, the certifying third party has to involve in costly monitoring of
the ﬁrms’ production process. Such monitoring costs are equally likely for the
case of standards though.
It may be assumed that the costs of informing consumers in particular are
relevant and for the current purpose we therefore restrict attention to these. We
limit the number of possible labels to one and assume that the additional costs,
b, over normal production costs for carrying a label take the following form:
b(τ)=β(τ − s), (5.8)
where τ is the quality of the label as speciﬁed in the certiﬁcate. Hence, it is
assumed that no costs are made for a label that speciﬁes the same technology
as the minimum possible technology (b(s)=0 )and furthermore that costs are
increasing in the quality level. This positive relationships between the cost and
quality of a label may for example be because a higher quality level means a more
complicated technology making it more diﬃcult to well inform the consumer. How
accurate this speciﬁcation of costs of information exactly is, is unclear, but this
speciﬁcation helps keeping the analysis tractable and does not aﬀect the main
results in an important way.
Suppose therefore that the government introduces a label for products that are
at least of quality τ.Because of the marginal cost pricing by ﬁrms, the price of a
labeled good will be equal to:
p(τ)=c(τ)+b(τ). (5.9)Chapter 5. Welfare Gains of Labeling with Heterogeneous Consumers 116
The type who is indiﬀerent between buying the labeled and the non-labeled prod-
uct is implicitly deﬁned by b θs − αs2 ≡ b θτ − ατ2 − β(τ − s), or, provided τ>s :
ˆ θ = α(τ + s)+β. (5.10)
No types refrain from consumption in this case: all types θ<b θ consume the non-
labeled product of quality s, whilst all types θ ≥ b θ consume the labeled product










2 − β(τ − s))dF(θ). (5.11)
The government then sets the quality of the label as to maximize welfare: τ∗ ∈






(θ − 2ατ − β))dF(θ) ≤ 0, (5.12)
with equality if σ>s . (Note that by the rule of Leibniz one should also take the
changes in the limits of the integral into account. However, this is a change in the
marginal consumer who is by deﬁnition indiﬀerent, and hence these terms cancel
out.) To rule out uninteresting cases, we make an additional assumption:
Assumption 2 θ
a ≥ 2αs + β.
This assumption is suﬃcient to rule out that the optimal quality of the label will
be so high that no consumer ﬁnds it interesting to consume the label. Solving the
ﬁrst order condition leads us then to the following proposition:
Proposition 11 Suppose the government certiﬁes producers who produce at least
aq u a l i t yo fτ. Then the optimal quality required for a label is given by τ∗ =
max{s,(θ
a − β)/(2α)} if ¯ θ<(3/2)θ
a − αs − (1/2)β and τ∗ =m a x {s,(θ + αs −
β)/(3α)} if ¯ θ ≥ (3/2)θ
a − αs − (1/2)β.
Like with a standard, if ¯ θ is relatively low all types consume the labeled product
and the optimal label is independent of ¯ θ. The optimal quality of the label is
decreasing in the cost parameter β. This is so because when the cost parameter β
increases, by (5.8) the costs of a label increases in quality and so a lower quality
is preferred. When ¯ θ increases further it is beneﬁcial to increase the quality of the117 Description of the model
label. High types are willing to pay a lot while low types can still enjoy a quality
level of s. The optimal quality is again decreasing in costs β, and, similar to the
case for standards, increasing in ¯ θ. Furthermore, if the cost parameter α is higher
or the minimum available quality is higher, so is the optimal quality. A higher α
or s makes the nonlabeled product more attractive for low types. Now that more
types will prefer the low quality, the high types can be made a bit better oﬀ by
increasing the quality of the label.
The expression of the welfare is a bit cumbersome in this case, and is there-
fore suppressed. But note again that the introduction of a label always weakly
increases welfare. However, contrary to imposing a standard, a labeling scheme is
always a Pareto-improvement upon the imperfect information equilibrium. This
is true, because consumers still have the option of consuming a good of quality s
but their choice is enriched with products that supply quality τ∗.
Before coming to the main proposition, it is interesting to discuss how the
optimal label relates to the optimal standard. First note that when everybody
consumes the label or standard, the optimal label quality, (θ
a−β)/(2α), is lower
than the optimal standard, (θ
a)/(2α). This makes sense: since the costs of a label
are increasing in the quality, the optimal quality is lower if the costs are higher.
For zero costs (β =0 )the two cases are identical.
Secondly, when not everybody would consume the label or standard, the op-
timal label is again lower than the optimal standard if the costs are high, but
can be higher if the cost parameter α is high enough. The intuition is that if α
is high, a high standard is bad because everybody pays high costs. But with a
label, only the higher types will consume the label and these are the ones that
are willing to pay most, making it attractive to set the quality relatively high.
Finally, note that the threshold value of ¯ θ for which not everybody consumes
the label or standard is lower under the labeling policy, where this threshold
is given by (3/2)θ
a − αs − (1/2)β, than under standards, where the threshold
is (3/2)θ
a. With a ﬁxed average θ
a, ah i g h e r¯ θ means a lower corresponding θ.
Increasing the quality of a label means that low types will consume s. Increasing
the standard means pushing the low types out of the market. Pushing consumers
out of the market is worse than making them consume a nonlabeled product,
which should therefore be prevented. Hence, the standard is chosen such that low
types stay longer in the market.Chapter 5. Welfare Gains of Labeling with Heterogeneous Consumers 118
5.4 Standards or labels?
We are now ready to formalize the idea mentioned in the introduction that the
trade-oﬀ between a standard and a label is that of costs versus ﬂexibility in the
producers’ choices of technology. One the hand brings the label a cost to the
consumer in terms of a higher price. It is clear that if the costs parameter β is
very high, a standard is to be preferred over a label, everything else equal. Also,
when the cost parameter is very low, a label is unambiguously to be preferred.
Indeed, if β =0 , then the welfare under a label is weakly higher than under
a standard, since the government can set τ = σ∗ in which all consumers who
want to can achieve the same utility level under a labeling scheme than with
standards, and some can achieve higher utility by consuming quality s instead of
the standard (or refrain from consuming). For a particular range of heterogeneity,
the welfare of labeling is in this case strictly higher.
The other part of the trade-oﬀ is that labeling is more ﬂexible in providing
quality in the customers’ needs. Intuitively, labeling leads to higher welfare than
a standard if consumers are heterogenous in their taste parameter. This intuition
turns out to be only partly correct. In a few steps, we show the following result:
labeling is better than standards only for an interval of heterogeneity. For either
small heterogeneity or high heterogeneity, a standard is to be preferred.
First, for notational convenience we introduce some more notation:
Notation 1 η ≡ (3/2)θ
a − αs − (1/2)β.
The parameter η is the threshold for which all types are willing to buy the label.
Consider then the following result:
Lemma 3 If ¯ θ<ηthen Wl ≤ W s with strict inequality for β>0.
If ¯ θ<η ,the optimal standard and label would be such that all types would
consume the standard or the labeled product respectively. In essence, no con-
sumer would refrain from consuming or buy the unlabeled good. The intuition
is straightforward. If β =0 , the optimal standard and label coincide: σ∗ = τ∗.
Clearly welfare would be identical. If the cost parameter β increases, but still all
consumers buy the label, the welfare under a labeling policy must necessarily be
lower. They still prefer the label to s, but the costs decrease their utility.
Next, consider:119 Standards or labels?
Lemma 4 If η ≤ ¯ θ<(3/2)θ
a and β =0then Wl >Ws.
For values of ¯ θ within this range, the welfare of standards is independent of
heterogeneity and that of labeling is increasing in heterogeneity. As W l = Ws at
¯ θ = η for β =0this lemma follows straightforwardly. As a ﬁnal intermediate step
assume that ¯ θ ≥ (3/2)θ
a and consider:
Lemma 5 Let ∆W(¯ θ,β) ≡ W l − W s. Then under assumptions 1 and 2, and
with θ









a − 2αs − β)+( 2 αs + β)2.
(A subscript denotes a partial derivative.) Thus, up to a certain threshold level
of ¯ θ, ξ, the welfare of labeling is increasing faster in heterogeneity than that of
standards. Beyond this threshold level, the reverse holds. Finally note that W l is
always decreasing in β. Putting things together, the following result is obtained:
Proposition 12 If heterogeneity is small, welfare under standards is always weakly
higher than under a label and strictly higher for any β>0. For intermediate het-
erogeneity there exists an interval where labels outperform standards provided that
the cost parameter β is not too high. For high heterogeneity standards outperform
labels again if β is high enough.
Although not all the thresholds levels for which labels are welfare improving com-
pared to standards have been derived explicitly, the picture is clear in qualitative
terms. For intermediate levels of heterogeneity labels are better than standards.
The size of this interval increases as the cost parameter β decreases.
The result of proposition 12 is pictured in the ﬁgure below. The ﬁgure is drawn
for a positive cost parameter β. Up to the point η, welfare of standards and
labeling are both constant in heterogeneity, though welfare of labeling is lower.
After this point, the welfare of labeling starts to increase and surpasses that of
standards. The diﬀerence in welfare ∆W ≡ W l−W s starts to increase. After the
point ξ the diﬀerence decreases. The curve shifts upward for lower values of β
and would be positive or zero over the whole domain for β =0 . The curve shifts
downward for higher values of β, and the domain where ∆W is positive ceases to
exist for high enough values of β.
The result that standards are better for suﬃciently high heterogeneity is per-
haps somewhat counterintuitive and deserves some more attention. Under a min-
imum standard scheme, consumers have the choice between buying the productChapter 5. Welfare Gains of Labeling with Heterogeneous Consumers 120
FIGURE 5.1.
at the quality of the standard, or refrain from buying. The consumer who is in-
diﬀerent is characterized by ˜ θ. Under a labeling scheme, the choice is between
a labeled and a nonlabeled product. The consumer who is indiﬀerent is charac-
terized by ˆ θ. Consider any ¯ θ ≥ ξ. Under that condition, ˜ θ<ˆ θ. It follows that
(¯ θ −˜ θ) > (¯ θ −b θ). In words: the fraction of consumers who consumes the highest
available technology is greater under a standard (¯ θ − ˜ θ) than under a labeling
policy (¯ θ −b θ). This is intuitive: under a labeling scheme the alternative is a non-
labeled good which is still better than the alternative under a minimum standard
(refraining from buying). Thus, a higher fraction will consume the highest qual-
ity under a minimum standard because the alternative is worse. Then, when the
heterogeneity increases, both the optimal standard and the optimal label increase
at the same rate 1/(3α). Under the standard, however, a larger fraction of the
consumer beneﬁts from this increase. This eﬀect is becoming more important for
higher values of ¯ θ, when heterogeneity increases.
5.5 Discussion and conclusions
In this chapter we have formalized some of the basic trade-oﬀs between labeling
and standards. Conditions under which labeling is welfare improving are derived.121 Discussion and conclusions
We now discuss the importance of the main underlying assumptions, and the
consequences of relaxing them.
The key assumption underlying the model is that some consumers are willing
to pay a price premium for goods that involve less social externalities of produc-
tion. This is a necessary requirement for labeling to be an eﬀective instrument.
Although there is evidence that consumers are indeed willing to pay a price pre-
mium, the evidence is still somewhat mixed (Bjørner et al.[2002]).
Assumption 1 is a relatively innocent assumption. Allowing for uncovered mar-
kets only changes the baseline welfare level W I but qualitatively speaking it does
not aﬀect any of the conclusions.
Assumption 2 ensures that there is a scope for government intervention in the
ﬁrst place. If assumption 2 does not hold, then the optimal label is such that all
consumers buy the unlabeled good. In this case, no intervention is needed other
than possibly a standard. Hence, this assumptions is a ﬁrst check for the relevance
of policy analysis.
We end the chapter by suggesting extensions to the model that seem necessary
for a well founded policy and that we intend to incorporate in future studies.
First of all, goods with social externalities of production often have a public
good character. Next to say a feeling of guilt of buying these products, they may
also care about the externality per se. The case of polluting production methods
belongs to this category. All people may care about a cleaner environment, but
there are clear incentives for free-riding. Even if a group of consumers is willing
to contribute to reduce the externality by buying labeled goods, there will likely
also be a group of consumers who prefer the nonlabeled goods. The latter group
imposes a negative externality on society. When the group of nonlabeled product
buyers is large, a labeling policy is hardly eﬀective in reducing the externality.
Standards circumvent this problem as it does not allow for consumers who wish
not to contribute.
Second, it is interesting to take note of the results of chapter 7 that deals
with self-serving biases in information procession. In the current chapter we have
assumed that some consumers may for instance experience a feeling of social
irresponsibility when they buy a good with high social externalities, inducing a
feeling of guilt. It is thus argued that they are willing to pay a price premium to
avoid any feelings of guilt.Chapter 5. Welfare Gains of Labeling with Heterogeneous Consumers 122
If this is related to the results of chapter 7, it becomes clear that consumers
may nevertheless be motivated to stay ignorant about labeled products. It is
clearly best for the consumers to buy a cheap good without reﬂecting on the neg-
ative social externalities that the product brings along. There is ample evidence
from psychology that many people indeed process information in a biased way.
Moreover, this seems to be mostly going on when their self-concept is at stake,
such as when people behave in a way that does not support their view of being
decent (Aronson [1988]). This is also likely to be the case for some of the prod-
ucts considered in this chapter. The taste parameter itself is then a function of
eﬀorts in gathering information, which on its turn is depending on the costs of
acquiring information. The more information is gathered about the wrongdoing
of a production method, the higher the willingness to pay for a product with a
higher social responsibility index. A labeling policy may well be very eﬀective as
it raises the costs of ignoring the information much more than, say, a tax would.
A second relation with chapter 7 is the following. In this chapter, it is analyzed
which policy instrument is better given the tastes of people. Thus, the feelings
of guilt make a labeling policy possible. Chapter 7 on the other hand, learns us
something how to foster such feelings because it endogenizes the willingness to
pay in relation to subsidies.
Third, the assumption of perfect competition may be relaxed to the case where
ﬁrms have some market power. This can have interesting consequences. Take for
example the case where there are only two ﬁrms. Under imperfect information and
a minimum standard, Bertrand price competition drives proﬁts to zero. However,
if one ﬁrm supplies a labeled product and the other a non-labeled product, then
their products are diﬀerentiated and they exercise some market power (for a more
elaborate treatment see Bansal [2002]). In this way, labeling has a negative eﬀect
on eﬃciency by increasing market power which may or may not be outweighed
by the larger array in the variety of goods.
Fourth, the impact on trade has not been discussed. One common theme in
the discussion on the implementation of labeling is that it imposes hidden trade
barriers (see in particular Keyzer [2002]). If consumers are willing to pay premi-
ums for clean technology, then this may well be in the advantage of producers in
developed countries who have better knowledge about clean technologies.
Finally, it is assumed that the government is perfectly informed about the pro-
duction technology. However, it may be hard for the government (or any other123 Discussion and conclusions
certifying party) to obtain precise information on all the stages of the produc-
tion process, especially if many small producers are involved. Uncertainty on the
governments side can have a great impact on the optimal policy instrument (see
Baumol and Oates [1988]). Furthermore, consumers may become skeptical about
paying price premiums if the contents of a labeled product is open to debate (see
Mason [2002]).Chapter 5. Welfare Gains of Labeling with Heterogeneous Consumers 124
5.6 Appendix
This appendix contains all the proofs and lemmas in the main text with the
exception of the proofs of propositions 8 and 10 and of lemmas 2 and 4 which
follow from straightforward substitution and/or are elaborated upon in the main
text and are for that reason suppressed.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n9 .
Most of the proof is contained in the main text or is straightforward. To complete
the proof, note that W s is continuously decreasing in σ between the unconstrained
optimum (unconstrained in the sense of ignoring the constraint σ ≥ s) and the
point where ˜ θ would equal ¯ θ, and constant thereafter. Hence, if the unconstrained
optimum is not within the interval [s,∞) then the constrained optimum is indeed
at s. ¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 1 .
Integrating out equation (5.12) gives:
(¯ θ −b θ)((1/2)(¯ θ +b θ) − β − 2ατ)=0 , (5.13)
as the ﬁrst order condition. If ¯ θ = b θ all consumers purchase the nonlabeled
good and welfare is as under imperfect information. With ¯ θ 6= b θ and using
equation (5.10) we can see that the ﬁrst order condition (5.13) is satisﬁed for
τ =( 1 /(3α))(¯ θ + αs − β) and consequently b θ =( 1 /3)(¯ θ +4 αs +2 β). Hence,
¯ θ = b θ occurs at ¯ θ =2 αs + β. For any smaller ¯ θ the optimal quality would be
such that even the highest type would consume the nonlabeled product but this
case is ruled out by assumption 1. With the foregoing expressions we can also
see that θ = b θ occurs at θ = 3
2θ
a − αs − 1
2β. In this case, substitution of θ = b θ
into equation gives the optimal quality τ =( θ
a − β)/(2α). T h e s ea r et h eu n -
constrained optimal qualities. Since W l is continuously decreasing in τ between
the unconstrained optimum (with respect to s) and constant after b θ = ¯ θ, the
constrained optimum is indeed s if the unconstrained optimal τ is not element of
[s,∞). ¥
P r o o fo fl e m m a3 .
For ¯ θ ≤ η, Ws =( θ
a)2/(4α). It is straightforward to show that in this case W l =
(1/2)τ∗(¯ θ+θ)−ατ∗2−β(τ∗−s). T h i sc a nb er e w r i t t e na sWl =( θ
a−β)2/(4α)+βs.125 Appendix
For β =0 ,W l = Ws. For any β>0,W l <W s since by assumption 2 it must be
t h ec a s et h a t2θ
a > 4αs + β. ¥
Proof of lemma 5.
1. ¯ θ ≤ 3θ ⇔ ¯ θ ≤ (3/2)θ
a. First note that it follows immediately from proposition
9t h a tWs is independent of both β and ¯ θ. It is also straightforward to show that
W l is decreasing in β. We continue by proving that W l is improving in ¯ θ.
All types θ ∈ [θ,b θ) consume the unlabeled product of quality s,a l lt y p e s
θ ∈ [b θ,θ] consume the labeled product of quality τ. Hence, the welfare under the

















∗ − s))dθ. (5.14)
We examine the behavior of W l around the optimum with respect to changes in











In the rest of the proof we suppress the condition that τ = τ∗ b u ti ti sa s s u m e d
to hold throughout. Taking the partial derivative of Wl with respect to θ using
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(b θ − θ)
2 +( b θ − θ
a)(θ − α(s + τ) − β)
¸
. (5.18)
It is useful to proceed as follows. We distinguish between θ<3θ
a−4αs−2β and
θ ≥ 3θ
a − 4αs − 2β. The former case implies that b θ<θ
a, the latter case that
b θ>θ
a. For each case we determine when b θ hits the boundary. If b θ<θ
a and b θ hits
the boundary, then it must be the case that b θ = θ. (It cannot be the case that
b θ = θ since θ ≥ θ
a and b θ<θ
a). Similarly, if b θ>θ
a and b θ hits the boundary, then
i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tb θ = θ. The thresholds are given by θ = 3
2θ
a − αs − 1
2β
(which follows from setting b θ = θ) and θ =2 αs+β (following from setting b θ = θ).





furthermore that Assumption 2 also implies that θ>2αs+β which rules out the
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a)2 [U(τ,θ) − U(s,θ)]
≥ 0.
The last inequality follows by a revealed preference argument, i.e. the fact that
t h el o w e s tt y p e( w e a k l y )p r e f e r st h el a b e l .
Case (ii): 3
2θ
a − αs − 1
2β ≤ θ<3θ
a − 4αs − 2β.127 Appendix
For values of θ within this interval, ˆ θ =
¡
θ +4 αs +2 β
¢
/3. Recall also that the
optimal label is in this case given by τ∗ =
¡
θ + αs − β
¢
/3α. Before proceeding,
note that the two conditions on ¯ θ imply that ¯ θ>2αs+β otherwise the case does






































































By inspection of the assumptions and the note we made before, it is then easily
seen that this expression must be positive.
Case (iii): θ ≥ 3θ
a − 4αs − 2β.
We now have ˆ θ =
¡
θ +4 αs +2 β
¢
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2 (5.23)
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By a revealed preference argument, it is easy to see that it must be the case that
U(τ,θ) − U(s,θ) > 0 since θ>b θ. Under the assumptions made we also have
b θ − θ
a > 0. Hence, we conclude that in this case ∂Wl/∂θ>0.
2. ¯ θ>3θ ⇐⇒ ¯ θ>(3/2)θ
a. Note ﬁrst that it cannot be the cast that ˜ θ>θ
and ˆ θ = θ. Hence, if the market for standards is not covered, then also not with
labels. This on its turn means that we can substitute for ˆ θ in equation (5.18)










(¯ θ − 3
2θ
a)
27α(¯ θ − θ
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Subtracting this from (5.22) gives us (again suppressing notation that we examine
behavior around the optimum):




























where χ ≡ 2/(27α(¯ θ−θ
a)2). This can, after some manipulations, be rewritten as:
∂(W l − Ws)
∂¯ θ
















It is then straightforward to show that:
∂(W l − W s)
∂¯ θ
=0⇔ (5.28)









a − 2αs − β +( 2 αs + β)2. (5.29)
Since ¯ θ ≥ θ
a we only need to consider the positive root. For any ¯ θ Q ξ, ∂(W l −
W s)/∂¯ θ R 0. This proves the lemma. ¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 2 .
This follows in a straightforward manner from lemmas 3, 4, and 5. ¥6
Rewards, Self-conﬁdence, and Motivation: The
Hidden Rewards of Rewards
6.1 Introduction
Many real-life situations concern relationships where no complete explicit con-
tracts can be written down. Moreover, many situations do not allow the possi-
bility of implicit contracts either. Incomplete contracts, however, can often give
strong incentives to shirk (Williamson [1985], Fehr and Gächter [2000]). This
raises some questions such as: why are eﬀorts rewarded, and why are they made
in the ﬁrst place? A particularly intriguing question is why spontaneous rewards
are sometimes given. This latter question is taken up in this chapter by examining
t h er o l eo fs e l f - c o n ﬁdence and its eﬀect on motivation.
There are several possible channels through which motivation can be stimu-
lated. Most of economic theory is built on the assumption that monetary rewards
motivate agents to make eﬀorts. The channel through which rewards motivate
is straightforward: agents care about money, and hence they are more willing to
make eﬀorts if this increases the probability of payments1. Social psychologists
have identiﬁed another channel through which motivation can be stimulated,
namely through changes in self-conﬁdence. Whenever an agent is more conﬁdent
0This chapter is coauthored by Anton Souvorov. We thank Jean Tirole for helpful ideas. Part of the research
was done during my stay at GREMAQ at the University of Toulouse 1, that was supported by the ENTER
exchange and a Marie-Curie fellowship.
1More generally, rewards can give non-monetary beneﬁts — payments in kind, promotions, recognition. What
matters is that rewards directly aﬀect the agent’s utility.Chapter 6. The Hidden Rewards of Rewards 130
about his ability to succeed, he is more likely to try to undertake a task. Thus,
if one succeeds in making the agent more self-conﬁdent, his eﬀort increases and
a successful outcome is more likely.
The primary aim of this chapter is to study both channels in one simple model.
Although both monetary rewards and self-conﬁdence are elements in economic
models, the self-conﬁdence eﬀect has rarely been studied: in most conventional
models with asymmetric information, the agent has full information about his
ability. Consequently, there is no role for the principal to give signals to the
agent. By contrast, in this chapter it is assumed that the agent has incomplete
information about his chances to attain a successful outcome, for example because
he undertakes a task that is new to him. In this case, it is shown that monetary
rewards can give credible signals about these chances and therefore inﬂuence the
level of self-conﬁdence.
Interaction eﬀects between rewards and self-conﬁdence are also examined in a
recent paper by Bénabou and Tirole [2002a]. Their focus is on promised bonuses
that are speciﬁed in a contract. The focus in this chapter is on discretionary
rewards. Such unexpected bonuses are interesting in their own respect, because
why would someone give a bonus that is not expected or speciﬁed in a contract
anyway? A possible answer is that such rewards can increase self conﬁdence. Or,
in the words of Bénabou and Tirole [2002a, 22]:
”Rewards that are discretionary (not contracted for) may well
boost the agent’s self-esteem or intrinsic motivation, because (...) the
worker or child learns from the reward that the task was considered
diﬃcult (and therefore that he is talented), or that the supervisor is
appreciative of, proud of, or cares about his performance — and that
it is worth repeating it. (...) And receiving the reward is good news,
because the agent initially did not know how to interpret his perfor-
mance.”
The main idea of the model in this chapter is that there is an agent who is
only willing to make eﬀorts if he has enough self-conﬁdence that he will succeed
in the task. However, it is diﬃcult for him to assess the outcome. By giving a
bonus, the principal can give a signal to the agent that his eﬀorts resulted in a
successful outcome last period. Thus, bonuses increase motivation in our model in
two ways: ﬁrst of all, they raise the agent’s self-conﬁdence, and he realizes that it131 Introduction
is worthwhile for him to continue working hard; secondly, foreseeing that bonuses
will be given more frequently after successful outcomes, the agent works harder in
the ﬁrst place. Altogether, this can explain why sometimes ”unexpected” rewards
are given, even in a game with a ﬁnite number of rounds2. These results are in line
with actual behavior in existing markets (Akerlof [1982]) as well as in laboratory
experiments (Fehr and Gächter [2000]).
Some social psychologists have stressed that rewards need not necessarily in-
crease self-conﬁdence. In their view, rewards sometimes have ”hidden costs” (e.g.
Kohn [1993]). The hidden costs of rewards are the possible negative eﬀects on
self-conﬁdence. There are two main causes for this. First, rewards can be per-
ceived as controlling, thereby undermining self-determination. Second, they can
carry an informational content which can be negative. For instance, in the model
by Bénabou and Tirole [2002a], promising a high bonus in case of success may
give a signal to the agent that the task in question will be diﬃcult and that he is
unlikely to succeed. For as long as rewards are given, the agent is motivated to
make eﬀorts. In the meantime, rewards lower his self-conﬁdence. At the moment
that rewards are withdrawn, the self-conﬁdence eﬀect persists and induces less
motivation than before. Interestingly, there is a considerable body of evidence
showing exactly this pattern (see Deci and Ryan [1985]).
The hidden cost component of rewards have not been found in studies where
unexpected rewards are used (e.g., Deci, Koestner and Ryan [1999]). This is
predicted by the basic model of this chapter: in any equilibrium, the principal has
no incentive to give a discretionary bonus that decreases motivation in the next
period. Thus, the rewards bring good news. Besides, they cannot be controlling
since they are discretionary. However, with a slight modiﬁcation, the model can
replicate a negative correlation between rewards and self-conﬁdence. One key
c o n d i t i o ni se x a m i n e dw h e nar e w a r dc a nl o w e rs e l f - c o n ﬁdence in equilibrium.
This is the case when eﬀort and ability are substitutes. Now, the bonus is a
signal that the outcome was a failure. This reduces his self-conﬁdence in his
ability, which he compensates by making more eﬀorts. However, even though the
bonus reduces self-conﬁdence, it stimulates the agent to work harder because he
realizes he must make eﬀorts in order to succeed.
2Unexpected in quotation signs, because in equilibrium the agent foresees the payment of a bonus with
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the model
and discusses the main assumptions. The derivations of equilibria are given in
section 6.3. Section 6.4 describes some qualitative properties of the equilibrium.
The results are discussed in section 6.5. After that, the results are related to the
results of related literature in section 6.6. Finally, section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 The model
6.2.1 Preliminaries
This section describes the general setup of the game. Some of the basic ideas are
closely related to the work by Bénabou and Tirole [2002a] and Souvorov [2003].
Where assumptions diﬀe r ,t h i si sm a d ec l e a ri nt h et e x t .
In the game, there are two players: a principal and an agent. There is a ﬁnite
number of periods, for simplicity set to two. The case with an inﬁnite horizon has
been studied brieﬂy by Bénabou and Tirole [2002a] in a slightly diﬀerent model.
The agent has to decide on his eﬀort level. He chooses to make eﬀorts or not:
e ∈ {0,1}. If the agent undertakes the task, i.e. e =1 , he incurs a cost of c in
terms of disutility. Depending both on eﬀort,e ,and ability,θ ,the outcome of
the eﬀort can be either a success,S ,or a failure,F. The probability of success is
given by:
prob(S | e)=eθ. (6.1)
In other words, ability and eﬀort are complements. No eﬀort induces a failure
with certainty. In case of success, it yields a payoﬀ equal to V to the agent, and
W to the principal. A failure yields a payoﬀ equal to zero for both. Both parties
are risk-neutral and the agent is protected by limited liability.
The principal has to select a reward policy. In each period, he can oﬀer a bonus
b ∈ R+ to the agent.
6.2.2 The main assumptions
Most of the above description is relatively standard for a principal-agent game.
The model, however, departs from most conventional models in several respects.
Each of these are discussed in more detail.
Imperfect self-knowledge. Although it is not a usual assumption, the idea that
people have only imperfect knowledge about their personal characteristics is plau-133 The model
sible (see for instance Bénabou and Tirole [2002b]). First because retrospective
evaluations of past utilities are known not always to be reliable (Kahneman
[1994]). Thus, based on retrospection, people make incorrect estimates about
how they will feel about certain matters. Moreover, some situations are new to
people. In this case, they do not have enough information about themselves to
infer their ability. Someone who tries to quit smoking for the ﬁrst time is unlikely
to be able to guess how persistent he will be. This requires some learning, but
learning opportunities are usually limited.
Imperfect self-knowledge in the current context means that people are not
perfectly informed about their ability. They cannot foresee their ability to make
a success out of it. The task they have to undertake is for example relatively
new to them, or they have forgotten how well they did on this or a comparable
task in the past. They do form an estimate about their ability. Based on this
estimate, they form an estimate of their chances to succeed, which represents
their self-conﬁdence.
To make things concrete: suppose that the agent can be either one of two
possible types, a high type with ability θH or a low type with ability θL <θ H.
His prior on being a high type is given by ρ. His self-conﬁdence is then given by:
ρθH +( 1− ρ)θL. (6.2)
Clearly, self-conﬁdence is increasing in ρ. In the remainder of the chapter the
parameters θH and θL are kept ﬁxed, and with slight abuse of terminology, self-
conﬁdence is identiﬁed with the parameter ρ.
Non-contractibility of the bonus. The principal has the possibility to give a
reward b to the agent. However, a crucial assumption in the model will be that
the outcome is not observable to the agent or an outside party. The outcome is
therefore private information to the principal. It follows that a reward contingent
on the outcome cannot be speciﬁed in a contract, because the agent or third party
would not be able to verify the truthfulness of the principal’s claim. That is, the
principal can always report a failure and no party can contest this claim.
The non-contractibility is one of the main departures from the model of Bén-
abou and Tirole [2002a]. They have analyzed the case where a contract can be
written that speciﬁes the bonus in advance. Of course, they also have to assume
that the output is veriﬁable to the agent. The case of noncontractibility is inter-
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noncontractible, and second, evidence from experiments show that the relation
between bonuses and motivation diﬀers depending on whether or not a bonus is
speciﬁed in advance.
Intrinsic motivation. Even though no contract that speciﬁes a bonus can be
written, it is still assumed that agents have a motivation to make eﬀorts. Econo-
mists usually takes rewards as the motivation to work. According to Frey [1997],
many psychologists emphasize that the motivation to undertake a task can come
from within the person. If they are motivated without apparent reward or en-
vironmental control, they are said to be intrinsically motivated. In the words of
Deci and Ryan [1985, 43]:
”Intrinsic motivation is the innate, natural propensity to engage one’s
interests and exercise one’s capacities, and in so doing, to seek and
conquer optimal challenges. Such motivation emerges spontaneously
from internal tendencies and can motivate behavior even without the
aid of extrinsic rewards or environmental controls”.
It is undisputed that people are intrinsically motivated to do certain things:
playing football, solving a puzzle, the list is endless. An assumption in this chapter
is that people are indeed motivated for the task they have to undertake, even if
they get no current rewards. This is not a completely innocent assumption. Even
if people are intrinsically motivated to perform certain tasks, it does not follow
that they are intrinsically motivated to do all possible thinkable tasks. However,
the assumption is not crucial in the sense that the agent may also be motivated
for expected rewards in the future, despite the absence of current rewards. The
model allows for both interpretations.
The motivation of the agent is modeled as the value V in the model. To make
things interesting, one additional assumption has to be made on V, namely that
it cannot be directly observed. In other words, it is assumed that the agent is
m o t i v a t e dt od oat a s kf o rw h i c ht h eb e n e ﬁts come later in life. Thus, one can
interpret V as the discounted value of payoﬀs later in life, be it extrinsic or
intrinsic. The agent may be a pupil learning to play the piano. First, he needs to
practice all kind of chords, a rather dull activity. The reward only comes when
he is able to play a decent piece. The agent may also be a student studying for
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may be to get a job afterwards that he really likes. Or he may be a worker, who
undertakes the task with the prospect of getting a promotion afterwards.
Asymmetric information. As explained, the agent is not sure about his ability
to bring the task to a successful end. Moreover, the focus in on situations where
even afterwards he does not get to know directly for sure whether it was a success
or a failure. He only gets an imperfect signal about the outcome. On the other
hand, the principal is able to observe the outcome. For instance, the pupil learning
to play piano cannot really tell whether he is talented after a few sessions, but the
principal can tell, having seen many pupils trying before this pupil. The same is
true for the student, whose grade will only be imperfectly informative about his
ability. This is certainly the case where the grade is dependent on the subjectivity
of the teacher, as with an essay. For a worker, it may be the case that this is the
ﬁrst time he undertakes the task, or that his task is only a small part of a bigger
whole he is part of, so that he is not able to judge the outcome based on his own
information only.
Note that this assumption is contrary to most conventional principal-agent
models, where the agent has more information rather than less. For example, in
the classic job-market signalling model of Spence [1973] it is the agent who knows
his ability, whereas the principal only knows the distribution of abilities among
the population.
The private signal that the agent gets is given by σ ∈ [0,1]. This signal has a
conditional distribution G(σ | y)=Gy(σ) and density g(σ | y)=gy(σ), where y
is the outcome of the task: y ∈ {S,F}. Ah i g h e rσ is interpreted as good news in
the sense that it is more likely that a success has occurred. To capture this idea,





is an increasing function in σ. This is the monotone likelihood ratio property
(MLRP).
The next section examines equilibrium behavior of the principal and agent. To
focus on interesting cases, the following additional assumptions are made.
Assumption 3 Were the agent to know his type, then he would only undertake
the task without a bonus if he is a high ability type: θLV< c < θ HV.Chapter 6. The Hidden Rewards of Rewards 136
As will be demonstrated shortly, no bonus is oﬀered by the principal in the second
period. If assumption 3 did not hold, then either the agent would never work in
period 2, or he would always work, independent of his self-conﬁdence. In both
cases, there is no role for the principal to increase self-conﬁdence. Thus, no bonus
would be given in the ﬁrst period either.
Furthermore, the following restriction is put on the likelihood ratio:
Assumption 4 The likelihood ratio l(σ) is continuous in σ and has full sup-
port on [0,+∞). Furthermore, the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) is
satisﬁed: l(σ) is everywhere increasing in σ.
The full support assumption simpliﬁes matters. It is also used by Bénabou and
Tirole [2002a] and Souvorov [2003] in related settings. The MLRP is an essential
assumption in many models with asymmetric information.
Assumption 5 In period 1, the agent undertakes the task: e =1in period 1.
This last assumption is made to focus on the interesting aspect of the model,
which is the behavior of the agent in period 2. Although conditions can be derived
under which e =1is an equilibrium strategy in period 1, not much insight is
gained from doing that.
6.2.3 Timing and summary of the game
Each period is divided in two subperiods. In each ﬁrst subperiod, the agent decides
to make eﬀort or not: e ∈ {0,1}.E ﬀort costs c in terms of disutility. At the end of
the ﬁrst subperiod, the principal observes the outcome (y ∈ {S,F}) and the agent
receives a private signal σ about the outcome. A success occurs with probability
eθ and gives a payoﬀ V to the agent and W to the principal. In the second
subperiod, the principal determines his reward policy b ∈ R+.
Note also the following: at the beginning of the game, both the principal and
t h ea g e n th a v et h es a m ep r i o rρ that the agent is of the high type, θH. To simplify,
both of them observe eﬀort. The signal σ is private information to the agent, but
the conditional distribution functions are common knowledge.137 Equilibrium behavior
6.3 Equilibrium behavior
Consider then the behavior by the agent if he does not know his type. First note
t h a tn ob o n u si se v e ro ﬀered to him in period 2. The intuition is simple: the bonus
is costly to the principal, and since it can have no impact on strategies played in
the past, he should never give a bonus at the ﬁnal stage of the game. Therefore,
given his posterior on being a high type ρ0, t h ea g e n tw o r k si np e r i o d2i fa n d
only if:
[ρ
0θH +( 1− ρ
0)θL]V ≥ c. (6.4)
His posterior on being a high type is depending on his prior of being a high type,
the private signal, and the bonus he received in the ﬁrst period. If the agent did
not work in period 1, he receives no additional signals and his posterior remains at
his prior ρ. Suppose then that the agent did work. Suppose also, quite generally,
that the principal oﬀers a reward bS with probability xS after success, and with
probability xF after a failure. Then, after a bonus bS and a signal σ, the agent






θHgS(σ)xS +( 1− θH)gF(σ)xF
θLgS(σ)xS +( 1− θL)gF(σ)xF
. (6.5)
B a s e do ne x p r e s s i o n( 6 . 4 ) ,t h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o nc a nb ed e r i v e d :
Proposition 13 Then there exist threshold levels of his initial self-conﬁdence ˜ ρS
and ˜ ρF ≥ ˜ ρS such that if the agent worked in the ﬁrst period, was given a bonus
bS and observed a private signal σ, in the second period the agent: (i) never works
if ρ<˜ ρS, (ii) always works if ρ ≥ ˜ ρF , and (iii) if ρ ∈ [˜ ρS,˜ ρF), works if and only
if he has suﬃciently good news (σ high enough).
Proof. All proofs are collected in the appendix.
In other words, if the agent has a suﬃciently low self-conﬁdence, he will not work
in period 2 whatever the signal or bonus he gets. If he has suﬃciently high self-
conﬁdence, he will work in period 2 even for the worst possible signal or bonus
he could get. For intermediate levels of initial self-conﬁdence, he is sensitive to
t h en e w sh eg e t s .I fh eg e t sg o o dn e w s ,h ew i l lw o r ki np e r i o d2 .I fh eg e t sb a d
news, he will not work in period 2.
All the speciﬁc thresholds are derived in the appendix. However, it is interesting
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range: ρ ∈ [˜ ρS,˜ ρF). He will work if and only if after observing bs, the signal σ





Here, A is a parameter depending on initial self-conﬁdence3.I ti se a s yt os h o w
that this parameter is decreasing in initial self-conﬁdence. Thus, the threshold
signal ˜ σ is decreasing in initial self-conﬁdence (for a given principal’s policy).
This increases the set of private signals for which the agent will work in period 2.
In sum, for a higher initial self-conﬁdence, it becomes more likely that the agent
will work in period 2. Note furthermore that the threshold signal is decreasing in
the probability that the bonus is paid after a success (xS), which makes it more
likely that the outcome was a success, and increasing in the probability that the
b o n u si sp a i da f t e raf a i l u r e(xF), which makes it more likely that the outcome
was a failure.
Consider now the behavior by the principal in period 1. For ρ/ ∈ [˜ ρS,˜ ρF), it
should be clear that the principal gives no bonus in period 1, since he is not able
to inﬂu e n c eb e h a v i o ri np e r i o d2 .F r o mh e r eo n ,t h ef o c u sw i l lt h e r e f o r eb eo n
ρ ∈ [˜ ρS,˜ ρF). For these values of ρ, the principal may try to signal through a bonus
that the agent was successful in period 1. The reason is that for this interval of
initial self-conﬁdence, it can happen that the agents works and is successful, but
receives a private signal that is below the threshold ˜ σ. This possibility is less
likely if the principal increases the probability of giving a bonus bS after success,
or decreasing the probability of giving a bonus bS after failure.
However, there are typically many perfect Bayesian equilibria in this game. This
is a common feature of signalling games. Some of these equilibria are less reason-
able than others, primarily because out-of-equilibrium beliefs are unrestricted. To
reduce the set of possible equilibria, it is useful to restrict the set of possible out-
of-equilibrium beliefs. Here, a relatively standard reﬁnement is applied, which is
the Never a Weak Best Response (NWBR) reﬁnement for signalling games, which
is, in the current context, equivalent to the universal divinity criterion (see Cho
and Kreps [1987] and Fudenberg and Tirole [1991]). A general deﬁnition is given
3For the values of ρ in the interval from ˜ ρS to ˜ ρF,A (ρ) is equal to the ratio of the expected loss from
working after a failure to the expected gain from working after success. In the absence of any intermediate
information the agent would work if and only if A(ρ) ≤ 1.139 Equilibrium behavior
in the appendix. Reformulated for the current model, the reﬁnement requires the
following:
Assumption 6 Fix an equilibrium outcome. For any out-of-equilibrium bonus ˆ b,
let ¯ σF(ˆ b) be the agent’s reaction4 to this bonus that makes the principal indiﬀerent
between the expected payoﬀ following ˆ b (the agent playing ¯ σF(ˆ b))a n dh i se x p e c t e d
equilibrium payoﬀ if a failure has occurred. Then, if for this reaction ¯ σF(ˆ b) the
principal strictly prefers his expected equilibrium payoﬀ to the expected payoﬀ
from deviating to ˆ b if a success has occurred, then the agent should believe that
a failure occurred after getting ˆ b. If for this reaction ¯ σF(ˆ b) the principal would
strictly prefer to deviate to ˆ b if a success has occurred, the agent should believe
that a success has occurred after getting ˆ b.
The intuition behind the assumption is that if the principal wants to deviate to
an out-of-equilibrium bonus ˆ b after success for any agent’s reaction making him
want to deviate after failure, the agent should believe that success is (inﬁnitely)
more likely. Similarly for the failure. That is, given an equilibrium outcome, if
the principal expects ¯ σF(ˆ b) after deviating to an out-of-equilibrium bonus, and
he would strictly prefer to deviate after a success but be indiﬀerent after a failure,
the agent should believe a success has occurred.
Under the assumptions made, the equilibrium is unique (see the appendix).
Depending on initial self-conﬁdence, the equilibrium is either a pooling equilib-
rium or a semi-separating equilibrium. In the pooling equilibrium, the principal
always oﬀers the same reward. In the semi-separating equilibrium, the principal
always oﬀers the same reward after success, but randomizes between two rewards
after a failure. These two equilibria are examined in detail below.
Before continuing, the following lemma will prove to be helpful. Deﬁne ˜ σ as the
threshold signal such that the agent works for all σ ≥ ˜ σ. Note that in equilibrium
this threshold signal depends on the bonus because the bonus provides additional
information. One can therefore write ˜ σ =˜ σ(b). Then:
Lemma 6 In any equilibrium, for b1 >b 2, it must be that ˜ σ(b1) < ˜ σ(b2).
In other words, a higher bonus increases the likelihood of eﬀort. This is easy
to see. Suppose b1 and b2 are equilibrium bonuses but ˜ σ(b1) > ˜ σ(b2). Then a
4Somewhat loosely, we shall call ¯ σ(b) (or σ∗(b)) the agent’s strategy to work after getting bonus b if and
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lower bonus increases the likelihood of eﬀort. Clearly, this makes the principal
unambiguously better oﬀ so that b1 could not have been an equilibrium bonus.
6.3.1 A pooling equilibrium
Suppose that there is a pooling equilibrium, with xS = xF =1 . Thus, the same
bonus bonus˜ b = bs is always given independent of the outcome. Suppose also that
given this bonus, the agent only works for signals exceeding ˜ σ>0, where l(˜ ρ)=A
is determined by (6.6). Denote by ˆ θF and ˆ θS the estimates by the principal of the
agent’s chances to succeed in period 2, conditional on failure and success in the
ﬁrst period. Thus:
ˆ θy = prob(S in period 2 | y in period 1). (6.7)
It is assumed that the agent tried in period 1. The exact probabilities are given
in the appendix. The expected payoﬀs for the principal is then given by:
ˆ θy(1 − Gy(˜ σ))W −˜ b. (6.8)
Assume that the principal deviates from the equilibrium strategy, and oﬀers a
bonus ˆ b = ˜ b + ε.L e tˆ σ be the agent’s reaction to this oﬀer which makes the
principal indiﬀerent between deviating or not after failure:
ˆ θF(1 − GF(˜ σ))W −˜ b = ˆ θF(1 − GF(ˆ σ))W −ˆ b, (6.9)
or
ε = ˆ θF(GF(˜ σ) − GF(ˆ σ))W. (6.10)
For instance, the left-hand side of equation (6.9) gives the expected proﬁto ft h e
principal by paying ˜ b knowing that a failure has occurred. The probability of
success in the second period is given by ˆ θF and the probability that the agent
w o r k si sg i v e nb y1 − GF(˜ σ).
T h eq u e s t i o nt h e ni s :c a ng i v e nt h i sb o n u sˆ b and the corresponding ˆ σ, the bonus
˜ b be an equilibrium? This depends on the beliefs of the agents after observing ˆ b.
If the agent believes that a bonus ˆ b is given after a success, the principal would
be able to achieve an increase in the probability of eﬀort at arbitrarily small cost
ε. Obviously, the principal then has incentives to deviate to ˆ b, and ˜ b cannot be an
equilibrium in this case. According to assumption 6 (NWBR), it must be that:
ˆ θS(1 − GS(˜ σ))W −˜ b ≥ ˆ θS(1 − GS(ˆ σ))W −ˆ b. (6.11)141 Equilibrium behavior
If this inequality did not hold, the agent should believe that a success has occurred
according to the NWBR assumption. This cannot be an equilibrium. In other
words, if the principal is indiﬀerent between a bonus ˆ b and ˜ b after a failure,
he should not be better oﬀ with a bonus ˆ b after a success. This is a necessary
condition.
Equations (6.9) and (6.11) combined yield:
ˆ θS(GS(˜ σ) − GS(ˆ σ)) ≤ ˆ θF(GF(˜ σ) − GF(ˆ σ)). (6.12)
Dividing both sides by ˜ σ − ˆ σ (note that ˆ σ is necessarily smaller than ˜ σ for a





Conversely, assume that (6.13) is satisﬁed and consider a possible deviation ˆ b =
˜ b + ε. Since the MLRP implies that5:
GS(˜ σ) − GS(ˆ σ)
GF(˜ σ) − GF(ˆ σ)
<l (˜ σ), (6.14)
for any ˆ σ<˜ σ, condition (6.13) together with assumption 6 are suﬃcient to insure
that the agent will believe in failure after receiving any out-of-equilibrium bonus
ˆ b and so the principal has no incentive deviate to a higher bonus. In the appendix
we prove that the equilibrium bonus is zero so the principal cannot deviate to
a slightly lower bonus. In sum, for the proposed pooling equilibrium to exists, a
necessary and suﬃcient condition is (6.13).
For later reference, note that condition (6.13) and the condition that l(˜ σ)=A
imply that A ≤ ˆ θF/ˆ θS.
6.3.2 A semi-separating equilibrium
Consider next a semi-separating equilibrium where the principal oﬀers ˜ bS after
success and randomizes between ˜ bS and ˜ bF after failure. In this case, a bonus ˜ bF is
only given in case of failure and therefore perfectly reveals a failure. It follows that





x gS(z)dz. Integrating out yields: l(x) < [GS(y) − GS(x)]/[GF(y) − GF(x)].
Similarly, for l(z) <l (y) ∀ z ∈ [x,y], it follows that [GS(y) − GS(x)]/[GF(y) − GF(x)] <l (y). Note in particular
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˜ bF =0 , since there is no reason for the principal to incur a cost when conveying
a negative signal.
Next note that in equilibrium the principal must be indiﬀerent between ˜ bS and
˜ bF after a failure, otherwise he would not be willing to mix. In other words:
ˆ θF(1 − GF(˜ σS))W −˜ bS =0 , (6.15)
where ˜ σS is the threshold signal for which an agent works after a bonus ˜ bS. Note
that after ˜ bF =0the agent does not work (recall that θLV< C ) so the payoﬀ for
the principal is zero. This condition determines the bonus ˜ bS.
Moreover, the principal should not want to deviate to a bonus slightly above
or below ˜ bS. Following similar logic as above, the principal does not want this in
case the agent would believe a failure occurred after observing the deviation from
the equilibrium bonus. Suppose ﬁrst that the principal deviates to ˆ bS = ˜ bS − ε.
Assumption 6 implies that if
ˆ θF(1 − GF(ˆ σS))W −ˆ bs =0 , (6.16)
it must be that
ˆ θS(1 − GS(ˆ σS))W −ˆ bS ≤ ˆ θS(1 − Gs(˜ σS))W −˜ bS (6.17)
Again, if this inequality did not hold, the agent should believe that a success has
occurred by the NWBR assumption. This cannot be an equilibrium.





(Recall that a deviation to a smaller bonus is considered, hence ˆ σ>˜ σ).
Now suppose ˜ σS =0 . The above condition implies l(0) = 0 ≥ ˆ θF/ˆ θS. However,
ˆ θF/ˆ θS > 0 so this case can be ruled out. Then consider ˜ σS > 0, so that the agent
does not always work after a bonus ˜ bS. Then, the principal should also not be
willing to deviate to a higher bonus ˆ bS = ˜ bS +ε to separate the success outcome.










as the only possibility. The agent’s reaction is given by
l(˜ σS)=˜ xFA. (6.21)
Condition (6.20) determines ˜ σS, (6.21) deﬁnes ˜ xF and (6.15) determines ˜ bS. Fi-
nally note that conditions (6.20) and (6.21) imply that ˆ θF/ˆ θS ≤ A since ˜ xF ≤ 1.
6.4 Rewards, self-conﬁdence, and motivation
The following is the main proposition of the chapter, which relates the reward to
initial self-conﬁdence and motivation in period 26:
Proposition 14 Under assumptions (3)-(6), there always exists is a unique con-
tinuation equilibrium depending on the initial self-conﬁdence. In particular, there
exists a threshold level ρ∗ such that for values ρ ∈ [˜ ρS,˜ ρF):
(i) for ρ<ρ ∗, the unique equilibrium is a semi-separating equilibrium in which
the principal always oﬀers a bonus bS = ˆ θF(1 − GF(˜ σS))W after success
( xS =1 ) , and randomizes between bS and bF =0after a failure with
probabilities xF =
l(˜ σ)
A(ρ) and 1−xF respectively. The threshold ˜ σS is positive
and determined by l(˜ σS)=
ˆ θF
ˆ θS , and ˜ σF =1 .
(ii) for ρ ≥ ρ∗, the unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium where no bonus
is ever oﬀered. The threshold ˜ σ is positive and determined by l(˜ σ)=A(ρ).





6The proposition states the equilibrium conditions for values of ρ such that ρ ∈ [˜ ρS,˜ ρF). Recall that it was
already established that for values of ρ/ ∈ [˜ ρS,˜ ρF) n ob o n u si se v e ro ﬀered. For ρ<˜ ρS, ˜ σS =˜ σF =1(the agent
never works) and for ρ ≥ ˜ ρF, ˜ σS =˜ σF =0(the agent always works).
7The existence of a point ρ∗ is obvious: A(ρ) decreases from inﬁnity to 0 on the interval [˜ ρS,˜ ρF] and
r(ρ)=
ˆ θF (ρ)
ˆ θS(ρ) is positive and bounded away from 0 on this interval. Implicitly we assume uniqueness as well. For
this it is suﬃcient (but not necessary) to require that r(ρ) be non-decreasing on the relevant interval. Multiple
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That the unique equilibrium for suﬃciently high initial self-conﬁdence is a pooling
equilibrium with no bonus is intuitive: if self-conﬁdence is high, the agent is likely
to work in the second period, and it becomes too costly for the principal to signal
a success. The main point of the proposition is however that there is a region
where the principal does have an incentive to give a bonus, and that this bonus
increases self-conﬁdence. In this region, the agent is relatively unlikely to make
eﬀorts in the second period. In this case, the principal has an incentive to make
a costly signal to the agent to make clear to him that a success has occurred.
It is also possible to show that for ρ<ρ ∗ the probability of a reward increases in
initial self-conﬁdence. Since ˆ θF/ˆ θS is increasing in ρ, so must l(˜ σS). It is then easily
seen that xF must be increasing, since A(ρ) is decreasing in ρ. The probability
that an agent works, on the other hand, is decreasing, as ˜ σS increases in ρ. The
change in the size of the bonus for a higher initial self-conﬁdence is ambiguous.
T h e r ea r et w oo p p o s i n ge ﬀects: ﬁrst ˆ θF increases, since a higher probability of
a high type increases the success of the agent in the second period. Secondly,
1−GF(˜ σS) decreases since ˜ σS increases. The total eﬀect depends on the relative
sizes of these two opposing eﬀects.
T h es i z eo ft h eb o n u si nt h er e g i o nw h e r es e l f - c o n ﬁdence is relatively low, that
is ρ<ρ ∗, is proportional to the payoﬀ for the principal in case of success, W.
This means that the scope of applications is not limited to situations where the
stakes are high for the principal. For example, it would be enough if the principal
derives a small beneﬁt from observing a successful performance of the agent, say
out of altruistic feelings. For smaller stakes, the corresponding equilibrium bonus
will be lower.
6.5 Discussion
When contracts are absent in a relationship, one easily ends up with the argument
that no bonus will ever be given, and neither that eﬀorts will be made. The cause
is the strong backward induction argument: the agent knows that the principal
has no incentive to give a reward in the last period and so he makes no eﬀort,
after which the principal realizes that rewarding in the before-last period makes
no sense, and so the agent will not work in that period either, and so on until the
very ﬁrst period. This chapter sheds some light on why rewards and eﬀorts may
be observed after all.145 Discussion
There is no shortage of empirical and experimental evidence that shows the
existence of rewards which are not conditioned on performance, and also that
there is a positive relationship between rewards and eﬀorts. Akerlof [1982], for in-
stance, has noted that labour markets can often be characterized as gift exchange
relationships. The employers give wages above the minimum wage, and work-
e r sm a k em o r ee ﬀorts than is required. Laboratory experiments show the same
positive relationship between wages and eﬀorts, even in the absence of explicit
performance incentives (Fehr and Gächter [2000]). Deci and Ryan [1999] survey
the psychological literature on rewards and intrinsic motivation. They present
some studies which ﬁnd a positive eﬀect, although not all studies which used
unexpected rewards ﬁnd a positive eﬀect, and on average they ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
relation8.
The positive relationship between rewards and eﬀorts is also called positive
reciprocity. Chapters 2 and 3 provide a more detailed exposition and extend
the phenomenon to other environments. These chapters give other explanations
of this relationship. For example, it is advanced that people are reciprocal by
virtue of their fair nature: they are driven by the moral obligation to reward
generous behavior by generous behavior (see e.g. Falk et al. [1999] and section
2.3.3). Another possibility is that people care about social approval and that
generous behavior elicits generous behavior (see chapter 3). The current chapter
adds another explanation to the existing literature, by focusing on the role of
self-conﬁdence.
Obviously, the proposed mechanism can only be valid as long as the main
assumptions are satisﬁed. An important assumption is that the principal has more
information about the expected payoﬀs than the agent. This makes the theory
more applicable to situations where agents are in their learning phase: at school
or at new jobs. A second important assumption is the sorting condition that is
implicit in the model. The principal must obtain a higher marginal beneﬁtf r o m
rewarding an agent after a success than after a failure. Otherwise, the principal
would be tempted to reward the agent after a failure as well, disturbing the
proposed equilibrium.
8However, in these studies it is not clear to the participants what the beneﬁts of the experimentator are.
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The model is also extendable to other situations with asymmetric information.
For example, it extends to situations where the agent is unsure about his own
payoﬀ rather than his ability. Another possibility is that the agent cares about
the principal’s payoﬀ (e.g. through altruism), but is unaware of how much utility
the principal derives from his eﬀort.
6.6 The hidden costs of rewards
So far the focus has been on how noncontracted rewards stimulate motivation. By
contrast, the papers by Bénabou and Tirole [2002a] and Souvorov [2003] study
how rewards can decrease motivation. As argued earlier, the main diﬀerence with
their approach is that they consider bonuses that are speciﬁed in a contract.
To sketch the argument: if a principal observes that the agent has low ability,
he also expects him to have low self-conﬁdence. He therefore proposes a high
powered contract which speciﬁes a high reward contingent on success to motivate
t h ea g e n ta n y w a y .T h i sm a k e st h ea g e n tr e a l i z et h a th em u s tb eo fl o wa b i l i t y ,
which lowers his self-conﬁdence. Whenever rewards are withdrawn, the agent will
be less motivated.
The mentioned papers are initiated because there is much evidence that this
eﬀect occurs. For example, in one experiment it is found that children who were
paid for engaging in an activity, showed less interest in the activity once rewards
were withdrawn than children who were never rewarded for the activity (Lepper
et al. [1973])9. Deci and Ryan [1999] survey the literature and ﬁnd that such
crowding-out of motivation also comes out of a meta-analysis of more than one
hundred earlier studies. In sum, there is a rich body of experiments showing that
there are hidden costs of rewards10.
How much motivation is crowded out depends to a great extent on the nature
of the reward (Deci and Ryan [1985]). For example, rewards contingent on per-
formance have an eﬀect on motivation, but the eﬀect of rewards contingent on
fulﬁlling the task are less profound. No such an eﬀect has been found for exper-
iments where rewards were unexpected, although the evidence is mixed and the
results are small and on average insigniﬁcant.
9Interestingly, when the reward was unexpected, there was a slight (yet insigniﬁcant) increase in interest.
10See also Kohn [1993], Deci and Ryan [1985], Frey [1997], Frey and Jegen [2002], and chapters 2, 3 and 7.147 Conclusions
It is possible to replicate the negative correlation between rewards and self-
conﬁdence in the current model. In the model of section 6.2, the principal has more
to gain from rewarding an agent after a success, and only then it is worth making
a costly signal. Thus, the reward is good news for the agent and raises his self-
conﬁdence. However, so far it is assumed that eﬀorts and ability are complements,
so that the principal indeed wants to increase the agent’s self-conﬁdence. There
are, however, also cases where a higher self-conﬁdence would be a bad thing from
the principal’s viewpoint, and the results of the model would be reversed: the
principal would have an incentive to oﬀer a reward to signal a failure, hence
reducing self-conﬁdence.
Consider for example the case where the agent has to perform a task that
has again only two possible outcomes: a failure or a success. Now assume that
the ability and eﬀort are substitutes rather than complements. For instance, a
student may be intelligent enough to pass an exam without any eﬀorts. Less gifted
students can compensate their lack of ability by making more eﬀorts and study
hard. In any case, the parent would rather make the student work hard to avoid
any risks of failure. By giving a reward he could say: ”Look, here’s a reward to
show that you have failed, you’d better work hard next period to pass.” Although
this lowers his self-conﬁdence, it would increase his motivation. Hence, no hidden
costs of unexpected rewards should be expected11.
6.7 Conclusions
Studies by psychologists show that rewards can undermine motivation. This has
stimulated economists to examine the eﬀects of rewards in more detail. One in
particular interesting contribution is the paper by Bénabou and Tirole [2002a]
where the focus is on the role of self-conﬁdence. This chapter also examines the
eﬀect of rewards on self-conﬁdence. The focus is on rewards that are not speciﬁed
in contracts. This answers several questions, such as why discretionary rewards
are used and how they can stimulate motivation.
11Consider for instance the following version of the model. The agent’s payoﬀ is given by λV − ec, with
λ =1if and only if e + θi ≥ ϕ. Thus, λ =1is a success and needs either eﬀort or a high ability. Assume that
ϕ<1, and V> c so that eﬀort is enough to pass. However, an able agent can pass without eﬀort whereas a low
ability agent cannot: θH >λ>θ L. If no eﬀort is made in the ﬁrst period, and the outcome was not a success,
the principal may want to signal through a bonus that the agent has low ability and should make eﬀorts in the
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Rewards can motivate agents by signalling a success, increasing self-conﬁdence.
Rewards can also decrease self-conﬁdence in the special case where eﬀorts and
ability are substitutes. In accordance with the empirical and experimental ev-
idence, no negative relation between rewards and motivation is found for such
unexpected rewards.
This chapter is only one of the ﬁrst few attempts to formally study the inter-
action between rewards and self-conﬁdence. Future work should generalize some
of the assumptions. For example, the role of shirking is central in many princi-
pal agent models. Here, it is simply assumed that eﬀort is observable. Another
straightforward extension is to include more than two periods. This would shed
light on the dynamics of rewards and self-conﬁdence in the spirit of Souvorov
[2003]. For instance, in a richer framework, the agent may beneﬁtf r o mp r e t e n d -
ing his conﬁdence is low in order to get a bonus. In addition, people may come
to expect another reward once they received one in a previous period. This may
complicate the analysis somewhat as this changes their reference point. Further-
more, it would be interesting to examine the relation between promised bonuses
(speciﬁed in contracts) and discretionary bonuses. Promised bonuses can under-
mine motivation but at least specify when a bonus will be given. Discretionary
bonuses increase motivation to work after a bonus, but insofar as they are un-
expected they cannot motivate agents in the ﬁrst period. Thus, perhaps there is
something such as an optimal mix of diﬀerent kinds of rewards, consisting both
of announced as well as unexpected bonuses.149 Appendix
6.8 Appendix
Proof of proposition 13.
With the strategy of the principal is to give bS after success with probability xS
and after failure with probability xF, the agent updates his prior ρ to ρS after a
bonus bS. The expressions for ρS is given in the text (equation (6.5)). Consider
an agent who observes bS. He works if and only if:
[ρSθH +( 1− ρS)θL]V ≥ c. (6.23)














φ(1 − ρ0)(1 − θL) − ρ0(1 − θH)






The denominator of the RHS is zero for:
ρ




The numerator of the RHS is zero for:
ρ
0 =˜ ρF ≡
φ(1 − θL)
φ(1 − θL)+( 1− θH)
. (6.27)
The sign of the derivative of the RHS of (6.25) is equal to the sign of (θL−θH)φ<
0. Furthermore, it is easy to show that ˜ ρS < ˜ ρF. Finally, note that:
lim
ρ↑˜ ρS




A(ρ) → +∞ (6.29)
In sum, for ρ<˜ ρS and ρ ≥ ˜ ρF the RHS of (6.25) is negative and decreas-
ing, and for ˜ ρS <ρ<˜ ρF, the RHS of (6.25) is positive and decreasing. Since
gS(σ)/gF(σ) ≥ 0, there is no signal for ρ/ ∈ [˜ ρS,˜ ρF) such that (6.25) holds with
equality. For ρ<˜ ρS the agent never ﬁnds it proﬁtable to work. For ρ>˜ ρF, theChapter 6. The Hidden Rewards of Rewards 150
agent always ﬁnds it proﬁtable to work. For ρ ∈ [˜ ρS,˜ ρF) the agent works for any







Since it is assumed that gS(σ)/gF(σ) has full support on [0,+∞), the threshold
signal ˜ σ always exists. Note that thresholds ˜ ρS and ˜ ρF do not depend on the
bonus bS.¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 4 .
In proving the proposition, we ﬁrst introduce some intermediate results in the
form of lemma’s and a corollary. At the end we give the precise deﬁnition of the
NWBR assumption, because this requires some additional notation of it’s own.
Lemma 7 If bonus ˜ b is given in equilibrium with probability ˜ xS > 0 after success
and with ˜ xF > 0 after failure, and ˜ σ is the agent’s reaction to the bonus (i.e. the




• ˜ b>0 and l(˜ σ)=r(ρ) or
• ˜ b =0and l(˜ σ) ≤ r(ρ),
with r(ρ) ≡ ˆ θF/ˆ θS.
Proof. l(˜ σ)=
˜ xF
˜ xS A(ρ) determines the agent’s optimal reaction to the principal’s
policy unless the agent would ﬁnd it worthwhile to always work when oﬀered ˜ b,
i.e. ˜ σ =0 . I nt h el a t t e rc a s ew es h o u l dh a v el(0) ≥
˜ xF
˜ xSA(ρ) in contradiction with
Assumption 4 which states l(0) = 0.
When ˜ b>0, for the principal not to be able (and a fortiori willing) to signal
that the agent has succeeded by deviating to ˜ b±ε for a small ε>0, it must be the
case that l(˜ σ)=r(ρ) (see the analysis of the pooling equilibrium in section 6.3.1).
When ˜ b =0 , only deviations to ˜ b + ε are relevant so the requirement reduces to
l(˜ σ) ≤ r(ρ).
Lemma 8 In equilibrium only one bonus is oﬀered after success.
Proof. Assume that b1 and b2 >b 1 are oﬀered after success with positive proba-
bility, and ˜ σ1 and ˜ σ2 are the corresponding agent’s reactions (˜ σ1 > ˜ σ2 by Lemma151 Appendix
6). The smaller bonus, b1,m u s tb eo ﬀered after failure with a positive proba-
bility (otherwise the agent would always work after b1 and the principal would
never give the larger one, b2). For the principal not to be willing to separate the
successful outcome by oﬀering b1 + ε, it must be that l(˜ σ1) ≤ r(ρ). Then,
b2 − b1 = ˆ θS(GS(˜ σ1) − GS(˜ σ2)) < ˆ θF(GF(˜ σ1) − GF(˜ σ2)). (6.31)
The equality in (6.31) comes from the principal’s indiﬀerence between b1 and b2,
and the inequality follows from l(˜ σ1) ≤ r(ρ) and MLRP and implies that that the
principal strictly prefers to give b2 rather than b1 after a failure — a contradiction.
Corollary 2 At most two diﬀerent bonuses are oﬀered with positive probability
in equilibrium. There are three potential types of equilibrium:
A. pooling — the same bonus oﬀered to both types;
B. semi-separating — the principal always gives ˜ bS after success and randomizes
between ˜ bS and ˜ bF 6= ˜ bS after failure;
C. separating — the principal always gives ˜ bS after success and ˜ bF 6= ˜ bS after
failure.
Each possible type of equilibrium is considered below.
A. Pooling equilibria
Some bonus ˜ b is always given to the agent (xF(˜ b)=xS(˜ b)=1 ), who works when
observes a signal σ above ˜ σ =˜ σ(˜ b).
Case A.1: ˜ b =0and ˜ σ =0(the agent always works).
For this equilibrium to occur it must be the case that
l(0) ≥ A(ρ). (6.32)
By the full support assumption for the likelihood ratio, this is equivalent to ρ ≥
˜ ρF.
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See section 6.3.1 in the main text. Note that:
ˆ θF =
ρ(1 − θH)θH +( 1− ρ)(1 − θL)θL





H +( 1− ρ)θ
2
L
ρθH +( 1− ρ)θL
(6.34)
Case A.3: ˜ b>0 and ˜ σ>0 (the agent does not always work).
As in case A.2, the principal should not want to deviate in case of success. Now





Indeed, by the same reasoning as in the previous case it easy to show that
l(˜ σ) ≤ ˆ θF/ˆ θS is necessary and suﬃcient for the principal’s inability to separate
the success outcome by increasing ˜ b by ε. According to similar logic, l(˜ σ) ≥ ˆ θF/ˆ θS
is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the principal not being able to signal
success through reducing the equilibrium bonus by ε. This leaves (6.35) as the
only possible case.
Besides (6.35), there is another condition for this equilibrium: the principal
should not wish to separate the failure outcome. In the previous case it was
satisﬁed trivially because increasing a bonus in order to decrease the probability
of eﬀort is clearly not a good idea. Now, when the principal can reduce her
equilibrium bonus, this requirement may be restrictive. When (6.35) is satisﬁed,
any deviation will be interpreted by the agent a signal of failure. Hence, the
optimal deviation is to pay no bonus at all. This deviation will not to be proﬁtable
if and only if
ˆ θF(1 − GF(˜ σ))W −˜ b ≥ 0
because the agent will not work if convinced in failure (remember that ρ<˜ ρF).
Thus, in this non-generic case (i.e. when l(˜ σ)=ˆ θF/ˆ θS for ˜ σ determined from
l(˜ σ)=A) there is a continuum of pooling equilibria with ˜ b ∈ [0,ˆ θF(1−GF(˜ σ))W]
satisfying the NWBR criterion.
Case A.4: ˜ b>0 and ˜ σ =0(all agents work).153 Appendix
Clearly, this case requires l(0) ≥ A(ρ). By the full support assumption for the
likelihood ratio, this is equivalent to ρ ≥ ˜ ρF. It also requires l(0) ≥ ˆ θF/ˆ θS, which
c a nb ep r o v e db yaal i n eo fr e a s o n i n gs i m i l a rt ot h eo t h e rc a s e sa b o v e .
Semi-separating equilibria.
Case B.1: Failure outcome semi-separated. See section 6.3.2 in the main text.
Case B.2: Success outcome semi-separated.
This equilibrium is impossible: Assume that the principal pays ˜ bF after failure and
randomizes between ˜ bS and ˜ bF after success; the agent then always works after
˜ bS and works when σ ≥ ˜ σF after ˜ bF .C l e a r l y˜ bS > ˜ bF —o t h e r w i s et h ep r i n c i p a l
would always pay ˜ bS, and ˜ σF > 0 — otherwise the principal would always pay
˜ bF.F o rt h ep r i n c i p a ln o tt ob ea b l et os e p a r a t eas u c c e s s f u lo u t c o m eb yab o n u s





In case˜ bF > 0, this should hold with equality since the principal should also not be
able to separate the success outcome by decreasing the bonus by ε. Furthermore,
the principal should be indiﬀerent between ˜ bS and ˜ bF after a success otherwise
he should not be willing to randomize:
ˆ θS(1 − GS(˜ σF))W −˜ bF = ˆ θSW −˜ bS, (6.37)
But (6.36) implies that if the principal is indiﬀerent between giving ˜ bS or ˜ bF after
success, she should prefer to give ˜ bS after failure — a contradiction. Indeed, the
MLRP property of l(σ) implies that
GS(˜ σ)
GF(˜ σ)
<l (˜ σ). (6.38)
But then if the principal is indiﬀerent between ˜ bS and ˜ bF after success, he prefers
˜ bS after a failure:
ˆ θF(1 − GF(˜ σF))W −˜ bF < ˆ θSW −˜ bS. (6.39)
Hence ˜ bF cannot be an equilibrium bonus.
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This equilibrium cannot occur. It implies that the principal must be indiﬀerent
between ˜ bS and ˜ bF both after a failure and after a success. It is easy to show that
this is not compatible.
Separating equilibria.
In a separating equilibrium the principal gives ˜ bF =0after a failure (again,
there is no sense to incur any cost to send a negative signal) and ˜ bS > 0 after
success. The agent always works after ˜ bS and never works after ˜ bF. For this pair
of bonuses to be an equilibrium, the principal should not strictly prefer to give
˜ bS after failure:
ˆ θFW −˜ bS ≤ 0. (6.40)
If (6.40) were a strict inequality, then the principal could reduce ˜ bS by a small ε so
that (6.40) would still be satisﬁed and according to he NWBR criterion the agent
should believe success has occurred: the set of the agent’s reactions that make
the principal indiﬀerent between giving 0 and ˜ bS −ε after failure — the empty set
— is strictly included in the set of reactions that make her indiﬀerent between ˜ bS
and ˜ bS − ε after success. Hence, ˜ bS is uniquely determined:
˜ bS = ˆ θFW. (6.41)
It must also be the case that the principal cannot separate the success outcome





To see this, assume that the agent’s reaction ˆ σ to an out-of-equilibrium bonus ˆ b
is such that the principal is indiﬀerent between deviating to ˆ b after a failure or
not:
ˆ θF(1 − GF(ˆ σ))W −ˆ b =0 . (6.43)
Then we need the principal not to be willing to deviate after success:
ˆ θS(1 − GS(ˆ σ))W −ˆ b<ˆ θSW −˜ bS, (6.44)
or, using ˜ bS = ˆ θFW
ˆ θSGS(ˆ σ) > ˆ θFGF(ˆ σ). (6.45)
For (6.45) to be satisﬁed for all ˆ σ, a necessary and suﬃcient condition is (6.42).155 Appendix
In sum, all equilibria other than those of proposition 14 require either that l(0) ≥
ˆ θF/ˆ θS or l(0) ≥ A(ρ) or both. Since ˆ θF/ˆ θS and A(ρ) are both positive for ρ ∈
[˜ ρS,˜ ρF) and since l(0) = 0, these can be ruled out. The only exception is case A.3
which exists only for the point where ˆ θF/ˆ θS = A(ρ) which has measure zero and
is therefore for simplicity ignored. ¥
Never a Weak Best Response in signalling games.
The following is a condensed presentation of the NWBR criterion. See Fudenberg
and Tirole [1991] for more details.
Suppose the principal chooses action a1 and the agent a2. This notation facil-
itates comparison with the literature. We say that a principal is of type t if he
has observed outcome t. Then, ﬁx an equilibrium, an out-of-equilibrium action
a1, and let u∗
1(t) be the principal’s expected payoﬀ in the proposed equilibrium if
he is of type t.T h e nd e ﬁne the set D(t,T,a1) to be the set of mixed-strategy best
responses α2 to action a1 and beliefs concentrated on T (a subset of the set of all
possible types Θ) that make type t strictly prefer a1 to his equilibrium strategy:
D(t,T,a1)=∪µ:µ(T|a1)=1{α2 ∈ MBR(µ,a1) s.t. u
∗
1(t) <u 1(a1,α 2,t)}, (6.46)
for beliefs µ over diﬀerent types.The set Do(t,T,a1) is deﬁned as the set of mixed-
strategy best responses that make type t indiﬀerent:
D
o(t,T,a1)=∪µ:µ(T|a1)=1{α2 ∈ MBR(µ,a1) s.t. u
∗
1(t)=u1(a1,α 2,t)}. (6.47)
Then, a type-action pair (t,a1) can be deleted under the NWBR criterion if:
D
o(t,Θ,a 1) ⊂∪ t06=tD(t
0,Θ,a 1). (6.48)
Type-action pair (t,a1) can be pruned if the (sequential) equilibrium response
to the out-of-equilibrium action a1 that makes t indiﬀerent between his expected
equilibrium outcome and a deviation to a1, makes some other type strictly prefer
to deviate to the out-of-equilibrium action. In other words, the agent is assumed
to believe that it is inﬁnitely more likely that a1 has come from some other type
t0. 7
Optimal Subsidies with Rationalizing Agents:
Subsidize Enough but Don’t Subsidize Too
Much
”He suddenly recalled how he had once in the past been asked, ”Why
do you hate so and so, so much?” And he had answered them, with
his shameless impudence, ”I’ll tell you. He has done me no harm. But
I played him a dirty trick, and ever since I have hated him.” F. M.
Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 1879.
7.1 Introduction
The typical economic approach is to take preferences as given and then study
how certain incentives can alter behavior in a desired way. Psychologists on the
other hand, have paid considerable attention to the formation of preferences,
trying to demonstrate that they are not stable. Preferences are not stable indeed,
sometimes even capricious (see the next section). According to psychologists, the
formation of preferences is nevertheless in many cases quite predictable.
While changing behavior by appropriate incentives has been subject to exten-
sive investigation within the ﬁeld of economics, changing preferences (or attitudes,
or tastes) has been left largely unexplored. In this chapter both eﬀects are taken
into account. I wish to argue that a subsidy on environmental friendly goods
0I am indebted to Riccardo Calcagno, Theo van de Klundert, Eloic Peyrache, Karim Sadrieh, Sjak Smulders,
participants at the European Economic Association (Lausanne, 2001), the ENTER Jamboree (Toulouse, 2002)
and seminar participants at Tilburg for very helpful comments.Chapter 7. Optimal Subsidies with Rationalizing Agents 158
(green products) not only inﬂuences behavior but also attitudes towards such
goods. Although subsidies have a straightforward eﬀect on buying behavior — a
higher subsidy giving more incentives to buy that good — the relationship between
subsidies and attitudes is surprising. The main result is that a low subsidy stimu-
lates a positive attitude change towards the subsidized good. Yet, a high subsidy
does nothing to the attitudes of people. This result ﬁts the experimental evidence
in the psychological literature well, reporting a negative relationship between re-
wards and attitude change (Aronson [1988]). It follows that after the removal of
a high subsidy behavior and attitudes are as in the status quo. But a low subsidy
induces attitude changes that can persist even after withdrawing the subsidy. I
therefore conclude that high subsidies are ’too much of a good thing’: they aﬀect
current behavior but fail to aﬀect attitudes and therefore future behavior.
The leading example of this chapter is the consumption of environmental dam-
aging goods, but the model applies to other instances of goods with social exter-
nalities as well, such as production methods that involve child labour or cruelty
to animals (see also Chapter 5 for more on goods with social externalities). Typi-
cal of environmentally damaging products (as well as the other examples) is that
the externalities tied to these goods are considered to be socially or morally un-
desirable. Consuming these goods therefore poses a threat to our self-concept of
being decent people. Psychologists argue that in such a case consumers experi-
ence an unpleasant feeling. To reduce this unpleasant feeling, they will either try
to change their behavior, or — by rationalizing their choice — their attitudes1.
That people can and do change their behavior is undisputed. But, as said, they
can change their attitudes as well. There are several ways to accomplish attitude
changes (see Baumeister [1998]). For example, Frey [1997] argues that when the
costs of following principles of environmental ethics are high, people ﬁnd a lot of
reasons why they should desist from doing so. They can for instance highlight
the argument that their eﬀect of buying environmentally damaging goods is neg-
ligible on the environment anyway. The mere fact that you contribute marginally
to a bad environment does not make you an indecent person, does it? Or you
may recall that article in the newspaper saying that the damaging eﬀects on the
environment are staggeringly exaggerated. And if that is not enough, you can
1In psychological terminology: the bad feeling is caused by cognitive dissonance — a discrepancy between
simultaneously held cognitions (beliefs, attitudes, opinions). Originated by Festinger [1957] the theory has been
found to be mostly relevant in situations where one’s self-concept is violated by one’s behavior (Aronson [1988]).159 Introduction
always buy yourself the book ”The Skeptical Environmentalist” by Bjørn Lom-
borg, which plainly denies any signs of an impoverishing environment. Just try to
ignore those other articles claiming the opposite. Possibilities abound. It should
therefore come at no surprise that self-serving biased information processing is
indeed systematically found (see the next section).
The beneﬁts of changing attitudes towards environmental damaging products
is to take away the associated unpleasant feeling. This goes at some psychological
and/or psychic costs: information has to be gathered and mental eﬀorts have to
be put into rationalizing choice. It is precisely the impact of subsidies on the cost-
beneﬁt structure that drives the main result of this chapter. In words (formalized
in the next section): both a high as well as a low subsidy on green products
might induce a change in behavior towards buying these goods. But it does not
in both cases pay oﬀ to change your attitude. A high subsidy provides enough
justiﬁcation of itself to buy green products. Even if you think that it does not
help the environment, it is still attractive to buy these goods due to their low
price. A low subsidy, on the other hand, does not give such a justiﬁcation of
itself. Why did you until recently refuse to buy green products (perhaps claiming
that buying them has no signiﬁcant merit) but consume them now that they are
slightly subsidized? That does not make sense. But it would start making sense
if you concentrate on the argument that, though each individual as such does
not contribute anything noteworthy, for the society as a whole it would make
ah u g ed i ﬀerence if everybody would behave the same way. Be supportive of
Kantian principles of morality. And, think of the social approval you will get for
the noble act of buying green products (see Chapter 3). Accordingly, the people
who received a relatively small reward are likely to revise their attitude most.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss
in more detail the basic premises of the model. Some evidence for the model is
provided in section 7.3. The formal model is presented in section 7.4, together
with the results. In the subsequent section I brieﬂy discuss the robustness of
the results. Finally, section 7.5 discusses the results, relates them to the existing
literature, and concludes.Chapter 7. Optimal Subsidies with Rationalizing Agents 160
7.2 Preference management
When a person deliberately harms someone else, he experiences an unpleasant
feeling: sentiments of guilt. This unpleasant feeling stems from a discrepancy
between held beliefs (”I am a decent person”) and actual behavior (”I harmed
her”). In the psychological literature this feeling has been labeled dissonance
(see also footnote 1). For ease of comparison with the existing literature, in the
remainder I stick to this terminology.
It is not so controversial to think that people experience dissonance when their
behavior imposes negative externalities on society. More controversial is that, to
reduce this unpleasant feeling, people can manipulate their preferences in a way
that serves their interest best. In other words, that people would ’rationalize’
choice. It is one of the most basic assumptions of theories of rational choice that
preferences are stable. Theories of habit formation depart from this by assuming
instead that future tastes are dependent on current consumption, for example as a
consequence of addiction or learning. These theories therefore allow for changing
tastes over time, but typically in a slow manner and in the direction of getting
to appreciate what you consumed in the past. Hence, habit formation does not
account for self-serving changes in tastes. Rationalizing choice, on the other hand,
demands a more rapid change in preferences and more ﬂexibility in the direction
it goes.
The existence of rapid changes in preferences is supported by a sizeable body
of research showing a picture of a remarkably labile nature of preferences (see
Slovic [1991]). Illustrative of this are the following two well-known examples.
• Endowment eﬀects: once goods are part of one’s endowment, the valuation
immediately increases sharply. This eﬀect is present even if the subjects are
made familiar with the object on beforehand, thereby excluding learning
arguments as an explanation (Loewenstein and Adler [1995], Thaler [1980]).
• Framing: another well established phenomena is the sensitivity of choice to
the way that a choice problem is formulated. For example, the valuation of
a gamble is sensitive to whether the outcomes are framed as gains or losses
relative to the status quo (Tversky and Kahneman [1992]).
The unstable nature of preferences paves the way for manipulating preferences in
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surprising on retrospective grounds, Slovic [1991] reports the existence of ”pref-
erence management”: preferences are constructed on the spot by ”...discarding
nonessential diﬀerences, adding new attributes into the problem frame in order
to bolster one alternative, or otherwise restructuring the decision problem to cre-
ate dominance and thus reduce conﬂict and indecision.” (Slovic [1991, 500]). In
a similar vein, Bénabou and Tirole [2000] speak of ”awareness management”:
people reframe performance by remembering successes, forgetting failures, and
by trying to convince themselves that the act was not so bad. Thus, although
”... the individual updates his beliefs according to broad Bayesian principles ...
it is also widely recognized that information acquisition and belief updating are
subject to self-serving biases.” (Bénabou and Tirole [2000, 2]).
From the marketing literature it is clear that ﬁrms have acknowledged that peo-
ple rationalize choice. To give two examples, according to Dibb et al. [1997, 108],
buyers seek positive information to justify their choice. They claim that ”mo-
toring journalists often note with amusement that car shows and exhibitions are
frequented by consumers who have just recently purchased a new car”. Berkowitz
et al. [1994, 144] take the advertising campaign by Buick as an example, which
had as message ”Aren’t you really glad you bought a Buick”. Firms know that
people seek to justify their choice afterwards, and they give response to this desire.
These ﬁndings are incorporated in the model of section 7.4. For a more elaborate
exposition of evidence of preference management I refer to Bénabou and Tirole
[2000] and Rabin [1995]2.
7.3 Evidence from psychology
The theory of cognitive dissonance roughly boils down to the idea that people
rationalize their choice. The idea is not limited to goods with social externalities.
In fact, despite its relative simplicity, there is a wide range of applications (Aron-
son [1988], Akerlof and Dickens [1982]). This section describes some experimental
2Other contributions to economics that try to explain the ﬁndings by social psychologists by formalizing the
theory of cognitive dissonance include the following. The focus of Akerlof and Dickens [1982] is on the purchase
of safety equipment in an environment of uncertainty, Akerlof [1991] considers time-inconsistency, Dickens [1986]
criminal behaviour, Rabin [1994] examines social norms, and Rabin [1995] moral behavior. James and Gutkind
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results. All of them are easily understood by assuming that people are motivated
to rationalize their choice3.
In a very early experiment by Brehm [1956], some women were asked to rate
various household products. The experimenter selected two of the appliances that
were presented wrapped to the women, and which were rated equally by the
women. The women were then told that they could choose one of these two
products as a reward for participation (without knowing on which base these
were selected). Still wrapped, they were asked to evaluate these two products
again. A systematic feature of the second evaluation relative to the ﬁrst one,
was that the chosen product increased in valuation, whereas the rejected product
apparently became less attractive to these women.
Aronson and Carlsmith [1963] designed an experiment where children were
asked to rate several toys in attractiveness and were then left alone. In one condi-
tion, the experimenter took the second rated toy with him. In a second condition,
the toy was left with the child but the child was asked not to play with it, with
the added mild threat that the experimenter would otherwise be annoyed. In the
third condition, the threat was more severe, announcing that he would be very
angry. No child played with the toy. After that, the experimenter returned and
asked for another evaluation. As it turns out, the perceived attraction increased
in conditions 1 and 2, where the child had enough external reasons not to play
with the toy. In the mild threat condition, however, the attraction was less in the
second evaluation. Apparently, the child had no really good justiﬁcation for not
playing with the toy and so tried to rationalize behavior by reasoning that the
toy was not so attractive after all.
Festinger and Carlsmith [1959] report an experiment where subjects had to lis-
ten to a rather boring seminar. After the seminar, some were asked to tell the next
participants that the seminar was going to be very interesting. Some were paid $1
for this, others $20. All participants were asked to rate the seminar. Interestingly,
the subjects who were paid $1 showed a much more positive evaluation record
than the other groups. This could be expected. Some individuals were asked to
tell a lie, and nobody rejected this request. Likely, telling a lie is not congruent
with the self-image of being a decent person. This can create some dissonance.
However, the group of people which received $20 has a clear rational for lying:
3Most of the material in this section draws upon the expositions by Aronson [1988] and Brigham [1991].163 Evidence from psychology
they were paid considerably for this. Hence, the only group where the lie created
dissonance was the group which only received $1 and they indeed revised their
opinion most.
If we assume that people try to rationalize behavior, this has an interesting
consequence for how people should recall things. Consider a situation where there
are good reasons pro and contra an individual’s position. From all the reasons
pro and contra, some make sense and others are less plausible. Which ones would
be best to recall for an individual? In order to rationalize the position taken, the
b e s tt h i n gt od oi st or e m e m b e rt h es e n s i b l er e a s o n sc o n g r u e n tw i t ht h ep o s i t i o n
taken, and the implausible arguments that are incongruent. In an experiment by
Jones and Kohler [1959] exactly this pattern was found.
Three more things are worthwhile to note. First, dissonance seems to bring
a real physiological arousal. An experiment by Croyle and Cooper [1983] shows
that conditions creating high-dissonance situations show more skin conduction
responses. According to them, this is a reliable indicator of physiological arousal.
This means that the phenomenon of dissonance goes beyond subjective self-
reports (Aronson [1988]). Relatedly, attitude change is not a superﬁcial tendency
of people to pretend they were changing (Baumeister [1998]).
Second, attitudes are, if properly measured, a reliable indicator of behavior
(Brigham [1991]). In a famous study by Lepper, Greene and Nisbett [1973] chil-
dren were asked to draw a picture using attractive magic markers. Some children
were paid for this. In a second session, the children were left alone to play freely
with the materials. Those children who were not paid before (and had therefore
no good rational to participate other than that the magic markers were enjoyable
in themselves to play with) were more likely to spend time with the materials.
Hence, instead of measuring attitude changes, this study shows that also behav-
ioral changes are induced. This is an important aspect from an economics point
of view, since if changed attitudes do not lead to changes in behavior they are
not very interesting from the perspective of choice theory.
Finally, the attitude changes are persistent. Between the ﬁrst and second session
of the experiment by Lepper et al. [1973] was a time span of several days. In
a study by Freedman [1965] children were less likely to play with previously
forbidden toys, even after nine weeks had passed.Chapter 7. Optimal Subsidies with Rationalizing Agents 164
7.4 A simple model
The aim of this section is to present a simple model that captures the forego-
ing observations. Still abstracting from preference management, subsection 7.4.1
introduces the unpleasant feeling that people experience when doing something
threatening to their self-concept into the utility function. In subsection 7.4.2 I
allow for preference management. Here, choice can be rationalized along the ways
described in the introduction and the previous section. Although this clearly is
a dynamic process, for simplicity the model is essentially static. It is my feeling
however, that the main results go through in a more general setting. Because the
ultimate aim of the chapter is to consider the eﬀects of subsidies on eﬀorts, this
is subsequently studied in section 7.4.3.
7.4.1 Preferences and choice
The standard utility function
Consider an individual with income I whose preferences can be described by a
quasilinear utility function. Later I explain how this speciﬁcation simpliﬁes the
analysis considerably but it is noteworthy to mention that it is not crucial to
obtain the results. Thus, let the following standard utility4 function represent her
preferences:
u(x,y)=x
α + y, 0 <α<1. (7.1)
Here, x and y are both bundles of goods. My concern here is only the bundle
of x goods. Within the bundle of indivisible x goods a distinction can be made
between x1 (the environmental damaging good) and x2 (the green product). These
goods are in principle good substitutes but each good has its own advantages
which will have to be weighed against each other. Thus, for example, if x is
the product ’wood’, then x1 and x2 may be tropical hardwood and certiﬁcated
wood guaranteeing forest preservation, respectively. The parameter δ reﬂects their
relative attractiveness as perceived by the individual in the following way:
x = x1 + δx2. (7.2)
4Standard refers here to the fact that normally dissonance is not an argument in the utility function, not
to the use of a quasilinear speciﬁcation.165 As i m p l em o d e l
Hence,
u(x1,x 2,y)=( x1 + δx2)
α + y. (7.3)
For simplicity, it is assumed that the x-goods are indivisible. Note that at most
one of the x-goods will consumed. As a shortcut, where no confusion can arise I
employ the notation u1 = u(x1,0,y) and u2 = u(0,x 2,y). Hence, ui denotes the
utility of consuming the bundle (x,y) knowing that good xi is consumed.
The extended utility function
I now wish to incorporate the unpleasant feeling, or dissonance, into the frame-
work. I propose the following extended utility function of an individual who
chooses product xj:
ˆ uj = uj − dj. (7.4)
This speciﬁcation gives credit to the thought that reducing dissonance, d,i n -
creases extended utility. Hence, reducing dissonance is a motivational factor. Cog-
nitive dissonance is measured by the relative attractiveness (in standard utility
terms) between the chosen alternative and the rejected good5. This seems reason-
able. Buying environmental damaging products creates dissonance, but less so if
their green counterparts are clearly inferior in quality. Let dj, denote dissonance
if good xj is consumed and good x−j is rejected, where j =1 ,2.T h e n :
dj = d(uj,u −j), (7.5)
5Note carefully the use of ’rejected’. It is possible that another good is valued positively but is out of the
budget restriction. In this sense, it is not rejected and causes no dissonance. Similarly, coerced regulations (such
as some taxes) that cannot be avoided do not cause dissonance. This is known in the psychological literature as

















and furthermore that uj = u−j implies d(uj,u −j)=d(u−j,u j).These conditions
are shown graphically in ﬁgure 7.1. Dissonance decreases as the chosen alternative
gets better or as the rejected alternative gets worse. Dissonance is maximal at the
point where both alternatives are equally attractive. (I therefore might as well
have labeled individuals as indiﬀerence averse.)
At this point, it is worthwhile to emphasize that the way dissonance is in-
corporated is not in contradiction with standard rationality assumptions. If the
standard utility function u represents the preference relation of the individual,
then, with the assumptions on (7.5), so does ˆ u.
Lemma 9 ˆ u is a monotonic transformation of u.167 As i m p l em o d e l
Proof. Iw a n tt os h o wt h a tu1 S u2 is equivalent to ˆ u1 S ˆ u2. Suppose ﬁrst that
u1 >u 2 for any given y.S i n c e∂d(uj,u −j)/∂uj < 0 and ∂d(uj,u −j)/∂u−j > 0
we have the following chain: d1 = d(u1,u 2) <d (u1,u 1) <d (u2,u 1)=d2. Hence,
ˆ u1 = u1 − d1 >u 2 − d2 =ˆ u2. The other cases are similar.
The intuition behind this result is the following. Suppose that good x1 is preferred
to x2.C h o o s i n gx1 causes some dissonance. But would x2 be consumed, and
consequently x1 be rejected, then dissonance would be even higher. This can also
be seen in ﬁgure 7.1. In the area left to the point u1, good x1 is preferred to x2
(u1 >u 2).A si sc l e a rf r o mt h eﬁgure, in this area the d2-curve is everywhere
above the d1-curve. This means that dissonance of rejecting x1 is higher than
dissonance of rejecting x2. Clearly, if both standard utility of x1 is higher and
dissonance is lower, then the extended utility of consuming x1 is also higher.
This result can be used to derive the individual’s choice without specifying dj.
I assume that the individual receives a lump-sum subsidy s from the government
conditional on consumption of the green good, x2. To simplify even more, I assume
that both bundles of goods are consumed and that all prices are unity. Finally,
v(p,I,s) deﬁnes the standard indirect utility function that gives the maximum
standard utility achievable at the prices, income and subsidies the individual
faces. It is then straightforward to show the following choice behavior (see also
ﬁgure 7.2):
Proposition 15 There exists a subsidy level ¯ s ≡ k1 − k2δ
α/(1−α) such that (i)
for all s<¯ s good x1 is consumed and v = I + k1 and for all s ≥ ¯ s good x2 is
consumed and v = I +s+δ
α
1−αk2, where k1 and k2 are positive constants and (ii)
¯ sδ < 0.
Proof. Let u(x,y)=xα + y and for simplicity px = py =1 .W ec a np r o c e e d
in two stages. First, an optimal (x,y) combination can be determined and then
the optimal (x1,x 2). Since it is assumed that y>0 and marginal utility of y is
equal to 1, it must be that an additional unit of x gives a marginal utility of
less than unity. Deﬁne ϕi =m i n∂u(x,y)/∂x s.th. ∂u(x,y)/∂x ≥ 1. Suppose x1 is
consumed. Then x1 is consumed up to the point where αx
α−1





Consumption of good y is determined by the budget restriction:
pyy
∗ = I − pxx
∗
1 ⇔ y
∗ = I − (α/ϕ1)
1/(1−α). (7.8)Chapter 7. Optimal Subsidies with Rationalizing Agents 168
FIGURE 7.2.
Substitution of the demand function in the utility function gives the indirect
utility function
v(p,I,s)=v(1,I,0) = I + k1, (7.9)
where k1 ≡ (α/ϕ1)α/(1−α) −(α/ϕ1)1/(1−α). (k1 > 0 for α<1.) Next, suppose that






The budget now includes the subsidy, hence in this case pyy∗ = I + s − pxx∗
2.
Indirect utility is in this case given by:
v(p,I,s)=I + s + k2δ
α/(1−α), (7.11)
where k2 ≡ (α/ϕ2)α/(1−α) − (α/ϕ2)1/(1−α). The individual consumes good x2 if
and only if indirect utility is higher, i.e. if I +s+k2δ
α/(1−α) ≥ I +k1 and equality
at the threshold subsidy level ¯ s. Hence:
¯ s ≡ k1 − k2δ
α/(1−α). (7.12)
Since k2 > 0, ¯ sδ < 0.169 As i m p l em o d e l
7.4.2 Rationalizing choice
The absence of any general principles or rules, either of personal or
administrative morality, which made it possible for him either to agree
or disagree with anybody according to what was wanted at the time. L.
Tolstoy, Resurrection.
Plagued by an unpleasant feeling, the individual then tries to rationalize her
choice. By focusing on certain arguments while ignoring others, she restructures
the problem as to convince herself that the choice she made was indeed the right
one. This means that if she chose good x1 she puts eﬀorts in trying to ﬁnd
arguments that bolster the choice of this good, and deprive the attractiveness of
the rejected good x2.I nc a s es h ec h o s eg o o dx2, she does just the reverse6.
In the model, the relative valuation of the two x goods is given by δ. The
p s y c h o l o g i c a lo rp h y s i c a le ﬀorts, e, are therefore reﬂe c t e di nac h a n g ei nδ. Let
this change, ∆δ,b eg o v e r n e db y :
∆δ = δ(γe− (1 − γ)e), (7.13)
with γ =1 if v1 ≤ v2 and
γ =0 if v1 >v 2.
where δ(0) = 0 and δ
0(·) > 0. For simplicity, it is also assumed that δ
00(·)=0 .
The properties of γ assure that someone who chose x1 decreases δ (making x1
look relatively more attractive) and someone who chose x2 increases δ (making
x2 look relatively more attractive), so that in both cases eﬀorts indeed rationalize
choice.
It goes without saying that, unlike the character of Tolstoy, for most people
rationalizing choice comes at a cost, c. Information has to be gathered, and re-
hearsed to recall later on, principles of decency have to be given up, mental eﬀorts
have to be put into convincing oneself of one’s rightness, and so forth. These costs
put a limit to the ability to change your opinion. Hence,
c = c(e), (7.14)
6Note that the timing is that ﬁrst decisions are made and that they are rationalized only afterwards. This
is in accordance with the psychological literature (see for example Festinger [1957]) but is not crucial to obtain
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where c(0) = 0, and with the usual assumptions c0(e) > 0 and c00(e) > 0.
In sum, the individual solves the following program:
e
∗ ∈ argmaxe≥0 ˆ v(e) − c(e), (7.15)
where ˆ v = v − d is indirect extended utility. Given the assumptions on δ(e) and
c(e) t h e r ei sau n i q u ee ﬀort level e∗ that optimizes attitudes. The next section
examines some properties of the optimal eﬀort level in relation to the subsidy
level.
7.4.3 The eﬀect of a subsidy
It is obvious that the optimal eﬀort level will somehow be related to the subsidy
level. The subsidy not only inﬂuences choice behavior and standard utility by
changing the budget restriction, but ultimately also extended utility through its
eﬀect on dissonance. One may conjecture that the eﬀorts put in rationalizing
behavior pay oﬀ most when dissonance is most severe. In this subsection I show
this conjecture to be true.
First, consider the eﬀect of a subsidy on the level of dissonance. A low subsidy
makes good x1 relatively attractive to purchase, and a high subsidy does the same
for good x2. Both a low and a high subsidy in itself therefore provide a good
rationalization of choice. In eﬀect, low and high subsidies create little dissonance.
It are the intermediate subsidy levels that create most dissonance, peaking at the
point of indiﬀerence. This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 10
∂d(·)
∂s > 0 for s<¯ s and
∂d(·)
∂s < 0 for s ≥ ¯ s.
Proof. Since v1 is constant in s, and v2 increasing in s (see prop. 1), it follows
straightforward from the assumptions on d that d(v1,v 2) is increasing in s and
d(v2,v 1) decreasing.
This immediately leads us to the conclusion that, without preference manage-
ment, up to a certain point (that is, ¯ s), increasing subsidies make individuals
worse oﬀ by creating dissonance. When the subsidy exceeds this level, however,
increasing subsidies makes individuals better oﬀ by enriching their consumption
level and taking away dissonance. Thus:
Proposition 16
∂ˆ v(·)
∂s < 0 for s<¯ s and
∂ˆ v(·)
∂s > 0 for s ≥ ¯ s.171 As i m p l em o d e l
Proof. For s<¯ s, by proposition 15 v(p,I,s) is constant in s and by lemma 10
dissonance is increasing in s.H e n c e ,ˆ v(p,I,s) is decreasing in s.F o rs ≥ ¯ s,b y
proposition 15 v(p,I,s) is increasing in s(see prop. 15) and (by lemma 10) d is
decreasing in s. Hence, ˆ v(p,I,s) is increasing in s.
The existence of dissonance depresses extended utility. The threshold level ¯ s is
t h ep o i n tw h e r ed i s s o n a n c ei sm o s ts e v e r e .I ti sa l s ot h ep o i n tw h e r et h ei n d i v i d u a l
gains most from rationalizing her choice. Dissonance decreases at subsidy levels
that are further away from this threshold, and so do the gains from rationalization.
In terms of optimal eﬀorts, this means that eﬀorts are increasing in the subsidy
level up to ¯ s, whereas for any higher subsidy level eﬀorts are decreasing:
Proposition 17 ∂e∗
∂s > 0 if s<¯ s and ∂e∗
∂s < 0if s ≥ ¯ s.























∂2ˆ v0(·)/∂e2 . (7.18)
Since ˆ v0(·) is maximal at e∗, the second-order condition already requires that
















The last equality follows from the fact that
∂2v0(·)
∂e∂s =0 .S i n c eγ =0we have that
˜ δ
0
(e) < 0 and because
∂2d(uj,u−j)
∂u2
−j > 0 we have that ∂e∗
∂s > 0 as stated. The case
where s ≥ ¯ s is similar but now γ =1so that ˜ δ
0
(e) > 0, and now
∂2d(uj,u−j)
∂u2
j > 0 is
as u ﬃcient condition for ∂e∗
∂s < 0.
Proposition 17 has the following consequences for the attitudes held. For low
subsidy levels (s<¯ s) dissonance can be reduced by decreasing δ. The higher
the subsidy, the more eﬀorts are made and, consequently, the larger the attitude
change. For high subsidy levels (s ≥ ¯ s)i ti so p t i m a lt oi n c r e a s eδ as comparedChapter 7. Optimal Subsidies with Rationalizing Agents 172
FIGURE 7.3.
to the initial beliefs. The higher the subsidy, the smaller the increase however. In
this range there is an inverse relationship between the subsidy and the attitude
change δ. This result is in accordance with much of the psychological literature
(see for example Aronson [1988] and section 7.3).
Figure 7.3 shows the implications of proposition 17 for the standard utility
function. The solid line v2 represents standard utility at any given subsidy level.
The dotted lines show the magnitude of the shift of the v2-curve. For example,
at point ˜ s, the standard utility function is shifted by the distance f so that the
new standard utility function of consuming x2 is given by v0
2.
Although strictly speaking the model is a static one, proposition 17 still gives
some hints to interesting dynamic implications. Suppose that the objective of
the government is to stimulate the consumption of green products. It may in
principle do so by providing any subsidy greater or equal than ¯ s. But proposition
17 suggests that the government does best by giving a subsidy exactly equal to
¯ s. In this way, the individual is stimulated most to change his attitude towards
the green product. The dynamic consequence is that this subsidy has the highest
chance of inducing persistent consumption of green products after removal of the
subsidy. A subsidy level of ˜ s, for instance, induces a shift of the v2-curve by the
distance f, enough to make the individual prefer the green product even at a173 Discussion
subsidy level of zero (see Figure 7.3)7. On the other hand, a higher subsidy level
like ˆ s does nothing to the attitude of individuals and removing the subsidy means
that the individual switches back to consumption of the environmental damaging
good. In sum, a high subsidy is ’too much of a good thing’: it aﬀects current choice,
b u ti tf a i l st oa ﬀect attitudes and therefore choice at any future time period. Note
also that according to the same logic, subsidies that are below the threshold level
may have undesired consequences in that people try to rationalize their choice
by degrading the green good. This is especially the case for subsidies near the
threshold level. Seen from a dynamic perspective, this means that it is better not
to subsidize at all than to subsidize a bit. The point is that the stimulation of
green goods can become unnecessarily very costly if the government fails to take
into account changes in attitudes. Subsidies that are not very well targeted are
costly: in a static as well as in a dynamical sense.
7.5 Discussion
Robustness
Proposition 17 is the main result of the chapter and it is therefore interesting to
see whether or not it can be generalized to other than quasilinear speciﬁcations
of the utility function. The interesting part of the proposition is that for subsidy
levels exceeding ¯ s, where there is a negative relationship between subsidies and
eﬀorts. The focus is therefore on this range of subsidies.
As usual, the sign of the change in eﬀort as a response to a change in the
subsidy is determined by the sign of the cross partial derivative of the objective
function; ∂2(ˆ v(e,s) − c(e))/∂e∂s.I ng e n e r a l ,w i t hˆ v = v − d this is given by:
sign











Note that the ﬁrst term measures the eﬀect of a subsidy on the marginal beneﬁts
of eﬀorts. In general, this eﬀect is positive: at higher subsidy levels, the individual
7It is fairly easy to show that attitudes can persist after withdrawal of the subsidy. Consider an individual
that faces subsidy level s and suppose that she makes eﬀorts to increase δ to δ0.B yp r o p o s i t i o n1 5 ,t h en e w
threshold subsidy level is s0 < s. Hence, there exists a range of subsidies smaller than s for which the individual
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spends more on good x2 and this increases the marginal beneﬁts of eﬀorts. Under
a quasilinear speciﬁcation, however, all additional income is spent on the y-good
and the eﬀect drops out, strengthening proposition 17. Note furthermore that if
an inverse relationship between eﬀorts and subsidies is indeed observed, then it
can only attributed to the dissonance term. Without dissonance, subsidies always
work as a reinforcer of making eﬀorts through the term ∂2v/∂e∂s.
Crowding-out
Crowding-out is an interesting phenomenon that is supported by a substantial
amount of empirical and experimental evidence (see e.g. Deci and Ryan [1985],
Frey [1997], Kohn [1993], and Chapters 1, 3, and 6). Crowding-out is said to occur
at instances where money has a perverse eﬀect on motivation. That is, rather than
being encouraging, higher rewards reduce the motivation to undertake a activity.
T h ec o m m o ni n t e r p r e t a t i o no ft h i se ﬀect is that, although higher rewards create
more external motivations to undertake an activity, at the same time it tends to
destroy the intrinsic motivation people have.8
The reduction in intrinsic motivation has sometimes been given a dissonance
reduction interpretation.9 Seen from that perspective, suﬃciently high rewards
provide enough external justiﬁcation to perform a task, whereas relatively low
rewards can only justify eﬀorts if people can convince themselves that the task
is intrinsically motivating. Intrinsic motivation is in the latter case likely to be
built up, whereas in the former case people feel no need to do so. Higher rewards
thus result in lower intrinsic motivation than lower rewards, mimicking the result
of the previous section (proposition 17). This result notwithstanding, cognitive
dissonance theory cannot explain true crowding-out. Higher rewards may give
less incentives to build intrinsic motivation, it does not give incentives to destroy
it. If anything, one would expect that higher rewards give more justiﬁcation to
undertake the rewarded activity, even if insigniﬁcantly so (see however the next
section for an explanation why higher rewards may undermine motivation after
all).
8In fact, crowding-out is not conﬁned to situations where rewards are provided. Other external motivations,
such as punishments, can produce the same result.
9See for example Dickens [1986] who presents a formal model where an increase in punishments can lead to
more criminal activity. His explanation is based on dissonance reduction.175 Discussion
Alternative explanations
It should at this point be noted that many of the experimental results put for-
ward by psychologists in fact do have an appealing more traditional economic
interpretation, namely, that the rewards are signals. To continue with the leading
example of this chapter, suppose that the quality of the green good is known to
be relatively low. This means that a relatively high subsidy is needed to make the
green good equally attractive as its environmental damaging counterpart. If, on
the other hand, the consumers cannot directly perceive the quality of the green
good, they may infer from a high subsidy that the quality must be low. In a
related paper, Bénabou and Tirole [2002] present a formal model where a higher
bonus signals a more diﬃcult task or lower ability to the agent who has to per-
form the task (see also Chapter 6). Under some conditions, this can lead to the
same predictions as proposition 17. High subsidies signal a low quality, and once
removed, the consumer is no longer willing to pay more for the green good. Low
subsidies may signal a high quality and result in permanent consumption of the
green good, even after withdrawal of the subsidy.
The reward as a signal is a reasonable alternative view, and it plays without
doubt a role in many situations. There are, however, experiments where a clear
signal is lacking and yet attitude changes still occur. For instance, in one study
children were oﬀered an opportunity to cheat but no payments were made what-
soever. They became more lenient towards cheating when they did not resist the
temptation (see Aronson [1988]). In the experiment from section 7.3 where women
were asked to rate several appliances, no new information was revealed during
the experiment because the rewarded appliance was given wrapped to them until
after their second rating. In the experiment by Lepper et al. [1973] where children
were given the task to draw a picture, it was told to the children that a reward
would follow just for drawing a picture, independent of the endresult. These re-
wards therefore carry no clear-cut information about their individual ability or
task diﬃculty. The result of decreased interest was replicated in a follow-up study
by Greene and Lepper [1974] where it was told to the children that all of them
would receive a reward for doing the task, again revealing no information. Fi-
nally, the experiment by Jones and Kohler [1959] where people were asked which
arguments they recalled, it is not obvious what kind of signal could have been
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A competing alternative interpretation from psychology to cognitive disso-
nance theory is self-perception theory, developed by Bem [1972]. This theory,
in essence, reverses the causality between attitudes and behavior. Self-perception
theory states that people infer their attitude from their behavior (see also chap-
ter 1 and section 2.3.5 of chapter 2 on self-signalling). Thus, the people in the
experiment of Festinger and Carlsmith [1959] who received $1 for telling the next
participants that the seminar is going to be a lot of fun, must have reasoned that,
because they did this for just one dollar, they really must have liked the seminar.
Even though this theory has many merits in many situations, it gives in many
instances ultimately the same behavioral predictions, and in some cases it is
somewhat less convincing as an explanation. First, the theory assumes imperfect
information about one’s self, which is more reasonable for people who try to
quit smoking for the ﬁrst time than for people who have already tried many
times before. It therefore depends on whether one believes that the people were
capable of valuing the seminar directly or had to infer this from their behavior.
Since the participants in this experiment were college men, one can safely assume
that they were capable of directly assessing the seminar10.F u r t h e r m o r e ,s e l f -
perception theory, as well as the signalling approach discussed above, assumes
that no physiological arousal takes place in any condition. However, as pointed
out earlier, such a physiological arousal has been measured to be present.
7.6 Conclusions
While psychologists have put great eﬀorts in understanding the formation of
preferences in order to explain changes in behavior, the economic approach insists
on explaining any changes in behavior by changes in income, relative prices, and
information. The purpose of this chapter is to show some of the consequences it
can have when attitude changes have been taken care of as well. Under, in my
view, fairly intuitive assumptions, I have been able to replicate the experimental
ﬁnding that low rewards induce more attitude change than high rewards.
10It is not unreasonable that self-perception theory becomes more relevant if a signiﬁcant time period has
elapsed between the action and evaluation. Since retrospective evaluations of past utilities are known not always
to be reliable (Kahneman [1994]), inferring preferences from past behaviour may be more accurate than from
recalled utilities. I do not know of any study which has worked this out.177 Conclusions
The focus of this chapter has been on a feeling of dissonance to explain the
data. Others have stressed the informational aspects. Likely, both elements are
present: informational signals and an unpleasant physiological arousal. Unfortu-
nately, in many cases the literature seems insuﬃciently conclusive in establishing
the relative weight of informational aspects. In my view, the results of this chap-
ter should be seen as complementary to a signalling interpretation. The latter
approach is taken up in Chapter 6. 8
Summary in Dutch
Beknopte inleiding in de onderwerpen
Vaak wordt er in economische modellen aangenomen dat mensen egoïstisch zijn en
alleen om geld en goederen geven. In veel gevallen kunnen op basis van deze veron-
derstellingen goede verklaringen geboden worden voor hoe mensen zich gedragen.
Maar er blijven ook veel onopgeloste vraagstukken over: waarom laten mensen
fooien achter? Waarom zijn ze soms minder gemotiveerd om iets te doen wanneer
er een beloning tegenover staat? Waarom verzamelen mensen zoveel informatie
nadat ze een aankoop hebben gedaan in plaats van dat vooraf te doen? En waarom
kopen mensen Max Havelaar koﬃe? Deze en andere vragen stel ik centraal in dit
proefschrift.
Om een antwoord te geven op bovenstaande vragen verwerk ik onderzoek uit
de psychologie in economische modellen. Zo stel ik bijvoorbeeld in navolging van
de psychologische literatuur dat mensen sociale waardering willen krijgen voor
hun gedrag. Andere concepten die ik overneem zijn bijvoorbeeld dat mensen hun
gedrag graag rationaliseren en dat ze onvolledige informatie over hun eigen per-
soonlijkheid hebben. Door economische modellen uit te breiden met dit soort
ideeën kan een verklaring gegeven worden voor veel gedrag dat afwijkt van stan-
daard economische modellen.
Het proefschrift is ingedeeld in twee centrale thema’s. Het eerste thema gaat
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geven. Het tweede thema betreft hoe mensen reageren op beloningen. Eerst ga ik
dieper in op deze twee thema’s. Vervolgens geef ik een inhoudelijk overzicht van
de individuele hoofdstukken.
Geven
De meeste mensen geven een behoorlijk bedrag weg aan familie, vrienden,
of liefdadigheidsinstellingen. Het gaat hier om uiteenlopende dingen zoals ver-
jaardagscadeaus en bloed, maar ook vrijwilligerswerk kan opgevat worden als een
gift. Men is geneigd om te denken dat het hier om vrijwillige en vrijblijvende
schenkingen gaat, maar niets is minder waar. In de werkelijkheid blijkt er een
sterke sociale druk te bestaan om iets terug te geven nadat men iets ontvangen
heeft. De ontvanger heeft als het ware een schuld uit staan die terug betaald moet
worden. Het is dan ook niet helemaal verwonderlijk dat vergif de tweede betekenis
van gift is.
Vanuit een economisch perspectief is het in eerste instantie verwonderlijk dat er
van alles weggegeven wordt, en slechts een klein deel daarvan in de vorm van geld.
Volgens de micro-economie kan geld nooit slechter zijn dan een cadeau. Immers,
de ontvanger kan met dat geld hetzelfde cadeau kopen, of iets wat hij nog liever
heeft. Maar als de ontvanger beter af is met geld, waarom geven we dan zo vaak
cadeaus?
Beloningen
Het tweede thema betreft hoe mensen reageren op beloningen. Doorgaans wordt
in de economie verondersteld dat een beloning in het vooruitzicht mensen mo-
tiveert. De reden hiervan is dat de nadruk meestal ligt op het directe eﬀect van
beloningen. Mensen geven om geld, dus het ligt voor de hand dat een beloning
hen stimuleert om harder te werken. Er zijn echter ook indirecte eﬀecten, soms
met een tegengestelde werking. Dit blijkt uit experimenten die door psychologen
zijn gedaan.
Een deel van die experimenten meet de zogeheten intrinsieke motivatie van
mensen. Met intrinsieke motivatie wordt bedoeld dat mensen gemotiveerd zijn
om bepaalde dingen te doen zelfs als er geen beloning tegenover staat of als ze
niet onder controle staan. Een goed voorbeeld zijn kinderen die ijverig werken aan
een puzzel. Het blijkt echter dat deze intrinsieke motivatie soms afneemt zodra een181
beloning wordt verstrekt. De kinderen gaan in eerste instantie nog harder aan de
slag, maar zodra de beloning weggenomen wordt zijn ze minder gemotiveerd dan
voorheen. Een indirect eﬀect van beloningen is dus het verdringen van intrinsieke
motivatie. Andere experimenten laten zelfs zien dat de motivatie direct afneemt
na het invoeren van een beloning. Zo nam het aanbod van bloeddonoren af nadat
een compensatie werd verstrekt, en kinderen wisten minder geld op te halen bij
een collecte nadat ze een kleine vergoeding kregen. Er zijn dus ’verborgen kosten
van beloningen’.
Er is nog een reeks experimenten die een onverwacht eﬀect van beloningen laat
zien. Het gaat hierbij om de invloed van beloningen op voorkeuren van mensen. In
de economie wordt verondersteld dat voorkeuren vastliggen. Psychologen hebben
echter gevonden dat mensen iets meer gaan waarderen wanneer ze er een kleine
beloning voor krijgen, terwijl dit eﬀect niet gevonden wordt bij een hoge beloning.
Zo woonden sommige mensen een uitgesproken saai seminar bij. Er werd hen
gevraagd de volgende groep luisteraars te zeggen dat het allemaal zeer interessant
zou worden. Een deel van hen kreeg daarvoor een kleine beloning, een ander deel
een ﬂinke beloning. Daarna werden ze gevraagd te zeggen wat ze er zelf van
vonden. Diegenen met een hoge beloning waardeerden het seminar laag, terwijl
diegenen met een lage beloning het hoog waardeerden.
Overzicht van de hoofdstukken
Het voorgaande is een beknopt overzicht van de verschillende thema’s uit dit
proefschrift. De thema’s worden dieper uitgewerkt in de hoofdstukken zelf. Het
proefschrift begint met een algemene inleiding in het onderwerp psychologie en
economie. De overige hoofdstukken zijn ruwweg ingedeeld naar de twee thema’s.
Hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 5 gaan in op de vraag waarom mensen geven. De
nadruk in hoofdstukken 3, 6 en 7 ligt op de eﬀecten van beloningen. Dit onder-
scheid is uiteraard enigszins kunstmatig, want in brede zin zijn beloningen soms
ook giften, en andersom. Hieronder volgt een overzicht van de inhoud van de in-
dividuele hoofdstukken, zonder diep in te gaan op de modellen en verklaringen.
Het is vooral bedoeld als leidraad.
Hoofdstuk 2. In dit hoofdstuk worden redenen uiteengezet waarom mensen
geven. Er zijn veel redenen denkbaar: altruïsme, ruil, rechtvaardigheid, signalen
geven en sociale waardering komen allen aan bod. Echter, niet allen zijn evenChapter 8. Summary in Dutch 182
geloofwaardig als verklaringen. Zoals gezegd zijn er twee bijzonderheden aan
geefgedrag: bijna altijd wordt iets teruggegeven (reciprociteit) en bijna nooit in
geld (inadequaatheid). Met deze twee kenmerken in gedachten wordt de verklar-
ingskracht van iedere theorie beoordeeld.
Een eerste voor de hand liggende verklaring is dat mensen een ruil beogen met
het geven van cadeaus aan elkaar. Dit kan inderdaad een goede verklaring zijn mits
mensen geduldig genoeg zijn, want ze krijgen bijna nooit meteen een cadeau terug.
Altruïsme lijkt aannemelijk, maar kan niet verklaren waarom mensen zo zelden
geld geven in plaats van cadeaus. Het verklaart dus maar een klein deel van alle
cadeau’s. Een andere verklaring is rechtvaardigheid. Maar er wordt aannemelijk
gemaakt dat dit niet alles kan verklaren, want in sommige experimenten hande-
len mensen in strijd met de veronderstelde rechtvaardigheidstheorieën. De vraag
naar sociale waardering kan deze experimenten wel verklaren, en ook waarom
giften inadequaat zijn en bovendien waarom er reciprociteit bestaat (zie vooral
hoofdstuk 3). Een andere, wellicht minder voor de hand liggende verklaring, is
d a tm e n s e ni e t sw i l l e ns i g n a l e r e nm e th u ng e e f g e d r a g ,b i j v o o r b e e l dh o er i j kz e
zijn of hoe goed ze de ontvanger kennen. Het kan zelfs zo zijn dat iemand iets aan
zichzelf laat zien, bijvoorbeeld dat hij rechtvaardig is omdat hij fooien achterlaat
terwijl hij net zo goed het restaurant had kunnen verlaten zonder fooi.
Het hoofdstuk eindigt met een discussie waarin ik pleit voor een hybride ver-
klaring. Bijvoorbeeld: mensen geven niet omdat ze eerlijk zijn maar omdat ze
eerlijk willen lijken en daar sociale waardering voor krijgen. Verder beargumenteer
ik dat het belangrijk is om te weten met welk doel mensen geven voordat een
institutie ontworpen wordt. Zo kan het bijvoorbeeld averechts werken om mensen
te belonen voor hun gift als ze dit doen om sociale waardering te krijgen.
Hoofdstuk 3 borduurt voor op de gedachte dat mensen geven teneinde so-
ciale waardering te krijgen. Allereerst probeer ik aan te tonen dat mensen om
sociale waardering geven en dat hier een element van status in zit: mensen willen
vooral meer gewaardeerd worden dan hun buren. Op basis hiervan verklaar ik
reciprociteit en adequaatheid. Reciprociteit volgt uit het status eﬀect: Wanneer
iemand geeft krijgt hij daarvoor waardering en dit motiveert de ontvanger om ook
te geven teneinde ook die waardering te krijgen. De eerste gever krijgt het liefst
meer waardering dan de ontvanger. Door geen geld te geven maar cadeaus, maakt
hij het duurder voor de ontvanger om iets terug te geven en blijft hij voorop
lopen in de race om status. Bovendien verklaart deze theorie waarom mensen183
meer geven als ze hiervoor publiekelijk bedankt worden, zoals vaak het geval is
bij liefdadigheid. Door de publiekelijke bekendheid die eraan gegeven wordt is het
mogelijk om sociale waardering te krijgen, zelfs als de directe ontvanger anoniem
blijft.
Er valt een interessante relatie te leggen tussen de theorie uit dit hoofdstuk en
die van averechtse eﬀecten van beloningen. Er wordt sociale waardering gegeven
voor een gift omdat een gift een opoﬀering is voor de gever. Het belonen van
giften maakt de opoﬀering kleiner, en bijgevolg ook de sociale waardering. Een
compensatie voor geven kan op deze manier averechts werken.
Vervolgens wordt in hoofdstuk 4 geefgedrag bekeken vanuit een meer macro-
economisch perspectief. Wanneer men veronderstelt dat het geven en wedergeven
een ruil ten doel heeft, dan lijkt het aannemelijk dat op termijn het marktmech-
anisme al het geefgedrag zal verdringen. Naarmate de markt groeit in omvang
wordt deze eﬃciënter en wordt geven een slechter alternatief.
Echter, in dit hoofdstuk wordt beargumenteerd dat geefgedrag niet alleen als
ruilmechanisme dient, maar ook symbolische waarde heeft. Hoofdstuk 3 ging
eerder al in op de gedachte dat een gift sociale waardering teweegbrengt. Deze
symbolische waarde komt niet tot stand via het marktmechanisme omdat deze
een betrekkelijk anoniem karakter heeft. Hierdoor wordt geefgedrag niet in zijn
geheel verdrongen. Het model laat tevens zien dat geefgedrag kan blijven bestaan
ondanks dat de markt eﬃciënter zou zijn geweest. Bovendien kan het voorkomen
dat de markt al het geven verdringt terwijl geven meer eﬃciënt is.
In de voorgaande hoofdstukken is er beargumenteerd dat er om verschillende re-
denen nut ontleend wordt aan geefgedrag. In hoofdstuk 5 worden de consequenties
hiervan nader beschouwd. Er wordt verondersteld dat mensen graag een meerprijs
willen betalen voor goederen die geproduceerd zijn met behulp van technieken die
sociale externaliteiten verminderen. Met sociale externaliteiten worden bijvoor-
beeld productiemethoden bedoeld die schadelijke eﬀecten op het milieu hebben,
maar ook die gebruik maken van kinderarbeid of een onrechtvaardig laag loon
betalen. De meerprijs voor producten met minder sociale externaliteiten kan als
een gift aan de werknemers of aan de maatschappij opgevat worden.
Problematisch is dat consumenten niet kunnen beoordelen welke techniek de
producent gebruikt heeft. Ze kunnen bijvoorbeeld niet zien of er gebruik is gemaakt
van kinderarbeid. Daarom zullen ze niet bereid zijn om een meerprijs te betalen.Chapter 8. Summary in Dutch 184
Op hun beurt zijn producenten niet bereid te investeren in productiemethoden
met minder sociale externaliteiten.
Er worden twee manieren bekeken om dit probleem op te lossen: een standaard
invoeren, of labels invoeren. Wanneer de overheid een standaard op de produc-
tiemethode invoert, dan betekent dat dat alle consumenten gedwongen zijn om
het product tegen die standaard te kopen, of om niets te kopen. Wanneer labels of
certiﬁcaten worden ingevoerd dan krijgt de producent (en daarmee de consument)
de vrijheid om te produceren volgens hun eigen gekozen productietechniek of vol-
gens de techniek waarvoor ze een certiﬁcaat krijgen. De consumenten met een hoge
betalingsbereidheid zullen het gecertiﬁceerde goed kopen, die met een lagere be-
talingsbereidheid het ongecertiﬁceerde goed. Vervolgens wordt bekeken welke van
de twee mogelijkheden sociaal optimaal is. Er wordt gevonden dat een certiﬁcaat
beter is voor een interval van consumentenheterogeniteit. Wanneer consumenten
of relatief homogeen zijn of relatief heterogeen, dan is een standaard welvaarts-
maximaliserend.
Hoofdstuk 6 bestudeert de eﬀecten van beloningen op zelfvertrouwen in een
principaal-agent model. Het model is een uitbreiding op de literatuur die laat
zien dat een bonus een signaal kan zijn dat het een moeilijke taak betreft of
dat de principaal de talenten van de agent laag inschat. Dit verklaart waarom
beloningen negatieve consequenties kunnen hebben. In die literatuur is de focus
gericht op beloningen zoals vastgelegd in een contract. In dit hoofdstuk wordt
de aanname gemaakt dat de uitkomst alleen geobserveerd kan worden door de
principaal. Dit maakt een contract onmogelijk. Er wordt dus gekeken naar het
eﬀect van onverwachte beloningen.
Dit hoofdstuk biedt een mogelijke verklaring waarom onverwachte beloningen
in eerste instantie gegeven worden. Een cruciale veronderstelling hierbij is dat de
principaal over meer informatie beschikt dan de agent wat betreft succesvolheid.
De principaal weet of de opdracht een succes is of niet, terwijl de agent slecht een
idee hierover kan vormen. De theorie heeft dus betrekking op situaties waar de
agent nog in een leerfase zit: een kind die piano leert spelen of een werknemer die
pas begonnen is aan zijn nieuwe baan. Een andere mogelijkheid is dat de agent
geen overzicht op het geheel van activiteiten omdat hij zich specialiseert op een
klein onderdeel ervan, terwijl de principaal het totale proces kan overzien.
In deze opzet kan een onverwachte beloning een signaal zijn dat de agent het
tot een succes heeft weten brengen. Een beloning is dus goed nieuws. Dit schroeft185
het zelfvertrouwen van de agent omhoog, die op zijn beurt de volgende periode
meer gemotiveerd is. We contrasteren dit met de literatuur die laat zien hoe een
bonus slecht nieuws kan geven. We geven een conditie aan wanneer een beloning
goed nieuws is. Deze conditie sluit goed aan bij de vele experimentele resultaten.
In het laatste hoofdstuk, hoofdstuk 7, wordt er gekeken naar veranderingen
in preferenties. Terwijl de prikkels om gedragsveranderingen teweeg te brengen
uitgebreid bestudeerd zijn, is er weinig aandacht geweest binnen economie naar
veranderingen in voorkeuren. Sociaal psychologen hebben daarentegen veel aan-
d a c h tb e s t e e da a nd ev o r m i n gv a np r e f e r e n t i e s ,w a a r b i jz eh e b b e np r o b e r e na a n
te tonen dat voorkeuren niet stabiel zijn. Voorkeuren lijken inderdaad niet stabiel
te zijn, maar in veel gevallen wel voorspelbaar. In dit hoofdstuk worden prikkels
en veranderingen in voorkeuren onderzocht. Veel van de veranderingen kunnen
verklaard worden door aan te nemen dat mensen hun keuze achteraf rationalis-
eren.
Het basisidee is dat mensen er een onaangenaam gevoel bij krijgen (cognitieve
dissonantie) wanneer hun geloof en gedrag niet consistent zijn met elkaar (bijvoor-
beeld, je rookt terwijl dat je gelooft dat het slecht is). Om van dit onaangename
gevoel af te komen kun je je gedrag proberen te rationaliseren, dus jezelf ervan te
overtuigen dat je de goede keuze hebt gemaakt. Dit kan bijvoorbeeld door infor-
matie te zoeken die overeenkomt met je gedrag, en informatie te vermijden die er
niet mee in overeenstemming is.
Als toepassing wordt in dit hoofdstuk speciale aandacht besteed aan consump-
tiegoederen met minder sociale externaliteiten, zoals milieuvriendelijke producten
(zie ook hoofdstuk 5). Het belangrijkste resultaat is dat een lage subsidie op dit
soort goederen een positieve verandering in de voorkeur ervoor teweegbrengt,
maar een hoge subsidie niet. Dit komt overeen met resultaten uit experimenten.
De conclusie is dan ook dat hoge subsidies teveel van het goede zijn: ze beïnvloe-
den het gedrag op dat moment maar niet dat van in de toekomst. References
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